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("we keep coming
back and coming back
to the vision of displacement at the site of
enactment, procurement,
debasement, transsubstanti ation, fulmination,
culmination
.)
--Peter Seaton

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Despite the tendency of the semiotic process to be openended and relatively indeterminate, determination takes
place all the time, has always taken place, and will always
take place, over and above the efforts of individual
thinkers .... The problem then becomes that of defining the
conditions under which such a violent arrestation--in other
words: institution--takes place.
--Samuel Weber
Today, how can we not speak of the University?
--Jacques Derrida

Given the incredible amount of critical work done on
the subject, a study of "postmodernism" requires words of
justification as much as it requires words of introduction.
A good deal of literary critical ink has recently been
spilled over each of the topics and writers I consider here:
certainly Derrida, Foucault, Heidegger, and Pynchon are not
new names to the discipline of literary criticism; and
Sukenick, McElroy and "Language" poetry, while they may be
new names to some, are likewise well commented upon.

In

fact, so much work has been done on these topics and authors
that simply to add to the bibliography seems not only
pointless, but also in some sense irresponsible-irresponsible insofar as it surreptitiously feeds a growing
institutional framework without questioning the processes of
(that) institution, as well as their consequences.

Hence my
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study takes a different tack.

Throughout, I will try to

emphasize the role(s) of the discipline of literary
criticism--and, by extension, the roles of the university-in the production and control of meaning, while
simultaneously trying to recognize and account for my own
status as a literary critic, as a person who teaches and
studies literature within an institution.

This will

necessarily entail, throughout, my engagement with what
Jacques Derrida has called "a double gesture," a dual
engagement which attempts to think the necessary,
indispensable work of the university "even while going as
far as possible, theoretically and practically, in the most
directly underground thinking about the abyss beneath the
university" (''Principle" 17).

This double gesture will,

hopefully, allow me to investigate important questions about
postmodern literature and literary theory, but also to
investigate the problems raised by the institutionalized
nature of my own work.
While scholarly work of all types should attempt to
take account of the functions of institutionalization, it
seems especially important when discussing the literary
manifestations of "postmodernism" and "theory"--the two
generic categories that this work most easily fits into, and
the two topics it treats most closely.

First, and most

obviously, there quite literally would be no categories
"postmodernism" and ''theory" if it were not for a
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disciplinary apparatus that classifies phenomena in order to
study them--a process, as Michel Foucault points out, which
actually creates that which a discipline wishes to study by
securing its proper object, its field of study. 1

It is

important to note, though, a peculiar kind of doubling of
this problem with respect to the institutionalization of
postmodernism and theory.

A seemingly obvious problem is

created by the institutional character of postmodernism and
theory:

both postmodern literature and theory--if one could

speak of their "generic" forms and put aside for the moment
the questionable nature of that opposition--tend to
emphasize the "open-ended and relatively indeterminate
semiotic process" that Samuel Weber points out in one of the
epigraphs to this chapter; but the process(es) of
institution, on the other hand, tend to emphasize the
"inevitable" closure of limits, the importance of
determinate or determining institutional programs of
decision-making or standard-setting.

In other words, while

the discursive claims and manifestations of postmodernism
tend to emphasize the irreducibility of meaning and the
inevitability of various kinds of indeterminacy, the
processes of the institution and the functioning of the
apparatuses of professionalism seem, for the most part, to

1see

The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 31/44ff. Here
and throughout this work, wherever a translation and ,an
original are both cited, I cite the translation page number
first.
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remain undisturbed.

One sees this especially (and

ironically) in theoretical writing, where--to return to
Weber's vocabulary--"individual thinkers'' of indeterminacy
often suffer "violent arrestation" at the hands of fellow
theorists, both "competing" theorists and well-meaning
followers.

Competing theorists are likely to "violently

arrest" a text in order to reduce it to a determinate,
criticizable or surpassable position, while sympathetic
followers are more likely to arrest a theorist's work in
transforming it into an interpretative grid, an aid to
producing determinate readings.
One might conclude from this paradox that the
"practice" of criticism simply has not caught up with the
"theory," and that what is necessary is some discussion
concerning how to close the gap--to make theory more
determinable in practice--or, in an anti-theory mode, a
discussion of the inevitability of the gap between theory
and practice.2

I defer these important and necessary

discussions for the time being, to point out instead that
what tends to go unexamined in such discussions is the
surreptitious forwarding of a certain institutional interest
in determination itself, in arresting what purports to be an

2one sees the former proposition played out in any
number of theory-practice primers, from books as disparate
as Eagleton's Literary Theory and Norris' Deconstruction:
Theory and Practice. The latter "anti-theory" mode is found
in the work of the "new pragmatists"--see Mitchell's
Against Theory.
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open-ended process in the service of "professional,"
institutional ends.

As Paul Bove points out in

Intellectuals in Power, even the most trenchant politically
or theoretically oppositional criticism can serve to
legitimate the hegemonic functions of the university through
"the endless repositioning of intellectuals vis-A-vis other
intellectuals in their battles for social rewards" (224).
Determining the adequacy of competing critical positions
tends to leave contemporary theorists in the uncomfortably
Arnoldian position of moral judge or arbiter who can secure
a position above the fray of mere opinion--a role, as Bove
points out, which "is essentially a legitimation of status
quo intellectual life" (223).
critic~l

Such determination and

jousting can, in other words, serve to protect

certain hegemonic power structures (both theoretical and
institutional) while attempting simultaneously to criticize
or undermine these structures.
In "The Profession of Theory," 3 David Kaufmann
summarizes the problems of institutionalization and theory
when he writes that, despite the many important questions it
poses,
Recent theory ... has precipitated the latest in a
century-long history of pseudocrises that have

3It is important to note that this essay was published

in a very noticeable place within the profession: an issue
of PMLA devoted to "The Politics of Critical Language" (May,
1 990) •
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functioned to protect the institutionalization of
literature in the academy .... Theory--like its
discontents--helps keep the world safe for lit. crit.
[sic]" (522).
This, of course, creates a dicey problem for a study which
would want to take account of the forces and problems of
institutionalization vis-a-vis literary criticism; in the
face of this insight--that simply criticizing a power
structure may actually help it to perform its work--the
question becomes, then, how to think against a structure
while one is irreducibly within that structure--when there
is no pure space "outside" from which one can criticize or
judge?

Or, to phrase the same problematic somewhat

differently, how does one think "practice'' when it can no
longer simply be governed (or have its results guaranteed)
by a determinate or determining "theory"?

The question

becomes, in Reiner SchCrmann's words, what happens "once
'thinking' no longer means securing some rational foundation
upon which one may establish the sum total of what is
knowable and once 'acting' no longer means conforming one's
daily enterprises, both public and private, to the
foundation so secured" (1)?

This, I will argue, is the

question of the postmodern:

insofar as almost any notion of

the postmodern is characterized by the absence of a pure,
grounding "rational foundation," the question of how to
proceed without this grounding purity shows itself to be the
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most crucial question for a time or place we would call
postmodern.

Also~

it will be my contention throughout this

work that the question of the postmodern is irreducibly both
a systematic (philosophical or theoretical) and an
institutional (pragmatic or worldly) question.

I will take

up the "systematic" aspects of this question beginning with
chapter 2 and its examination of Derrida and literary
criticism, and will focus primarily on the ''institutional"
questions in this chapter--though this distinction will,
hopefully, become more and more dubious as I proceed.
Chapter 3 will continue to examine literary criticism as an
institutional system in relation to Foucault's texts.

I

will hold in reserve the question of theories of the
postmodern until chapter 4, at which time I will also broach
the question of postmodern literature.

Chapters 5 and 6

will deal with the institutional and systematic problems
raised by specific postmodern texts--Thomas Pynchon's
Gravity's Rainbow and "Language" poetry, respectively.

"In the Interest of Professionalism":
Literary Criticism, Theory, and the Institutional
Question of the Postmodern
We have seen, then, that there is an initial tension
between the ''interests" of institutionalization and those of
postmodernism and theory--namely, institutionalization tends
to undermine the openness that much postmodern theory calls
for.

As David Kaufmann continues in "The Profession of
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Theory," the upshot of this is that "literary critics are
confronted by a series of interesting but ultimately
frustrating aporias" (528), paramount among them the
frustrating realization--similar to Bove's above--that
theory "has militated against the tendencies of [academic]
specialization at the same time that it has acted as their
agent" (528).

Kaufmann goes on to sum up the dilemma that

these aporias leave to the literary critic:
To practice theory is to help the very divisions and
forms of domination that theory seeks to overcome.

By

the same token, however, to give up critical, truly
critical thought in the academy would be to strangle
such thought in the only cradle it has left and to
sacrifice what we still have of our best hopes. (528)
This is an eloquent phrasing of the disciplinary and
institutional consequences surrounding what I have called
the question of the postmodern:

how does an oppositional

critic proceed when no position "outside" can be secured,
when theorizing in an attempt to undermine a system or
institution runs the risk of actually "help[ing] the very
divisions and forms of domination that theory seeks to
overcome"?

Certainly one cannot simply "give up critical,

truly critical thought in the academy," but how do we make
thought or action "truly critical" if the category which
would ground such a criticism--truth--has withdrawn?
Kaufmann--like so many others who formulate the question of
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the postmodern--has no answers to these "ultimately
frustrating aporias," precisely because they are, in his
eyes, ultimately frustrating:
unsolvable dilemmas.

that is, in the end, they are

His essay concludes:

What remains, then, is hardly the stuff of heady
perorations:

the desire for an integrity that will

sell itself neither cheaply nor easily and the hardened
edge of an irony that, in the words of one of our less
fashionable poets, "will not scare." (528)
What remains, in other words, is an impasse:

the desire to

recuperate a grounding integrity "must constantly fail"
(528)--dashed by the hardened (though, he seems to suggest,
ultimately frivolous) edge of a theoretical irony which
posits the impossibility of such a ground.
Kaufmann's assessment of the paralyzed state in which
the discipline of literary criticism finds itself is quite
similar to Paul de Man's in "Shelley Disfigured," his essay
on The Triumph of Life written for Deconstruction and
Criticism.

Toward the end of the essay, de Man takes stock

of "our present critical and literary scene":
It functions along monotonously predictable lines, by
the historicization and the aesthetification of texts,
as well as by their use, as in this essay, for the
assertion of methodological claims made all the more
pious by their denial of piety.

Attempts to define, to

understand, or to circumscribe romanticism in relation
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to ourselves and in relation to other literary
movements are all part of this naive belief.

The

Triumph of Life warns us that nothing, whether deed,
word, thought, or text, ever happens in relation,
positive or negative, to anything that precedes,
follows or exists elsewhere, but only as a random event
whose power, like the power of death, is due to the
randomness of its occurrence .... [The Triumph of Life]
also warns us why and how these events then have to be
reintegrated into a historical and aesthetic system of
recuperation that repeats itself regardless of the
exposure of its fallacy. (68-9, my emphasis)
De Man's focus here is "systematic" while Kaufmann's is
primarily "institutional" (though already this distinction
becomes problematic, since each is dependent on the other
and both on a ground that seems to be eroding).

But while

de Man clearly has a different agenda than Kaufmann, they
share a similar concern--the state of literary criticism in
the absence of a transcendental ground--and a strikingly
similar conclusion:

in the absence of a "beyond" which

could ground criticism, it is doomed to a "recuperation that
repeats itself regardless of the exposure of its fallacy,"
destined to follow "monotonously predictable lines,"
endlessly concerning itself with Kaufmann's "interesting but
ultimately frustrating aporias."

In short, they both

reiterate that the determinate and determining practice of

criticism can never "catch up with" the indeterminacy
posited by literary theory--that the impasse cannot be
resolved, and we are left with no choice but to go on as if
the problems, fallacies, chiasmi, and aporias revealed by
theory could be put aside.

They both seem to grant the

undisplacable imminence of an inevitable, nihilistic impasse
for the discipline of literary criticism--an impasse that
locates itself at the site of the question of the
postmodern. 4
This widely recognized and discussed impasse, though,
certainly has not curtailed the production of literary
criticism and theory--quite the contrary.

In fact, an

entire "theory industry" has grown up around literature
departments in the past 20 years, and with this industry has
come the increasingly specialist professionalization of
4It should be noted that de Man tends to see this
impasse itself as a new rigor that "refuses to be
generalized into a system" (69), but my point here is that
this undecidable de Manian impasse becomes generalizable
when it grants the imminence of the present system. De Man
here does not attempt to displace what he feels is a bogus
aestheticist/historicist opposition, but focuses on the
undecidability brought about by this opposition in Shelley's
Triumph, and then argues that this "process differs entirely
from recuperative and nihilistic allegories of historicism"
(69). I'm not so sure: while I have no problem with
arguing that undecidability is unescapable, it seems
precisely a "nihilist allegory" to grant the simple
inevitability of the system which engenders this
undecidability--to argue that this process is destined
always and everywhere to fall short (which is why for de Man
it is "historically more reliable than the products of
historical archeology" [69]). See Chapter 2 for a more
detailed discussion of this topic vis-a-vis Derrida's (much
different) notions of undecidability and history.
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theory and interpretation.

As Kaufmann points out, the

impasse at or in which literary criticism finds itself has
not had the cooling effect that one would expect on the
profession(alization) of literature studies; rather, the
impasse has fueled this profession(alization)--the most
frustrating of Kaufmann's aporias--and given rise to a
plethora of book series, journals, symposia, and
dissertations (like this one) in which "specialists" attempt
to diagnose criticism's illness.
The institutional metaphor of medicine here is, in some
sense, unavoidable, as is the implicit disciplinary
comparison. 5 While medical care and technology have
certainly "improved" in the last 20 years (and continue to
do so), the discipline has concomitantly gotten more
specialized; and while medicine's improvements and
discoveries have certainly had liberating effects (saving
and improving the quality of patients' lives), they do
continue to exercise a certain kind of (perhaps more
insidious) control--a kind of "discursive" control begins to
show itself as, for example, more and more tests as well as
second and third opinions become "necessary." 6 While

5see Weber's "The Vaulted Eye: Remarks on Knowledge
and Professionalism," where he makes several striking
comparisons between medicine and teaching--which have
surpassed the law as the "exemplary professions" (45).
6This is, of course, not to mention the more obvious
problem that medicine and the academy share: access
(rather, the lack of access) for the underprivileged.
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medical care generally improves as more specialized tests
and more layers of interpretation are added to the process
of diagnosis, these tests and layers of interpretation--both
of which are applications of "progressive" methodologies
discovered by the discipline--begin to exercise their own
kind of control, and can lead to frustrating interpretative
or diagnostic impasses.

And while "progress" in the

discipline of literary criticism certainly never saved or
even necessarily improved the quality of anyone's life
outside the discipline (as the progress made by the
disciplines of social work, psychoanalysis, and even
computer science could be said to have), I think the
disciplinary comparison remains apt:

literary. criticism,

like medicine, has seen an unprecedented rise in
specialization in the last 20 years, and while this rise
most certainly has opened up (one could say "improved'') the
theory and practice of both disciplines, it has also brought
along with it a different kind of control--a "discursive''
control that, because it is difficult to recognize, often
goes unanalyzed.

I also stress the (seemingly outlandish

and digressive) comparison between the disciplines of
literary criticism and medicine to emphasize that, for
either discipline, it is not simply or primarily a matter of
going back to some pre-specialized "golden age"--even if
such a regression were deemed possible or desirable.

It

would obviously be ludicrous to say, for example, that human
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sciences like medicine have not "progressed''--that a cancer
patient is not better off today than he or she was 20, 30 or

so

years ago.

Likewise, in discussing the

professionalization of literary criticism, it is not a
matter of attempting to recuperate a picture of the critic
akin to Norman Rockwell's series of general-practitioner
paintings--a folksy generalist whose individualism would
stubbornly keep him out of an institutional setting; nor,
however, is it a matter of simply apologizing for the
disciplinary progress that professional specialization seems
to allow.

I must reiterate here the importance of the

double gesture in this analysis:

it would obviously be

disingenuous of me simply to criticize or undermine a
profession to which I "belong" and in which I work; but it
is not, within this same reiteration, exclusively a matter
of accepting the status quo vision of professional life.

It

is rather a matter of asking how and why it is that this
process of institutionalization and professionalization can
seem to be inevitable--unable to be disrupted.

If Kaufmann

is correct when he asserts that "Professors of literature
can neither submit to professionalization nor resist it"
(528), this seems to beg certain questions:

questions about

submission and resistance from within, about the seemingly
totalizing conditions of this institutional specialization,
about how and why institution leads to a paralyzing impasse
for those who would want to study or disrupt it--questions
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about, in other words, the institutionalization of theory
and the institutionalization of the question of the
postmodern.
Kaufmann's, though, is certainly not the only version
of the disciplinary role of theory within the university.
Jonathan Culler, in Framing the Sign:

Criticism and Its

Institutions, puts forth a much more positive picture of
contemporary theory within the academy.

He characterizes

theory as
anti-disciplinary, challenging not only the boundaries
of disciplines, on whose legitimacy the university
seems to depend, but also on these disciplines' claims
to judge writing that touches their concerns.

In

practice, 'theory' contests the right of psychology
departments to control Freud's texts, of philosophy
departments to control Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger. (245)

For Culler, theory, rather than adding to a kind of
discursive disciplinary control, precisely disperses such
claims of control by questioning the "disciplines' claims to
judge writing that touches their concerns."

For Culler,

theory does not secure and protect a disciplinary knowledge,
but rather it is the "subversion of the articulation of
knowledge" (25), a subversion which leads to "changes which
repeatedly transgress university boundaries" (25) and open
up the disciplines.

While this is certainly a more positive
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picture of the role of theory in the university, it does not
seem to silence Kaufmann's objections.

Indeed, it seems to

begin forwarding precisely what Kaufmann sees as an overenthusiasm concerning the "liberating'' role of theoretical
discourse, as well as surreptitiously broaching the
"unwanted" professionalization of thinking that inevitably
comes with the institution of theory.
In fact, Culler's discussion turns out to be a sort of
hommage to the institution of theory--almost unbelievably
so, especially given the way he traces the rise of literary
professionalism.

For example, in discussing the importance

of the refereed journal in bringing about the institution of
theory, he writes:
One can argue that the system of publication exists not
just to accredit professionals (a system of degrees
would do that) but to distinguish those accredited from
providers of services (such as nurses and school
teachers), to accredit them as participants in an
autonomous enterprise--a quest for knowledge--where in
principle projects are not imposed by outside forces
but flow from the critic's own curiosity or from the
so-called 'needs' of the field itself. (29)
While Culler is here simply summarizing the rise of literary
professionalism, this certainly sounds like the beginnings
of a theoretical and ideological critique of the
professionalizing role of journals:

they serve to
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"distinguish" literary professionals from mere "providers of
services," and foster what could only be called a mystifying
and theoretically indefensible portrait of the critic as a
kind of individualist genius whose "projects are not imposed
by outside forces" or institutions, but rather "flow from
the critic's own curiosity" in the name of "an autonomous
enterprise," a seemingly disinterested "quest for
know 1edge. " 7
Indeed, Culler's summary of the rise of professionalism
continues in such a way that a sort of demystifying reading
of literary criticism's professionalist fictions seems both
necessary and imminent.

For example, still summarizing,

Culler quotes Christopher Jencks and David Riesman's The
Academic Revolution: "Professionalism, [they write], is
'colleague-oriented rather than client-oriented'" (29).
Culler does not comment on this quotation, but again
criticism of it seems imminent, if for no other reason than
such a claim--that literary criticism exists out$ide a
commodity system--seems especially specious in the context
of Culler's discussion of the professional centrality of
journals, which rather obviously have to be "clientoriented" in order to compete for a shrinking theory dollar

7For just such a ideological critique of the role of
the critic, see Said's The World, the Text, and the Critic-especially the introduction, "Secular Criticism."
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in an increasingly competitive market. 8

Likewise, when

Culler notes that "In the academy, professionalism ties
one's identity to an expertise and hence to a field in which
one might be judged expert by one's peers" (29, my
emphasis), it seems precisely a prolegomena to a sort of
Foucaultian argument--perhaps like the one sketched out by
Kaufmann above--concerning the processes by which the
supposedly "liberating" discourses of theory lead to a
proliferation of other (more insidious) means of control,
the process by which "professionalism ties one's identity to
an expertise. "9
No such critique, however, is forthcoming from Culler.
Rather, he celebrates professionalism precisely in the terms
it seemed he was sure to undermine:
The connection between criticism and the continuing
professional evaluation on which promotions, grants,
and prestige depend may thus generate a more
specialized, yet more innovative criticism than would
some other arrangement.

The need to make an 'important

8cf. Weber's discussion of Burton Bledstein's work on
"the culture of professionalism": the professional seeks to
define his services as having "predominantly a use-value,
not an exchange value. It is precisely in the effort to
distinguish himself from the businessman, on the one hand,
and from the worker, on the other, that the professional
finds it necessary to cultivate the professional ethos and
'culture' ..... (Institution 27).
9cf.

"The Repressive Hypothesis" in The Foucault Reader
(301-29). Also, as I think will become clear, I am not
attempting to make an argument for Kaufmann as a
Foucaultian.
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new contribution' is built into the American academic
system .... (29-30)
Here Culler puts forth, in his own name, the benign vision
of the university that it had seemed he was setting up to be
criticized:

he characterizes the academy as a place of

innovation, where an "important new contribution" is
graciously rewarded by "promotions, grants, and prestige."
Specialization, he argues, is necessary to produce "a more
innovative criticism."

While he glances over it as self-

evident, the "innovative criticism" that he posits as
literary studies' end (product) remains quite problematic-seems to be precisely a version of the autonomous "criticas-genius" paradigm.

Also, the imperatives of disciplinary

self-protection (veiled in the terminology of progress) and
the commodity fetish implied by emphasizing the "new and
improved"--as well as the ways in which emphasizing critical
"innovation" protects, promotes, and generates
specialization--seem to be buried under a very rosy picture
of personal freedom within the theoretical university.

(In

fact, one might note that Culler's vision of the theoretical
humanities seems uncannily similar to the--supposedly
outdated--vision of the academy in which the ends of a
disinterested, appreciative Arnoldian criticism protect,
promote, and generate the generalist--an irony to which I
will return.)
Culler continues to explain the virtues of this
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Professionalism makes a critic's career depend upon the
judgments of experts in his or her own field:

deans,

departments, publishers and foundations have, in the
interest of professionalism, increasingly relied on
peer reviews in decisions to hire and promote, to
publish books and

arti~les,

and to award grants.

While

reducing capriciousness and favoritism in important
decisions, this progress of professionalism shifts
power from the vertical hierarchy of the institution
that employs a critic to a horizontal system of
evaluation. (29-30, my emphases)
It seems Culler here names not only a subversion of
disciplinary knowledge strategies as the consequence of
theory's professionalization, but also a shift of
disciplinary power's axis from vertical to horizontal-though, of course, the shifting of power becomes a goal in
itself when one argues, as Culler does, that power cannot be
simply undermined or subverted, that there is no simple
liberation from institutions or power. 10

But what seems

anomalous here is precisely Culler's forwarding of a kind of
liberation that comes "in the interest of professionalism'':
the "system of evaluation" which grows out of this shift
helps in "reducing capriciousness and favoritism," a
formulation which continues the liberationist metaphor that
10 see

his discussion of Foucault in Framing (57-68).
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he develops throughout his discussion of the "progress of
professionalism."

But in shifting axes, one does not

necessarily--or even primarily--reduce capriciousness or
favoritism or in any way escape these undesirable byproducts of the workings of an institution.

In fact, given

the polarization of theoretical camps in recent years, one
could argue that specialization has increased capriciousness
and favoritism rather than vice versa. 11
But, to get back to the "original" question, what is
the status or role of theory in all this?

As he continues,

Culler concretely ties his professional progress metaphor
back to the question of theory in an absolutely astonishing
way:
we must assert the value not just of specialization but
of professionalization also, explaining how
professionalization makes thought possible by
developing sets of questions, imposing norms which then
have to be questioned and thereby promoting debate on
key problems. (54, my emphasis)
Professionalism here finds its denoument in Culler's
argument not simply as an improved system of evaluation nor
even as a bolstering of critical ends, but literally as a

11 Given the plethora of theoretical stances, it seems
unlikely that favoritism in publication is decreasing:
would, for example, a deconstructive analysis be recommended
for publication by a nee-Marxist; would a Habermasianrecommend a Foucaultian analysis, or a new historicist
recommend a new critical analysis?
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transcendental--as that which "makes thought possible."
This is, it seems to me, an absolutely chilling formulation,
and not so simply because of the ominous consequences it
seems to have for the hopes of "non-professionals" to think
at all, but because thought or knowledge seems to be named
here precisely and only in terms of its 19th-century
disciplinary manifestation--as "developing sets of
questions, imposing norms, and thereby promoting debate on
key problems."

Professionalism, as Culler defines it here,

seems less what makes thinking possible than what makes the
organization, control, and articulation of thinking
possible--by deciding what sets of questions will be
addressed, what norms imposed, and what problems deemed key.
Here theory is made, quite literally (and paradoxically,
given Culler's original formulation of the role of theory)
into the discipline of professionalism--into a kind of metadiscipline which takes the other disciplines as its object,
and organizes them under its classifications and rules. 12
12 compare the institutional resonances of Culler's

theoretician with the MLA's self-produced picture of the
critic in its Introduction to Scholarship: "criticism
assimilates the best findings of the other, partial
disciplines ... and completes them by subsuming them in a
final act of interpretation. Criticism gives meaning to
literary studies; only when we, as critics, have performed
our task have we fulfilled the purpose of understanding and
placing the text .... [T]he view of critics as persons who
complete the other disciplines also requires them to know
the other disciplines. A superior position involves burdens
as well as privileges. If literary studies stand atop a
pyramid, perhaps that testifies not only to their elite
situation but to the difficulty of the climb and the
precariousness of keeping balance" (84-5).
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For Culler, then, theory is a kind of new ground of the
humanities, the privileged discipline because it affords to
the professional the "critical or self-critical space within
which discoveries and critiques take place" (54, my
emphasis).

The language of the so-called hard sciences fits

well here with his call for innovation. 13

And it is

perhaps here that an irony I noted earlier becomes most
apparent:

if the project of the humanities becomes a kind

of scientistic innovation, then of course specialization is
necessary; but this logic of the ends of the humanities is
uncannily similar (in that it is dialectically opposed) to
the conserving, Arnoldian paradigm which makes necessary the
generalist.

In fact, Culler sets up his argument in direct

contradistinction to this generalist paradigm.

He writes of

the decision before us today:
One can distinguish two general models at work .... The
first makes the university the transmitter of a
cultural heritage, gives it the ideological function of
reproducing culture and the social order.

The second

model makes the university a site for the production of
knowledge, and teaching is related to that function:
in early years students are taught what they need to
13 see Weber, who quotes Marx on the capitalist/
imperialist paradigm of the language of ''progress": "'the
conquest of each new country signifies a new frontier'
... [and] each new frontier signifies only a new country to
be conquered" (Institution 148).
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know in order to progress to more advanced work; in
later years, they follow or even assist their teachers'
work at the frontiers of a discipline. (33, my
emphases)
There seem to be several problems with Culler's formulation
of the decision before us.

First, we note that he has

simply inverted the Arnoldian paradigm of the generalist:
for the generalist, the tradition is the repository of real
knowledge--episteme--while theory is the realm of merely
ideological doxa.

But Culler, without examining the dubious

terms of this opposition, simply rearranges the terms to
favor the specialist--who is now involved in the "production
of knowledge" while the generalist is assigned the
"ideological function of reproducing culture and social
order."

Certainly the ideology/knowledge opposition is ripe

for deconstruction, and Culler even goes on to give us the
ammunition to do so:

how, we might ask, does teaching

students "what they need to know to progress to more
advanced work" escape the "ideological function of
reproducing culture and social order"?

Likewise, if

students' goals are to get to the point where they may
"follow or even assist their teachers' work at the frontiers
of a discipline," one might ask how professionalist teaching
escapes a paternalistic, appreciative model or fosters
innovation?

In any case, it seems that the theoretical

professionalism which Culler calls for serves--just as
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strongly as the paradigm it seeks to displace by inverting-to conserve or protect the most traditional imperatives of
the discipline. 14 And Culler admits that professionalism
may have its problems, but he feels that they are outweighed
by
its compensating strengths--an encouragement of
innovation, for example--and one must remind oneself of
the alternatives which the opponents of professionalism
promote:

a vision of the humanities as repository of

known truths and received values, which a dedicated
non-professional corps of workers present to the young.
(55)
So, in the end, Culler sees professionalism as the only
defense against a backslide to the bad old days of higher
education as ideological indoctrination, carried out by
functionaries for the state's interests, "a dedicated nonprofessional corps of workers."
For Culler, then, professionalism is, in the end,
inevitable--it is absolutely necessary to avoid what he sees
as the disastrous outcome of its denial.

And, it should be

noted, he is by no means the only high-profile theorist who
is also an apologist for professionalism:

Stanley Fish,

writing from a new-pragmatist perspective that is

14 cf. Kaufmann's discussion of the Arnoldian strain of
contemporary theory, 523ff.
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particularly abhorrent to Culler, 15 comes to a similar
conclusion about the necessity, value, and inevitablilty of
professionalism. 16

He writes, about the hesitation that

some of the contributors to The New Historicism collection
express about the disciplinary consequences of their
theoretical work:
whatever the source of the malaise, I urge that it be
abandoned and that New Historicists sit back and enjoy
the fruits of their professional success, wishing
neither for more nor less.

In the words of the old

Alka-Seltzer commercial, "try it, you'll like it,"
("Commentary" 315)
Professionalism here is named as a possible cure for the
"malaise"--the impasse--of a literary criticism robbed of
its transcendental ground; even if professionalism is not
exactly the cure, Fish suggests, at least it will allow the
critic to forget or soothe the consequences of totalizing
15 culler vehemently attacks the new pragmatism, "whose
complacency seems altogether appropriate to the Age of
Reagan" (55). Curiously, though, he seems finally to
envision the future of literary studies as a kind of Rortian
conversation: "the future is perhaps best imagined as an
ongoing debate" (56).
16 Fish's "thesis"--reiterated in a series of essays on
professionalism--is roughly the following:
"My contention
is that anti-professionalism, insofar as it imagines a
position of judgment wholly uncontaminated by professional
concerns, is incoherent, since in order to be heard as
relevant, a critique must already be implicated in the
assumptions and goals that define the profession" ("A Reply"
125). This is precisely the dilemma to which the Derridean
"double gesture" speaks and why this gesture is, to use a
problematic but appropriate word, necessary.
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over-indulgence. 17

And while Culler's professionalism

cannot simply be conflated with the Fish's sloganeering,
"don't-worry-be-happy" brand, they do both name
professionalism as a valuable and necessary cure for the
impasse of literary criticism--and it is also interesting to
note that they do so from opposing sides of what would seem
to be a ragingly discordant deconstruction/new historicism
debate (a debate which I will discuss at some length in
Chapter 3).

What is particularly intriguing here, though,

is that through Culler's and Fish's discussions of the
necessity of professionalism it seems we are back--though we
have taken an extremely circuitous route--to Kaufmann's
assertion that the theory's professionalism can neither be
affirmed nor denied in any consistent manner:

its

affirmation can be denied as an untheoretical acceptance,
while even its denial--insofar as it comes irreducibly from
within--can be shown to be a surreptitious affirmation.

As

a cure for criticism's malaise, then, professionalism seems
also to be a poison:

professionalism as pharmakon.

The Institutional Pharmakon
Pharmakon is one of Derrida's well-known
"undecidables."

In his analysis of the discourse on writing

in Plato's Phaedrus, Derrida notes that Plato's text uses
17 Alka-Seltzer's other famous slogan, after all, was "I
can't believe I ate the whole thing."
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the same word--pharmakon--to characterize writing's
seemingly dual and contradictory position vis-a-vis memory
(see Dissemination 61-172).

Socrates tells the story of two

gods--Theuth, the inventor of writing, and Thamus, a ruler.
Theuth comes to Thamus with his "elixir [pharmakon, remedy]
of memory and wisdom" (274E); Thamus responds:
you, who are the father of letters, have been led by
your affection to ascribe to them a power opposite of
that which they really possess.

For this invention

will produce forgetfulness in the minds of those who
learn to use it .... You have invented an elixir
[pharmakon, poison] not of memory but reminding. (275A)
The undecidable opposition inscribed in the very word
pharmakon--poison or cure?--gives rise to a puzzling impasse
in Plato's text:

how can the necessary power of letters in

memory and wisdom work as a cure if it is also a poison; how
can writing be both an aid to memory and a subversion of
memory?

Indeed Plato himself here depends on this

pharmakon, writing a didactic story that Socrates remembers
he ''heard of the ancients" (274C); the nagging question ·
becomes:

how can a pure knowledge be upheld or attained at

all when following the necessarily discursive logic of
knowledge leads inexorably to an impasse, to depending on
that which should by rights be excluded, exiled to the realm
of doxa?
The ''systematic" situation of undecidability outlined
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here (the ''cure" of knowledge also brings, at the same time
and through the same word, the ''poison" of writing) quite
closely resembles the "institutional" situation of the
profession of theory:

the cure of theory brings with it the

poison of professionalism.

In the language of

deconstruction, perhaps one could say that the postmodern
academy is in the position of Plato's pharmakon:
undecidable, caught at or in what seems like an impasse.
This impasse becomes all the more frustrating for the
discipline of literary criticism because it seems to be a
necessary, logical outcome of critical thinking itself:

the

thinking that is to uncover episteme uncovers only impasse.
And though this impasse can likewise be ''explained" by
critical thinking--it comes about precisely because in a
postmodern epoch, the purity of knowledge has withdrawn, is
not there, as Plato may have thought, to be uncovered--it
seems to offer little solace, only adding to the slippage,
leaving us inexorably, repeatedly within or at the impasse,
blankly staring down Kaufmann's "ultimately frustrating
aporias."

The only tool we seem to have at our disposal to

neutralize the impasse--critical thinking which could lead
to critical action--is implicated as/in the "cause'' of the
impasse itself.
And this institutional impasse is, interestingly

30

enough, likewise inscribed in Plato's text. 18

Thamus

continues on the poison of letters:
You have invented an elixir [pharmakon] not of memory
but reminding; and you offer your pupils the appearance
of wisdom, not true wisdom, for they will read many
things without instruction and therefore will seem to
know many things, when they are, for the most part,
ignorant and hard to get along with, since they are not
wise, but only appear wise. (275A-B)
The descent from knowledge to mere opinion that comes with
writing likewise creates an institutional impasse--it makes
Athens' students "ignorant and hard to get along with."

In

some sense, we postmoderns would want to cheer on this
supposed amateurish "ignorance" in our students, thinking of
it instead as a healthy and necessary skepticism concerning
a received tradition.

But there likewise seems a chiasmic

reversal here in that this necessary skepticism must be
learned, taught by a corps of professional teachers and
scholars.

We are back, again, at Kaufmann's impasse:

theory--as truly critical thought--can neither be taught nor
abandoned in the university; and it likewise seems that, as
Stanley Fish writes, "Anti-professionalism is
professionalism in its purest form" (''Anti-professionalism"
106).

18 cf.

Barbara Johnson's discussion of pedagogy and
Phaedrus in A World of Difference (83-85).
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So here we are left with a question; as Derrida asks,
"If the same premises lead to evaluations that are
apparently contradictory, what does that tell us about the
system of reading and hierarchization at work?'' ("Age" 21 ).
It is at this point, then, that it becomes necessary to
rethink the path that leads to this impasse, to conceive of
some way to rethink the impasse, somehow to think opposites
together--theory and academy, poison and cure, thinking and
acting--without falling into the spuriousness of simply
neutralizing the differences within some "beyond," but
likewise without giving in to the status quo of impasse:
"to avoid both neutralizing the binary oppositions ... and
simply residing within the closed field of these
oppositions, thereby confirming it" (Positions 41); in other
words, it is as this point that the double reading and
writing of deconstruction becomes necessary.

Necessary

because deconstruction attends precisely to this impasse-but attends to it as other than simply impasse or
stagnation.

Necessary because there seems to be no simple

ground beyond these oppositions, but a difference, a
displacement, a double bind between them--an "outside" or
double that disrupts their functioning rather than
guaranteeing it.

As Derrida writes:

"a repetition without

identity--one mark inside and one mark outside the
deconstructed system, should give rise to a double reading
and a double writing" (Dissemination 4).

For Derrida, one
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move of this double reading is a thematizing or "critical"
one, a repetitive reading of sorts done necessarily from
within the confines of the system or institution, but the
second move of this reading or writing goes back over
itself, questions its own motives, attempts to attend to
what was excluded--systematically or institutionally--in the
first move; a double reading or writing tends to a kind of
outside, not a stable ground but rather an exteriority which
"can no longer take the form of a sort of extra-text which
could arrest the concatenation of writing" (Dissemination
5).

This is what Derrida calls "out-work," the non-

dialectical "work" of the outside, the "work" of the
undecidable.

I will, as I promise above, take up the

"systematic" aspects of double reading/writing in the
following chapters, but I would like here to attempt to take
up the institutional "necessity" of a deconstruction.
The text that most trenchantly takes up this question
of deconstruction and the academy is Weber's Institutions
and Interpretation, a deconstructive analysis of the work of
institution--the academy and the functioning of disciplines
--and one that is notable in that it does not look primarily
to Derrida's GREPH work for its institutional focus. 19
19 see, for discussions of Derrida's GREPH [Groupe de
Recherches sur l'Enseignement Philosophigue] work, Ulmer's
Applied Grammatology, Culler's On Deconstruction, and
Fynsk's "A Decelebration of Philosophy." See also Derrida's
"The Principle of Reason," and "Sendoffs," a report written
by Derrida on the International College of Philosophy.
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Though Weber is at times critical of Derrida's inattention
to institutional matters, he performs a kind of double
reading--based, it seems, very much on Derrida's
"systematic" work--of the functioning of the academic
disciplines.

According to Weber, the basic problem

surrounding professionalism, especially within the
university, is not that the liberating intentions of the
disciplines or of theory have been or are inexorably
destined to be betrayed by the limiting of institution, but
rather that the disciplines do not continue to ask
themselves ground-questions, do not attend to what is
excluded in or through their analyses; as Weber writes, the
academy has built itself on
instituted areas of training and research which, once
established, could increasingly ignore the founding
limits and limitations of the individual disciplines.
(32, my emphasis).
Disciplines can posit innovative ends or lament unintended
outcomes only if practitioners "ignore the founding limits
and limitations" of the discipline--because those foundings
are themselves impure, exclusionary, arbitrary and therefore
cannot hope to lead to pure ends.

According to Weber, any

discipline, in order to perform its analyses, must cover
over its founding problems, limits, and exclusions.
Disciplines do so most often precisely by appealing to the
"advance of knowledge" or the liberation which they
~···---···;·-.
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supposedly are to bring about:

in short, disciplines--of

whatever type--do not ask ground questions, they ask end
questions.

Ground questions lead to what disciplines read

as an impasse because these "foundational" questions can
upset the easy obtaining of an end:

if a discipline

seriously examines its ground, it will indeed "inexorably"
lead to an impasse, precisely because the exclusions that
work to constitute a discipline--its objects, its
methodologies--are groundless.
Deconstruction, however, reads this impasse--this
withdrawal of ground--as the closure of a way of thinking:
after the closure or withdrawal of a transcendental mode of
thinking, attempting to think with transcendental categories
will, of course, lead to an impasse--the guarantee of
transcendental thinking's success having withdrawn in a
postmodern epoch. 20

But, at the same time, there is no

pure place post-closure.
logic:

Hence the necessity of the double

both inside and outside the categories of the

closure, inside and outside the academic institutions that
base themselves on these categories.

We need, in other

words, to ''answer" the question of the postmodern, but,
because of this double bind, the answer cannot be singular.
As Derrida writes,
Two logics, then, with an incalculable effect, two

20 see my much more detailed discussion of this point in
Chapter 4.
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repetitions which are no more opposed to each other
than they repeat each other identically and which, if
they do repeat each other, echo the duplicity that
constitutes all repetition:

it is only when one takes

into 'account' this incalculable double-bind of
repetition ... that one has a chance of reading the
unreadable text which follows immediately, and to read
it as unreadable. (Post Card 352/373-4, translation
modified)
With the closure of metaphysics, something comes to thought
which cannot be read or understood in the terms of that
thought--for example, the "perfectly logical" impasse of
knowledge and its institutions, the fact that one set of
data can lead to two logical conclusions which radically
exclude each other.

This "unreadable" text, however, does

follow a "logic," though not a determinate (and therefore
not a simply indeterminate) one--rather, it "follows" the
dual logic of the "incalculable double bind of repetition."
And it is only when one takes this logic "into 'account'"
(though, obviously, there is no simple accounting possible
here) 21 that one has a chance of reading at all.

It is

only when one recognizes the "logic" of the impasse of
unreadability that one has the chance of "accounting for"
21 cf. Weber:

"If
quotation marks, it is
cannot simply be taken
modified the quotation
translation.

'account' ... is inscribed within
to indicate that the double bind
into account" (97). Also, I have
above by consulting Weber's
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the unreadable as something other than the dialectical, nonsensical opposite of the readable; likewise, it seems that
it is only when one recognizes the determinate/determining
logic that leads to the impasse of an institution or
discipline--a way of thinking and acting that inexorably
leads to nihilist reversals and hence to inaction--that one
can attempt to account for this impasse as other than simple
paralyzation or stasis, and other than simple obstacle to be
overcome.

It is this "logic"--which I will call the logic

of the postmodern, inasmuch as it "answers" what I have
called the "question of the postmodern"--that I will attempt
to investigate and articulate throughout this dissertation.
My approach throughout this work might be called
"deconstructive" (though a good bit of this dissertation
questions deconstruction as an institutional category), but
I emphasize from the start that it is not a matter of
distilling a determinate/determining logic out of Derrida's
texts and applying it to a horizon of other philosophical
and literary texts.

Rather, it is a matter of marking and

negotiating paths through specific texts and institutions-in short, it is a matter of reading.

I begin with the

question of institutions because this question is
inseparable from the more traditional systematic questions,
and because the very question of the application of a
methodology broaches inescapably institutional questions,
question to which deconstruction can and does respond.

As
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Derrida writes in "Contest of Faculties":
Precisely because it is never concerned only with
signified content, deconstruction should not be
separable from this politico-institutional problematic
and should seek a new investigation of responsibility,
an investigation which questions the codes inherited
from ethics and politics.

This means that, too

political for some, it will seem paralyzing to those
who only recognize politics by the most familiar road
signs.

Deconstruction is neither a methodological

reform that should reassure the organization in place
nor a flourish of irresponsible and irresponsiblemaking destruction, whose most certain effect would be
to leave everything as it is and to consolidate the
most immobile forces within the university. (in Culler
On 56)

Deconstruction, however, has been and remains thematized
precisely as "irresponsible and irresponsible-making
destruction," and as a critical movement which "leave[s]
everything as it is ... within the university."

In order to

pose a question to this dominant reading of deconstruction,
I would like to move from here to examine the institutional
rise and fall of deconstruction in North American literature
departments.

CHAPTER 2
THE DISCIPLINE OF DECONSTRUCTION
Deconstruction, it seems, is dead in literature
departments today.

Its death is usually attributed either

to suicide--to its falling back into the dead-end formalism
it was supposed to remedy--or to murder at the hands of the
New Historicists, whose calls for re-historicizing and recontextualizing the study of literature have successfully
called into question the supposed self-cancelling textualism
of the deconstructionists.

Consider the following fairly

representative assessments--the first of the "suicide"
theory, the second of the "murder" theory:
deconstructive criticism, which, however important, is
but an offspring of New Criticism, ... has done little
more than apply what it takes to be a method for
reading literary texts to the unproblematized horizon
of its discipline.

By neglecting the pragmatic and historical context of
the utterance of what is dramatized in such a manner as
to cancel it out, the criticism in question reveals its
origins in Romantic (as well as, in a certain
interpretation, Idealist) philosophy.
38

It is a
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suprahistorical criticism that pretends to speak from a
position free of ideology--that is, from an absolute
point of view.
crit1cs of deconstruction will agree, I think, that these
quotations well sum up the critiques which brought its
short, happy life in American literature departments to an
end.
The first quotation puts forth the critique usually
associated with, for lack of a better word, "skeptical"
detractors of deconstruction--those who hold that while
deconstructive reading claims to be something radically new,
in actuality it is simply another version of New Criticism's
traditional methodology of close reading, cloaked in a
theoretical vocabulary and reapplied to a series of texts in
order to yield "new" readings. 1 These detractors point to
the way in which deconstructive readers of literary texts
hunt for self-cancelling binary oppositions in the same
(essentially unproblematic) way the New Critics hunted for
themes and ironies.

In addition, according to this line of

reasoning, the end result of both readings is the same:

a

New Critical reading totalizes the text by offering an all-

1see,

for example, Jane P. Tompkins' "The Reader in
History'': "What is most striking about reader-response
criticism and its close relative, deconstructive criticism,
is their failure to break out of the mold into which
critical writing was cast by the formalist identification of
criticism with explication. Interpretation reigns supreme
both in teaching and publication just as it did when the New
Criticism was in its heyday in the 1940s and 1950s" (224-5).
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inclusive meaning or interpretation,

while a deconstructive

reading totalizes the text in exactly the opposite way-simply denying meaning or interpretation by showing how
oppositions in the text cancel themselves out.

For the

skeptic, deconstruction committed suicide in literature
departments after it realized it was unable to break away
from the tradition it wished to supersede.
The second quotation reflects the critique of
deconstructive criticism generally advanced by those
concerned about its political dimension--or rather, its lack
of political dimension.

Deconstructive readings are

faulted, in this line of reasoning, primarily for
"neglecting the pragmatic and historical context" of
literature and the production of literature, thereby
performing a "suprahistorical criticism that pretends to
speak from a position free of ideology."

Additionally, and

perhaps more damningly, those concerned with the political
dimension of literature studies point to the danger of the
political despair inevitably fostered by these readings'
notions of simple textual self-cancellation, the danger of
fostering passive acceptance as the political result of a
reactionary and nihilistic textual undecidability. 2 For
2see, for example, Eagleton's assessment in Literary
Theory: deconstruction "frees you at a stroke from having
to assume a position on important issue, since what you say
of such things will be no more than a passing product_ of the
signifier and so in no sense to be taken as 'true' or
'serious' .... Since it commits you to affirming nothing, it
is as injurious as blank ammunition" (145).
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the marxist, feminist, or (new) historical literary critic,
deconstruction was murdered by a reorientation in literature
departments toward the political and social dimensions of
literary texts and of the discipline of literary criticism
itself.
In any case, the quotations with which I began are
certainly representative of compelling critiques of the
practice of deconstructive criticism from two distinct
points of view--what I have called the skeptical and the
political--which are at odds with deconstruction.

It is

indeed odd, then, that both of these critiques are quoted
from a recent book which is an apology for deconstruction,
Rodolphe Gasche's The Tain of the Mirror (quotations from
255, 139).

Gasche vehemently critiques a certain kind of

deconstructive practice, but, unlike most of
deconstruction's critics within literature departments,
Gasche attacks and subverts this practice of deconstructive
literary criticism in defense of deconstruction, in 'the
name' of deconstruction, of "deconstruction, properly
speaking" (135)--in defense of Derrida's thought against
those who (ab)use it by turning it into an unproblematic,
nihilistic method for reading literary texts.
There are, then, different readings of the role or
value of deconstruction at work for Gasche and for the
skeptical or political critics of deconstruction I
characterized earlier; yet somehow both Gasche--a defender
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of deconstruction--and the skeptical and political critics
of deconstruction can come to the same general conclusions
about the inadequacy of deconstructive literary criticism as
it was and currently is practiced in America, especially by
the "Yale school" and its followers.

Gasche, rather than

dismissing deconstruction out of hand, as the skeptics and
political critics often do, argues that Derrida's thought
has been grossly misrepresented by his American disciples,
and that there has never been a properly deconstructive
criticism in America; in fact, Gasche argues that there is
nothing inherent in Derrida's work which makes it applicable
in any simple way to literary criticism. 3 For Gasche,
Derrida is, like many before him, a philosopher who has an
interest in literature, but Gasche argues that this interest
in no way makes his thought readily or easily available to
be taken up for use in traditional literary criticism.

He

writes, against deconstructive criticism, that "to quarry
from Derrida's writings is not automatically to become
deconstructive" (2); in fact, Gasche states, "the importance
of Derrida's thinking for the discipline of literary
criticism is not immediately evident" (255).
Assuming that Gasche is correct--and I believe that,
for the most part, he is--the question for those of us
interested in deconstruction and literature then becomes:

3Gasche made this point as early as 1979, in his
"Deconstruction as Criticism."
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what, if anything, can be made of--written of, thought of-the

relatio~

between a body of texts we call Derrida's

philosophy and a body of texts we call literature?

If we

agree that, for the most part, what passed under the name
"deconstruction" in literature departments in the 1970's and
beyond had little to do with Derrida's thought, perhaps
deconstruction needs to be reexamined.

In short, it seems

to me that now that the wave of deconstruction as a method
for interpreting texts has crested and rolled back in
literature departments, perhaps it can be reexamined as a
philosophy, specifically a postmodern philosophy, a
postmodern thinking, which is overtly interested in the
literature and institutions of the postmodern world--or,
more precisely, a philosophy which is interested in the
process by which borders (the borders that separate
literature and philosophy, texts and institutions, the
modern and the postmodern) are assigned.

I must stress that

I am not interested here in aligning myself with those-skeptics or proponents--who see postmodern thought as valid
solely in relation to postmodern texts; but, at the same
time, I would like to question the value of critical
projects which aim at simply re-reading the tradition from
another (in this case, deconstructive) point of view.

Or,

perhaps phrased more precisely, I would like to question a
certain reading of deconstruction which would allow it a
properly critical project or a kind of world view.

I would
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like, at this point, to examine the institutional rise of
American deconstruction and its reading of Derrida, and then
point out where I think this dominant reading--the reading
upon which the skeptical and political critiques of
deconstruction are based--fails to account for the
complexities of Derrida's work.
However, I run the risk throughout this argument of
too-quickly totalizing the category "deconstructive literary
criticism"; indeed, one of the key problems surrounding the
reception of deconstruction in America is its thematization
as a master term, something Derrida warns against:
the word 'deconstruction' like all other words acquires
its value only from its inscription in a chain of
possible substitutions, in what is too blithely called
a 'context.'

For me, for what I have tried and still

try to write, the word only has an interest within a
certain context where it replaces and lets itself be
determined by such other words as 'ecriture,' 'trace,'
'supplement,' 'hymen,' 'pharmakon,' 'margin,'
[etc.] .... "

(in Bernasconi and Wood 7)

I will try to honor the complexity within what may seem to
be the monolithic category "deconstructive criticism"--a
move which is, of course, necessary given the double bind I
find myself in as someone who could quite easily be called a
"deconstructive critic."

There are, from the very

"beginning," many deconstructions:

the "rhetorical"
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deconstruction of Paul de Man is different from the
"pedagogical" deconstruction of Gregory Ulmer, which in turn
is different from the "political" deconstruction of Michael
Ryan, the "post-colonial" deconstruction of Gayatri Spivak,
the "philosophical" deconstruction of

Gasch~,

or the

"feminist" deconstruction of Barbara Johnson, and these
differences must be attended to.

I should make it clear,

then, that most of my comments concerning "deconstructive
literary criticism in America" will be directed toward a
rhetorical or tropological brand of Yale school
deconstruction, perhaps most clearly represented by de Man
and J. Hillis Miller.

I turn my attention here because it

is this rhetorical mode that has offered the greatest
possibility to read deconstruction as a critical method--as
a discursive tool for producing readings, and thereby for
bolstering the work of a discipline.

The Commodification of Deconstruction
in America
Deconstruction in America has a well-known genealogy;
it was, so the story goes, imported from France and received
in an enthusiastic way by many scholars in American
literature departments, most following the lead of the Yale
critics.

Deconstruction brought "theory'' to the foreground

in the study of literature in America.

Soon, theory classes

in English graduate departments were a must, and a wave of
deconstruction "handbooks" was produced to introduce
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graduate students and interested faculty to the complexities
of deconstruction in theory seminars.

(Derrida's own

writings were and still are, for the most part, scrupulously
avoided in these classes because of their complexity and
difficulty--again, or so the story goes.)

Deconstruction

was, to put it bluntly, commodified for an American market,
simplified and watered down for use in how-to books which
gave (and continue to give) an entire generation of
literature students an overview of what was supposedly
Derrida's work without a corresponding attention to
Derrida's texts.~

For example, the following quotations

were taken from two of the leading handbooks used to
represent deconstruction in theory seminars--the first from
Jonathan Culler's On Deconstruction and the second from
Christopher Norris' Deconstruction:

Theory and Practice: 5

In undoing the oppositions on which it relies and
between which it urges the reader to choose, the text
places the [deconstructive] reader in an impossible
situation that cannot end in triumph but only in an
outcome already deemed inappropriate:

an unwarranted

4This commodification, we should note, moves hand-inhand with the professionalizing of theory that I discuss in
Chapter 1.
5rhe title of Norris' book, with its dependence on the
metaphysical ur-distinction between theoria and praxis--the
very distinction with which philosophy first configures
itself--shows that Norris hasn't the faintest idea of the
stakes of Derrida's project. "Differance," Derrida w~ites,
is "a system that no longer tolerates the opposition of
activity and passivity" (Margins 16).
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choice or failure to choose. (81)6

To deconstruct a text in Nietzschean-Derridean terms is
to arrive at a limit point or deadlocked aporia of
meaning which offers no hold for Marxist-historical
understanding.

The textual 'ideology' uncovered by

Derrida's readings is a kind of aboriginal swerve into
metaphor and figurative detour which language embraces.
(80)

If we compare these handbook accounts of deconstruction with
the characterizations of the skeptical and political
critiques I began with, I think we can see that the
critiques are right on the beam:

in Culler's

characterization, deconstruction is an essentially formalist
reading method which emphasizes a pre-determined fall into
meaninglessness resulting from the self-cancellation of
oppositions in any text. 7 In Norris' view of
6To be fair, this quotation from
context of his reading of de Man, but
conflates his project with Derrida's,
deconstruction "emerges from the work
( 228) .

Culler comes in the
Culler effectively
writing that
of Derrida and de Man"

7This reading is so institutionally canonized~ in fact,
that it has made it onto the GRE Literature in English Test.
Sample questions 31-32 in the 1989-91 GRE Literature in
English test booklet concern a passage comparing the new
critic's "prior knowledge that all literature is
paradoxical" to "the deconstructionists' foreknowledge that
all texts are allegories of their own unreadability" (16).
This is a point well taken, as I am arguing here. However,
the GRE's question concerns the proper names of these
movements. The answer: "(E) Cleanth Brooks and Jacques
Derrida" (16).
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deconstruction, we see the political implications of the
"deadlocked aporia of meaning" which results from the
deconstructive act--rather, we see precisely that there are
no political implications, that the ideology uncovered by
(and, presumably, championed in) Derrida's readings is
indeed that we are trapped in a prison-house of language.
That, however, is simply not the case in Derrida's own
writings.

Time and time again Derrida warns of the danger--

metaphysical and political--of simply neutralizing
oppositions in the name of deconstruction.

Derrida

emphasizes that deconstruction involves a double reading, a
neutralization and a reinscription.

He writes,

Deconstruction cannot limit itself or proceed
immediately to a neutralization:

it must, by means of

a double gesture, a double science, a double writing,
practice an overturning of the classical opposition and
a general displacement of the system.

It is only on

this condition that deconstruction will provide itself
the means with which to intervene in the field of
oppositions that it criticizes, which is also a field
of non-discursive forces. (Margins 329)
For Derrida, contra many of his followers and critics,
deconstruction is not a simple move toward neutralization.
Derrida's thought does not move toward an end constituted by
a "deadlocked aporia of meaning" which leads to "an
impossible situation which cannot end in triumph"; rather,
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this deadlock, this undecidability, this unreadability is
only the first gesture in a double reading, the
''overturning" gesture which shows the untenability of the
"classical opposition," the fact that the privileged term in
the opposition can only structure itself--in its presence-with reference to the non-privileged term--in its absence-leaving non-presence as a structuring principle of presence
and calling into question the privilege of
over the subservient term.

th~

master term

This is indeed first-level

deconstruction, but it leaves the crucial operation of
Derrida's thought unperformed:

the displacement of the

system and the reinscription of the opposition, the second
move of a double reading in which "deconstruction will
provide itself the means with which to intervene in the
field of oppositions that it criticizes."

For Derrida,

deconstruction can intervene only by displacing the mode of
thinking which leads precisely to these deadlocks, by
calling for and attempting to make possible an other
thinking.

So, Derrida, in some sense, actually agrees with

skeptical and political critics of deconstruction as
literary criticism:

deconstruction will not be able to

intervene in the field of oppositions it criticizes until it
goes beyond simple neutralization--that is, unless it makes
this second move of double reading, a general displacement
of that system whose logic leads it inexorably to these
neutralizations, these pure negations.
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Deconstructive literary criticism, as it is summed up
by Culler and Norris and practiced in America, has yet to
acknowledge the importance of this displacement in Derrida's
thought.

Derrida writes,

deconstruction involves an indispensable phase of
reversal [i.e. first level deconstruction].

To remain

content with reversal is of course to operate within
the imminence of the system to be destroyed.

But to

sit back ... and take an attitude of neutralizing
indifference with respect to the classical oppositions
would be to give free rein to the existing forces that
effectively and historically dominate the field.

It

would be, for not having seized the means to intervene,
to confirm the established equilibrium.

(Dissemination

6)

If deconstruction as literary criticism limits itself to
neutralization, to first level deconstruction, Derrida here
agrees that it is then politically impotent and even
reactionary;

simple "neutralizing indifference" gives "free

rein to the existing forces that effectively and
historically dominate the field" leaving the field of
oppositions--a field which Derrida emphasizes is made up of
both discursive and non-discursive forces--itself
undisrupted.

To fail to make the second move of the double

reading would be simply "to confirm the established
equilibrium."

This, in Derrida's own words, is the
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unfortunate status of deconstructive literary criticism in
America.
The reason deconstructive criticism has yet to make the
second move of the double gesture can, I think, be traced to
the Yale school's influential (mis)reading of Derrida's
notion of "undecidability," the notion that the majority of
critiques of deconstruction attack most stringently:

the

skeptic sees the deconstructive critic's notion of
undecidability as the simple opposite of decidability-making undecidability quite decidable; while the political
critic sees undecidability as spelling out a dead end of
futility for political action--as a notion which cannot help
but bolster the social status quo.

Deconstructive

criticism, as Gasche has shown, often mistakes the inability
to decide brought about by oppositions cancelling themselves
out--what deconstructive critic par excellence Paul de Man
calls "unreadability"--for Derrida's notion of
undecidability; they are, however, not the same.

According

to de Man, "A text ... can literally be called 'unreadable' in
that it leads to a set of assertions that radically exclude
each other" (Allegories 245).

This, as we have seen in

Chapter 1, would hold for Derrida also, but only as a first
level deconstruction; textual assertions cancelling each
other out are, for Derrida, a sign that a certain totalizing
way of reading is experiencing its closure, a sign that this
way of reading (thinking) must be radically displaced--its
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grounds must be rethought carefully and the opposition must
be reinscribed in a system which respects separation, which
stands on a discontinuous, withdrawing ground.
For Derrida, the closure of this objectifying system--a
system which always privileges identity over difference-entails a distinctly ethical imperative to rethink decision
carefully and problematically. 8

For de Man, however, the

upshot of this self-cancellation is that texts "compel us to
choose while destroying the foundations of any choice"
(Allegories 245, my emphasis).

The undecidability fostered

by unreadability, then, is the lesson, the end, the telos of
deconstruction for de Man, 9 just as deconstruction names
the negative movement which founds or constitutes the
text. 10

And this genesis-to-revelation movement of de

Manian deconstruction allows quite nicely a critical or
institutional project for deconstruction; note, for example,
de Man's comments about deconstructive reading, a reading

8As Bernasconi has pointed out, there is no ethics
without undecidability, i.e. if a totalizing system is your
guide, decision is not a problem because the system has, by
definition, all the answers. See his "Deconstruction and
the Possibility of Ethics" (especially 135). See also
Derrida very clearly making this point in his Afterword to
the Limited Inc. texts (116).
9see above my discussion of de Man's "Shelley
Disfigured" as a nihilistic allegory of recuperation.
10 cf. "Semiology and Rhetoric": "The deconstruction is
not something that we have added to the text; it constituted
the text in the first place" (138). For an excellent
discussion of de Man and Derrida on this point, see Irene
Harvey's "The Differance between Derrida and de Man."

53

that inexorably ''ends up in indetermination":

"We seem to

find ourselves in a mood of negative assurance that is
highly productive of critical discourse" (''Semiology" 137).
Highly productive indeed; since deconstruction in a de
Manian sense can be said both to constitute the text (as a
system of rhetorical or thematic patterns) and likewise to
predict the text's productive end (its assured
indetermination), it becomes the ultimate critical discourse
to which literature can be and should be submitted.

De Man,

in fact, makes a claim very much like this concerning the
response of Proust's texts to the critical project of
deconstructive reading:
The whole of literature would respond in similar
fashion, although the techniques and patterns would
have to vary considerably, of course, from author to
author.

But there is absolutely no reason why analyses

of the kind here suggested for Proust would not be
applicable, with proper modifications of technique, to
Milton or to Dante or to Holderlin.

This in fact will

be the task of literary criticism in the coming years.
("Semiology" 138, my emphasis)
For de Man, then, deconstruction is the critical project par
excellence, the determination (as indetermination) which no
text can escape.

Of course, to reiterate, this determining

of the whole of literature as simply unreadable

make~

possible to thematize deconstruction as a "new new

it
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criticism," 11 a criticism which reveals the meaning of
literature as/in its unreadability.

And this unreadability,

in turn, allows the reader "to see that failure lies in the
nature of things" (Blindness 18).
This is, however, not so for Derrida, who touches on
the question of unreadability in his treatment of Blanchot's
L'arr~t

de mort:

If reading means making accessible a meaning that can
be transmitted as such, in its own unequivocal,
translatable identity, then this title is unreadable.
But this unreadability does not arrest reading, does
not leave it paralyzed in the face of an opaque
surface; rather. it starts reading and writing and
translation moving again.

The unreadable is not the

opposite of the readable, but rather the ridge that
also gives it momentum. movement, sets it in motion.
("Living On" 116, my emphasis)
For Derrida, the unreadable or the undecidable is not the
revelation of a "failure [that] lies in the nature of
things," as unreadability is for de Man; rather, for
Derrida, the unreadable is the "place" where deconstruction
11 In fact, de Man has no trouble thematizing his
project in this way: "I don't have a bad conscience when
I'm being told that, to the extent that it is didactic, my
work is academic or even, as it is used as a supreme insult,
it is just more New Criticism. I can live with that very
easily, because I think that only what is, in a sense,
classically didactic, can be really and effectively
subversive" ("Interview" 306).
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becomes most enabling, most aware of the need to displace
the system which leads to such an impasse.

For Derrida,

undecidability is a condition of possibility for reading;
reading's impossibility--the impossibility of totalizing
reading, of self-identical meaning--makes it possible for
reading to be set in motion in other ways, makes it possible
for readers to ask questions other than the metaphysical
question, what is it, what is its truth? 12

Undecidability,

for Derrida, is the undecidability of this question--what is
it?--coupled with the imperative to ask different questions,
to displace the force of this metaphysical question.

De Man

and many other deconstructionist literary critics do not,
for the most part, see undecidability this way.

For them,

the impossibility of reading is the telos of deconstruction
--it is what deconstructive readings seek to reveal. 13

It

seems clear that this impossibility--if taken as a simple
impossibility, as a "failure" or simple lack of possibility
--can be seen as, in Derrida's words, the "unequivocal,
translatable identity" of the text, of any text, for the
12 For an excellent discussion of Derrida's relation to
the Aristotlean question "what is it?," see Gasche's Tain,
especially pages 79 and 283.
13 The notion that indecision is the telos of
deconstruction is consistently attributed to Derrida as well
as to deconstructive criticism. See Jonathan Arac: "De Man
and Derrida scrupulously, brilliantly, pointed out others'
errors and incidentally suggested whole new dimensions of
the texts they read. There they stopped, Derrida with a
question and beyond that an impasse, de Man with a paradox
that rescued him from arrogance" (Critical 100).
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deconstructive critic.

A reading which concludes on the

simple impossibility of reading is, in fact, a totalized
reading;

in other words, the deconstructive critic

definitively--or, one could say, decisively--continues to
answer the totalizing question "what is it?" when he or she
contends that the truth of the text lies in its
undecidability.
This move toward totalization in deconstructive
literary criticism is not particularly surprising however,
because literary criticism, as such, has always depended on
a notion of decidability, of totalizing readability--even if
the totality is thematized as absence, unreadability; the
notion of decidability is necessary to isolate a text and
then to produce a "reading" of it.

Decidability, it seems,

is a notion necessary for any literary criticism--even
deconstructive literary criticism.

For example, J. Hillis

Miller writes in "The Critic as Host" (which was written for
the famous "deconstructive manifesto'' Deconstruction and
Cr i tic i sm) :
"deconstruction," which is analytic criticism as such,
encounters always, if it is carried far enough, some
mode of oscillation.

In this oscillation two genuine

insights into literature in general and into a given
text in particular inhibit, subvert, and undercut one
another.

This inhibition makes it impossible for

either insight to function as a firm resting place, the
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end point of analysis .... "undecidability" names the
experience of a ceaseless dissatisfied movement in the
relation of the critic to the text.
The ultimate justification for this mode of
criticism, as of any conceivable mode, is that it
works. ( 252)
Here we see Miller giving an account of deconstruction
similar to de Man's:

deconstruction is a method which, if

taken far enough, reveals the self-cancellation of binary
oppositions in a text.

What this movement finally affirms

is the text's fall into a ceaseless undecidability
predetermined by its--for the most part unconscious--selfsubversion through its employment of figural language.

This

is, by now, familiar ground, but what is particularly
interesting to me in Miller's notion here is his
"justification" of deconstructive criticism; he writes that
deconstructive criticism's justification, as the
justification of any conceivable mode of criticism, is that
it works.

Miller here thematizes two contradictory modes or

premises of deconstructive criticism:

it must be

"undecidable" as deconstruction; but, at the same time, it
must "work" as literary criticism--it must decide
for/in/about the text.
The paradigms of literary criticism do indeed "work";
they throw themselves into the dialectical process which

i~,

which defines, work--work as movement toward decidability,
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toward meaning, work that shows itself in literary criticism
as the production of an interpretation of a text, a polished
"reading" of a text, a decision about the meaning of a
text.a

As Miller writes in the same essay,

"Deconstruction" is neither nihilism nor metaphysics
but simply interpretation as such, the untangling of
the inherence of metaphysics in nihilism and of
nihilism in metaphysics by way of the close reading of
texts. ( 230)
For Miller, deconstruction is "simply interpretation as
such"; it is part and parcel of the "untangling" work of
traditional criticism.

In short, deconstructive criticism

here is explicitly tied to decidability, the work of--what
works in--traditional literary criticism.

According to

Miller, the recognition of an interpretative undecidability
is, then, the "work" of deconstructive criticism, what it
reveals as a transhistorical principle in its readings.
This notion of undecidability as a principle--as the meaning
of texts, of all texts--is, as I have argued above,
essentially the same as traditional criticism's

14 Fish aptly summarizes this type of literary critical
work when he writes, "theories always work and they will
always produce exactly the results they predict .... Indeed,
the trick would be to find a theory that didn't work" ·(Is
There? 68). Deconstruction, I will argue, is precisely such
a "theory."
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transhistorical notions of meaning and/as decidability. 15
Derridean deconstruction, though, always problematizes
this decidability--though not in any simple, dialectical
way; hence, a relation between Derridean deconstruction and
literary criticism is not readily apparent--that is, a
relation other than one in which literary criticism is a
discipline to be deconstructed.

Derrida writes:

Deconstruction is not a critical operation.

The

critical is its object; the deconstruction always
bears, at one mement [sic] or another, on the
confidence invested in the critical or criticotheoretical process, that is to say, in the act of
decision, in the ultimate possibility of the decidable.
("Ja, ou le faux bond," 103; trans. and cited in
Culler, 247) 16
15 According

to Miller, for example, texts deconstruct
themselves, uniformly and without reference to--or
differentiation among--historical circumstances:
"logocentric metaphysics deconstitutes itself, according to
a regular law which can be demonstrated in the selfsubversion of all the great texts of Western metaphysics
from Plato onward" (228). Likewise for de Man, who actually
mentions this point as the principal difference between
Derrida and himself: "I would hold to that statement that
'the text deconstructs itself, is self-deconstructive'
rather than being deconstructed by a philosophical
intervention" ("Interview" 307). Cf. David Carroll's
critique of this notion in Paraesthetics: "This
indeterminacy or undecidability of art must, in each
instance, ... be argued anew and meticulously analyzed, rather
than simply declared" (187, my emphasis).
16cu11er,

rather bafflingly, lets this quotation ,from
Derrida stand virtually without comment--in a section
entitled "Deconstructive Criticism." He does, though, gloss
Derrida's quotation with the following from de Man: "'A
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Derrida here argues that criticism--critique, the
dialectical movement of affirmation, negation, and synthesis
on the way to a totalized realization of truth--is the
object of deconstruction, that-which-is-to-be-deconstructed.
This notion of knowledge as critique can be read in the
movement of the history of philosophy, with the great
system-builders criticizing those before them and replacing
the old systems with new and improved systems on the way to
or in the name of synthesis, identity, and the realization
of truth.

But this movement of critique is also the

movement of literary criticism, insofar as literary
criticism is tied to a search for the meaning of texts, to
the decidability of texts, to synthesis, to "transcendental
reading, in that search for the signified" (Grammatology
160).

As Derrida writes in "The Double Session," "The

critical desire--which is also the philosophical desire--can
only, as such, attempt to regain ... lost mastery"
(Dissemination 230) .11
deconstruction,' writes de Man, 'always has for its target
to reveal the existence of hidden articulations and
fragmentations within assumedly monadic totalities'" (Culler
247, my emphasis). When he uses de Man to gloss Derrida
here, Culler sums up two of my arguments in a nutshell: 1)
de Man "always" wishes to reveal a certain undecidability as
the end of his project; and 2) the project of deconstructive
criticism is consistently conflated with Derrida's--here in
Culler's book, as it is in a great deal of secondary
literature.
17 cf. earlier in "the Double Session" where Derrida

argues that his "undecidables"--hymen, pharmakon,
suppl~ment, etc.--"mark the spots of what can never be
mastered, sublated, or dialectized" (Dissemination 221 ).
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Arguing for the transhistorical principle of the
undecidability of texts is deconstructive criticism's move
to regain this lost mastery over texts, to re-empower
literary criticism.

In fact, a re-empowering of literary

criticism is overtly mentioned by Geoffrey Hartman as one of
the "shared set of problems" facing those writing in
Deconstruction and Criticism.

He writes in his Preface:

These problems center on two issues that affect
literary criticism today.

One is the situation of

criticism itself, what kind of maturer function it may
claim--a function beyond the obviously academic or
pedagogical.

While teaching, criticizing, and

presenting the great texts of our culture are essential
tasks, to insist on the importance of literature should
not entail assigning to literary criticism only a
service function.

Criticism is part of the world of

letters, and has its own mixed philosophical and
literary, reflective and figural strength. (vii)
Hartman here seems to begin with an interesting notion of a
possible "function beyond the obviously academic or
pedagogical" (perhaps a function beyond the
"professionalism" that I discuss above) for criticism, but
ends up simply wanting to have criticism recognized for its
"figural strength"--the strength it gains from its
recognition of and use of a privileged figural
within "the world of letters."

langua~e-

Again, this seems to leave
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the door open for deconstruction to be read as a
traditional--even traditionalist 18 --thematized reading
method, one which assigns and removes mastery from texts by
the single criterion of their employment of figurative
language.

But it seems to me that if there is to be a

relation between deconstruction and literary criticism, if
deconstruction is to be "useful" at all to literary
criticism, if there is a "lesson to be learned" from
deconstruction, it is that literary criticism must face up
to the questions posed by deconstruction:

it must do

something other than provide a method to produce thematized
readings--to reassert mastery over texts--which,
unfortunately, is what most of the deconstructionist critics
in America have done with Derrida's texts.

Undecidability, Structure, Institution
"Yale" deconstructive criticism has, from its inception
in America, certainly been characterized by its proponents
as a sort of criticism which does something other than
provide such thematized readings; as I argue above, it fails
because it finds the same rock-bottom simple undecidability

18 For example, Hartman's notion that "teaching,
criticizing, and presenting the great texts of our culture
are essential tasks" is debatable on many fronts: who is
the "we" implied by "our culture"; to whom are these tasks
"essential"; what are (the stakes of assigning the status
of) "great texts"? In the end, it seems that all of this
quite clearly reinforces a notion of criticism as simply and
"obviously academic and pedagogical."
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in all texts as the nature of literature.

For the

deconstructionist critic, undecidability is a function of,
is grounded in, the irreducibly rich signification of
literary language; Hartman writes that all deconstructors
are interested in "figurative language, its excesses over an
assigned meaning" (vii).

The undecidability of a text is

the product of the figural, metaphoric language always at
play within the text's attempted constitution of scientific,
objectified truth.
investigation

o~

As Miller writes, "Deconstruction is an

what is implied by this inherence in one

another of figure, concept, and narrative" (223).

In other

words, because figurative language, which is irreducibly
rich in significance or signification, is part of the
constitution of--part of the ground for--the notions of
concept and narrative, these notions cannot be made
univocally significant:

for Miller, the "concept"

literature and the specific text's "narrative" remain
undecidable because of the inherence of "figure"--figurative
language--within their make-up.

Thus, the ground of

deconstructive literary criticism's notion of undecidability
is specifically the undecidability of figurative
1anguage. 19
19 cf.

Mi 11 er' s "The Search for Grounds in Literary
Study," in which he states that a double emphasis on the
tropological and narrative (taken together, figural) nature
of language in a story is both "the underlying logos or
Grund and at the same time [that which] interrupts or
deconstructs that story--this double emphasis tends to break
down generic distinctions and to recognize, for example, the
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This realization of the figural or metaphoric nature of
all language is generally taken to be something that
deconstructive criticism has lifted right out of Derrida, as
an important component of his work.

As Norris writes about

Derrida's work, "deconstruction finds its rock-bottom sense
[in] the irreducibility of metaphor, the differance at play
within the very constitution of 'literal' meaning" (66).
Here Norris characterizes a turn to the irreducible richness
of metaphorical or figurative language (against the
univocality of literal language, against philosophy) as the
thrust of Derrida's work, especially in his famous text on
metaphor, "White Mythology."

This, again, is not the case

in Derrida's work; he writes, against those who take "White
Mythology" to be a text about the privilege of metaphor over
metonomy,
the whole of "White Mythology" constantly puts into
question the current and currently philosophical
interpretation of metaphor as a transfer from the
sensible to the intelligible, as well as the privilege
accorded this trope in the deconstructi0n of
metaphysical rhetoric. ("Retrait" 13)
For Derrida, metaphor is not a trope which can have a
privileged place in the disrupting or deconstruction of
metaphysical rhetoric because it is part and parcel of this

fundamental role of tropes in novels" (Rhetoric and Form
34).
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rhetoric, a ground-concept of metaphysics.
"White Mythology,

He writes in

0

Above all, the movement of metaphorization (origin and
then erasure of the metaphor, transition from the
proper sensory meaning to the proper spiritual meaning
by means of the detour of figures) is nothing other
than the movement of idealization .... Each time a
philosophy defines a metaphor it implies not only a
philosophy but a conceptual network in which philosophy
itself has been constituted.

(Margins 226, 230)

For Derrida, a turn to metaphor, an affirmation of figural
or metaphoric language, is a metaphysical move par
excellence; the concept of metaphor--the sensible standing
in for the intelligible by means of tropes--is the movement
of metaphysics, of idealization, so it could hardly function
as the ground for a concept of undecidability which could in
some way disrupt this movement.
Undecidability, for Derrida, has nothing to do with the
semantic, metaphorical richness of figural language; he
writes, in his discussion of the undecidability of hymen in
Mallarm~,

"'Undecidability' is not caused here by some

enigmatic equivocality, some inexhaustible ambivalence of a
word in a 'natural' language" (Dissemination 220).

It is

not the richness of figural language which brings
undecidability about for Derrida, but the structure of the
field itself--a field which engenders undecidability as a
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symptom of the closure of a certain totalizing way of
thinking, of the need for the displacement of such a system.
He writes,
If totalization no longer has any meaning, it is not
because the infiniteness of a field cannot be covered
by a finite glance or a finite discourse, but becausa
the nature of the field ... excludes totalization.
(Writing and Difference 289, my emphasis)
For Derrida, it is the nature or structure of the field--of
systematicity or metaphoricity in genera1 20--rather than
some sort of inherent ambiguity in a certain tropic use of
figural language which is the ground of undecidability.
According to Derrida, the nature of the field--a field
which, he emphasizes, is made up of both discursive and nondiscursive forces--inscribes difference within the heart of
identity.
This can best be explained, I think, in terms of
Derrida's interest in Saussurian linguistics, wherein the
systematicity of language is accounted for solely in terms
of "differences without positive terms" (Course 120);

for

Derrida, undecidability is a consequence of the functioning
20 structure cannot be thought here as origin, ground,
or limit; as Derrida writes, "Here structure means the
irreducible complexity within which one can only shape or
shift the play of presence or absence: that within which
metaphysics can be produced but which metaphysics cannot
think'' (Grammatology 167, my emphasis). This discussion is
very much indebted to Gasche's discussion of structure and
systematicity in Tain (especially 143 ff.).
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of the general system, a system which is grounded in
difference rather than identity, a system which cannot purge
the difference--the non-presence--which is part of its very
structure.

As Gasche writes,

[For Derrida,] since concepts are produced within a
discursive network of differences, they not only are
what they are by virtue of other concepts, but they
also, in a fundamental way, inscribe that Otherness
within themselves. (Tain 128, my emphasis)
Undecidability is brought about because of this irreducible
otherness which is inscribed in each concept--because of its
necessary inclusion in a systematicity which forces the
concept to constitute itself in/by relation to a chain of
other terms.

One term cannot function as a master term--

rule the system from without--because it is configured in
and it functions within a system always already in place.
There is no pure, positive term constituted (from) without a
system.

The upshot of all this for deconstructive

criticism's reading of undecidability, then, is that for
Derrida this undecidability cannot be a "positive"
consequence of the richness or ambiguity of figural language
for the same reason that a signified cannot be a "positive"
consequence of a signifier for Saussure:

systematicity

excludes the possibility2 1 of a positive master term ruling
21 As a kind of ground, it also engenders this
possibility, making Derrida's notion of ground quasitranscendental, giving simultaneously conditions of

68
within a field.

Hence, the inability to totalize--the

undecidability--that Derrida speaks of is not the "positive"
consequence of a certain sort of tropic language use:
rather, it is conditioned by the nature of the system:

it

is due to the always already fact of systematicity at work
in the very constitution of supposedly pure, "origin-al"
concepts, concepts that wish to rule the chain, assure its
decidability--concepts such as deconstructive criticism's
transcategorial, transhistorical notion of simple
undecidability.

In short, a systematic rather than figural

or rhetorical notion of "undecidability" separates Derrida
from deconstructive criticism.
But perhaps I paint here an overly deconstructive
picture of Saussure's systematic linguistics.

An emphasis

on systematicity is certainly no unproblematic buffer
against decidability.

Saussure, in fact, never quite goes

as far as to allow the end-less chain of substitutions that
would necessarily accompany a linguistics in which the
signified was impure--tainted to the point of being "just"
another signifier.

As Derrida points out, Saussure has

several mechanisms built into his linguistics which
precisely allow decidability and maintain the sovereignty of
the signified--most notable among them is the voice,
Saussure's insistence on the properly spoken character of
possibility and impossibility. Cf. Dissemination p. 166-68
and Tain pp. 316-18. See the more detailed discussion of
ground in Chapter 4.
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language. 22

As Samuel Weber notes, in order to protect

meaning, "What Saussure does is simply to replace the notion
of 'pure difference' with that of 'opposition' in order then
to derive the structure of what he calls the 'totality of
the sign.'" (Institution 146).

On the level of system,

then, Saussure protects meaning by introducing "opposition"
(and hence dialectical sublation) into a system that would
otherwise be characterized by "pure difference," a move
which Derrida analyzes in terms of the opposition
speech/writing. 23

But, as Weber points out, there is

another way that Saussure arrests the chain of
significations and assures meaning--through the very work of
the discipline of linguistics:
this 'totality' [of the sign] is, in turn, the product
of what in a strange and revealing equivocation he
calls the 'linguistic institution,' whose task is 'to
maintain the parallelism between these two orders of
difference,' that is, between signifier and signified.
The equivocation of the term 'linguistic,' which can
refer here to either language or to linguistics, is
revealing inasmuch as it suggests that the
22 saussure writes, "Language and writing are two
distinct systems of signs; the second exists for the sole
purpose of representing the first" (23); of course, language
for Saussure is not simply equal to speech, but speech is
language's proper articulation (see Chapter 3, "The Object
of Linguistics").
23see "Linguistics and Grammatology"
Grammatologx.

(27-65)

in
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establishment and maintenance of the object of a
discipline--language as a system--is a task that only
the discipline itself, qua institution--that is,
linguistics--can perform. (Institution 146)
Weber here points out that Saussure guarantees meaning not
only through the protection afforded the system of language
by the signified, but through the protection afforded the
entire enterprise of language study by the
institutionalization of its discipline.

Here "linguistic

institution" is both the institution (establishment,
organization) of meaning through the system of language and
the protection of this entire apparatus of meaning through
the institution (institutionalization) of the discourse
known as linguistics.
Weber, as I noted above, is somewhat critical of
deconstruction's lack of attention to such matters; he
argues that Derrida's focus on "the conditions of
possibility and impossibility of systematic thought ... has
tended to downplay the forces and factors that always
operate to institute and to maintain certain sets of
paradigms" (19).

Weber, it seems, would criticize Derrida

for deconstructing only the ''systematic" aspect of
Saussure's thought, and not its inevitable--and perhaps more
sinister and pervasive--institutional manifestations. 24
24 one could also note here that Saussure's lingui~tics

is the paradigmatic "science" for structuralism, certainly
the most powerful cross-disciplinary institutional movement
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This is, as I suggest from the beginning of this study, a
point well

taken-~one

which I have already touched upon and

which I will examine at some length in the following
chapters.

However, it is interesting to note here, as I

have noted above, that Weber's argument against the singlemindedly systematic nature of deconstruction depends quite
heavily on what could be called the systematic terms and
strategies of deconstruction.

Weber's argument concerning

the functioning of institutions, for example, follows quite
closely the argument I have been making for the prominence
of the inscription of otherness in Derrida's "systematic''
writings.

In fact, Wlad Godzich paraphrases Weber's

argument in strikingly similar terms; he writes, ''In its
day-to-day functioning, the institution manages to ignore
this constitutive otherness within itself, and yet it cannot
forget it since it stands as its foundational moment" (157).
As I note in Chapter 1, Weber argues throughout his analyses
that disciplines can only do their work it they forget that
they are founded on exclusion--that a (groundless) exclusion
defines the very field of a discipline, and if this
exclusion were taken into account, it would inexorably
disrupt the smooth functioning of the institutional
apparatus.

It should be noted, however, that this is

precisely the logic that a ''systematic" deconstruction
follows--is precisely Derrida's analysis of the work qf
of this century.
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metaphysics.

Following Weber, I likewise have argued that

the only way deconstruction can become criticism--can be
institutionalized as/in a method--is through forgetting this
"foundational moment" of alterity, though this foundational
moment is, strictly speaking, neither a foundation nor a
moment.

It is through a discussion of this (non)founding

"moment" of otherness that I hope to develop the question of
the postmodern--how to think and act without a determinate/
determining foundation--but I digress here to re-emphasize
that, from the "start," this will have been an institutional
as well as a systematic question.

From here, I would like

to move on to discuss Foucault and the problem of
institutionalization--both his work on institutionalization
(especially insofar as it can be brought to bear on
deconstruction) and the institutionalization of his work
(especially insofar as it mirrors and comments on the
commodification of deconstruction).

CHAPTER 3
EXTERIORITY AND APPROPRIATION:
FOUCAULT, DERRIDA, AND THE DISCIPLINE OF LITERARY CRITICISM
In the past decade, Michel Foucault's thought has been
gaining increasing currency in literature departments in the
United States.

If one were to plot schematically the rise

and fall of theories in literature departments, one could
rather easily tie the rise of Foucault's genealogical
discourse to the fall of another contemporary French
discourse, Derrida's deconstruction; in fact, Foucault's
thought first comes on the American literary critical scene
thematized as a socially and institutionally engaged
alternative to what many politically oriented critics saw as
the paralyzing textualism of Derrida and his disciples at
Yale.

Raman Selden gives a representative account of the

debate in A Reader's Guide to Contemporary Literary Theory:
There is another strand in post-structuralist thought
which believes the world is more than a galaxy of
texts, and that some theories of textuality ignore the
fact that discourse is involved in power .... [For
Foucault] it is evident that real power is exercised
through discourse, and that this power has real
effects. (98)
73
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Thus, Foucault is brought to bear on deconstruction in order
to re-orient literary criticism to the real world, to the
workings of "real power" in discourse and history.

In fact,

a whole school of criticism has sprouted up around
Foucault's texts, "new historicism," which takes from a
reading of Foucault its ground notion that "discourse is
like everything else in our society:

the object of a

struggle for power" (Harari 43).
In this chapter, I would like to take issue with the
terms of this debate--specifically with the notion that
Foucault is somehow a champion of historical praxis over
Derrida's purely textual theoria.

But I would like to do so

not in order presumptuously to expose misreadings of either
Foucault or Derrida in the service of a better understanding
of their relationship to literary criticism, but, rather, in
order to say some things about the discipline of literary
criticism itself.

In other words, I am interested less in

exposing supposed "misreadings" of either thinker's work
within this second-hand debate than I am in examining the
institutional and disciplinary imperatives which make these
misreadings possible--in fact, I will argue that a certain
economy of misreading is even necessary if literary
criticism is to "use'' either Foucault or Derrida at all.
And attempt to use them it does.

The discipline of

literary criticism is hungry for paradigms--hungry for new
readings and new methods.

The theory explosion of the
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1970's brought with it an entire "theory industry" within
and around literature departments; the backbone of this
industry is the theoretical guidebook:

there are evaluative

studies like the aforementioned Reader's Guide, Terry
Eagleton's Literary Theory:

An Introduction, much of

Jonathan Culler's early work, or Frank Lentricchia's After
The New Criticism; and there are essay collections, like
Donald Keesey's Contexts For Criticism, Josue Harari's
Textual Strategies:

Perspectives in Poststructuralist

Criticism or H. Aram Veeser's The New Historicism.

Books

such as these are a major source of "theory" for many
literary critics, and they present to the profession various
methods or strategies for reading texts, for producing
critical analyses. 1 As Harari writes in his hugely
successful collection Textual Strategies, "method has become
a strategy" (72), and for Harari, the future of literary
criticism is to be a struggle among these critical
strategies, these truth-strategies:
I have presented the various critical struggles at play
among contemporary theorists.

It remains to inscribe

these strategies in a more global framework, to put
them in the ring of criticism as it were, and to
determine how the rounds are to be scored. (69)
1

These types of books are, of course, especially
prevalent--and, I hasten to add, important--for introductory
courses in graduate curricula, where the traditional
"Bibliography and Methods" course is quickly metamorphosing
into a theory course.
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Harari here invokes a perhaps all-too-familiar picture of
the literature department--indeed of "pluralistic" society
on the whole--as engaged in a violent struggle for the
truth, for truth as strategic "victory," for truth as
appropriation. 2 Such a conception, unfortunately, seems to
replicate rather than displace the violent will-to-truth
which is in question in many of the theoretical discussions
he presents.

Also, Harari's notion of truth as critical

struggle rather problematically recuperates thinking such as
Foucault's or Derrida's within an institution--it names and
preserves the interior, protected space of the university as
the nexus of discourse's truth, the ''ring" where various
truth strategies will be tested and a winner declared.
The notion of a "ring of criticism" is particularly apt
here because the space of interiority suggested by the image
of a ring is precisely what literary criticism has to secure
for itself in order to isolate its object and to perform its
work.

If a truth about a text is to be revealed and

preserved in criticism, then there must be a protected
interior space where this truth can lie:

the structure of

2In fact, Harari gleefully celebrates criticism as
violent appropriation: "all criticism is strategic. To the
question: how should the critic approach knowledge? I know
of only one answer: strategically, The power and
productivity, the gains and losses, the advances and
retrenchments of criticism are inscribed in this term:
strategy, reminding us of its obsolete--obsolete?-definition:
'A violent and bloody act.' In the game.of
knowledge, method has become a strategy: the 'violent and
bloody' agent by which criticism executes the work and in so
doing, paradoxically, canonizes it" (72, his emphasis).
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the work, the biography of the author and its relation to
his or her other works, the relation of the work to its
historical circumstances, and so on.

But any such notion of

interiority--a place protected from the play of a larger
network, a place where meaning can rest unmolested--is
precisely one of the things in question in many of these
"critical strategies," in thinking like Foucault's or
Derrida's. 3 For example, in "What is an Author?," an essay
anthologized (I am tempted to say canonized) in Harari's
collection, Foucault calls for a writing about literature
which is not based on the accepted interior unities of the
author or the book; rather, he speaks of the possibility of
a topology of discourse based on statements, positivities
which "cannot be constructed solely from the grammatical
features, formal structures, and objects of discourse"
(157).

Statements cannot be expected, contra Harari's hope,

to stay in one place and fight it out in the ring of
criticism because, as Gilles Deleuze notes, "each statement
is itself a multiplicity, not a structure or a system" (6)-3Foucault and Derrida do, of course, perform "readings"
of texts, philosophical and literary, but their readings are
different from the majority of literary critical
thematizations because of a certain exterior or reflexive
moment in their readings: crudely put, there is the
genealogical moment in Foucault, where the will to truth
puts itself in question; and for Derrida, there is the
second move of the double reading, which is a displacement
and reinscription of the opposition uncovered in the first
reading. Literary criticism attempts to reproduce these
reflexive moments, but generally preserves an interiority of
meaning through a valorization of the reflexivity itself as
the meaning of all reading, all texts.
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each statement is exterior, diffused, overflowing the
totality of interiority.
It is precisely here, with the exteriority of the
statement, that Foucault poses his most dangerous question
to literary criticism; he writes in The Archaeology of
Knowledge:

"Language, in its appearance as a mode of being,

is the statement [l'enonce]:

as such, it belongs to a

description that is neither transcendental nor
anthropological" (113/148). 4 He goes on to explain:
... the analysis of statements treats them in the
systematic form of exteriority.

Usually, the

historical description of things said is shot through
with [tout entiere traversee par] the opposition of
interior and exterior; and wholly directed by [tout
entiere commandee par] a move from the exterior--which
may be no more than contingency or mere material
necessity, a visible body or uncertain translation-towards the essential nucleus of interiority.
(Archaeology 120-21/158-59)
This formulation of the "historical description of things
said" also holds, I think, for the literary critical
description of things said:

literary criticism moves from

the exterior (the other, the untranslatable, the
unthematized) to the interior (the same, the translation,
the theme).

Foucault challenges the (possibility of such a)

4r continue to cite translation page numbers first.
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totalizing impulse in the human sciences, and outlines a
thinking whose task is "to describe a group of statements
not with reference to the interiority of an intention, a
thought, or a subject, but in accordance with the dispersion
of an exteriority" (Archaeology 125/164).
Notions such as dispersion and exteriority pose serious
problems for literary criticism, whose traditional field
enables it to explain what is inside a text by putting to
work certain notions from outside a text, from a constructed
place of critical privilege such as the author, reader,
structure, or historical circumstances of the text.
Paradoxically then, in the literary critical model,
"outside" the text becomes another name not for an
exteriority which would disperse the text's meanings, but
rather for another--perhaps more pernicious--interiority
which could protect and preserve the text's meanings; in
other words, for criticism, the "outside" of the text is
simply another name for an interior space--a space which can
maintain its purity because it is beyond the play of the
textual network.

For example, in "What is an Author?"

Foucault takes up the problem of the text's relation to the
author--"the manner in which the text points to this
'figure' that, at least in appearance, is outside it and
antecedes it" (141)--and argues that the author is one such
privileged space of interiority that is outside the text:
[The author] is a certain functional principle by
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which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and
chooses; in short, by which one impedes the free
circulation, the free manipulation, the free
composition, decomposition, and recomposition of
fiction. (159)
Foucault here points out that criticism employs the notion
of the author to preserve a space of meaning, an interiority
which can arrest the exterior hazards of signification.

But

it is problematic--if not impossible--to locate and maintain
such spaces of interiority because, as Foucault notes,
the margins of a book are never clear-cut:

beyond the

title, the first lines, and the last full stop, beyond
its internal configuration and its autonomous form, it
is caught up in a system of references [un systeme de
renvois] to other books, other texts, other sentences:
it is a node within a network. (Archaeology 23/34,
translation slightly modified)
For Foucault, the book exists in an exterior network of
statements where the interiority of totality is always
dispersed; hence, there is no protected interior space
within this network which could rule the entire network.
Likewise, there is no place above or below the surface of
discourse--no "outside," no pure interior space beyond the
reach of the exterior network's effects--which could explain
discourse, which could force discourse to render up a" secret
truth.

This is what he calls the flattening of discourse:
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all discourse is on a flat surface; therefore no instance of
discourse can claim to rule from outside--above, below, or
from a protected interior space upon--the surface, can
explain or ground the entire chain nor preserve an instance
of determinate meaning within the network.

He writes,

"There is no sub-text [Il n'y a pas de texte d'en dessous].
And therefore no plethora.

The enunciative level is

identical with its own surface" (Archaeology 119/157).
At this point, we may have to circle back to where we
started this chapter, with literary criticism's recent
romancing of Foucault at the expense of Derrida--to Raman
Selden, who goes on to write in his Reader's Guide:

"Like

other post-structuralists, Foucault regards discourse as a
central human activity, but not as a universal, 'general
text,' a vast sea of signification" (98).

This would seem

to be the party line on the huge difference between
Foucault's thought and Derrida's:

Foucault's thought is

interested in active power and history, Derrida's in passive
thought and textuality. 5 But I would like to step back and
5Foucault is, of course, more than partially
responsible for this thematization of his thought vis-a-vis
Derrida's, but I am not considering in this essay his rather
vitriolic--and, it seems to me, unfair--response to Derrida
in "My Body, This Paper, This Fire." This may seem like an
outrageous avoidance on my part, but I justify it on two
counts: 1) Foucault's text consists almost entirely of a
point-by-point refutation of Derrida's reading of Descartes
on the dreamer and the madman, something which does not
directly concern me here (Foucault's infamous remarks "
concerning the metaphysical and pedagogical danger of "there
is nothing outside the text" are dealt with below); 2)
Foucault himself later criticizes Historie de la folie, as I
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try to read Derrida and Foucault together.

Strangely

enough, I would like to read them together at the point
where they seem farthest apart, at that "place" in Derrida's
text that a whole host of his critics (including Foucault)
have pointed to as the metaphysical Achilles' heel of
deconstruction:

Derrida's notion of "general text," which

Selden glosses above as a totalizing "universal" that denies
the world and history in favor of a "vast sea of
signification." 6
As I argue above, with his notion of general text
Derrida is not attempting to cast the text and the world in
what Foucault calls "the gray light of neutralization"
("Author?" 145), but rather to complicate notions of
exterior and interior--not attempting "to extend the
reassuring notion of the text to a whole extra-textual realm
and to transform the world into a library by doing away with
all boundaries, all framework, all sharp edges," but rather
also outline below, for its naive notions of the
metaphysical "experience" of madness--a criticism which, to
a great extent, actually agrees with Derrida's: "everything
[in Historie de la folie] transpires as if Foucault knew
what 'madness' means. Everything transpires as if, in a
continuous and underlying way, an assured and rigorous
precomprehension of the concept of madness, or at least of
its normal definition, were possible and acquired" ("Cogito"
41). For an excellent discussion of the conflict, see Geoff
Bennington's "Cogito Incognito," a brief but insightful
introduction to his translation of Foucault's essay.
6The secondary sources for such a reading of Derrida
are too numerous to mention--it has become critical
commonplace; so, instead, let me cite a book concerning
Derrida and criticism that doesn't contain such a reading of
general text: Gasche's The Tain of the Mirror.
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"to work out the theoretical and practical system of these
margins, these borders, once more, from the ground up"
("Living On" 84).

Derrida's notion of text, then, seems to

have at least this much in common with Foucault's notion of
the exteriority of a network of statements:

both notions

posit a discursive field or network in which no term can
rule from a privileged place of interiority; 7 and both
share what Foucault calls a "limit-attitude"
("Enlightenment?" 45), an interest in re-working thought's
borders in the wake of the Enlightenment.
But it is at this limit that the dominant literary
critical-political reading of. Foucault triumphs over
Derrida; Foucault, given this reading, is interested in
"reference and reality," with the "world of institutions and
action" CArac "To Regress" 250, 243), 8 while Derrida
reinscribes everything within the rigid limit of the prison
7rn fact, one could gloss Derrida on the undecidability

of text by quoting Foucault on the network of statements:
"there is no statement in general, no free, independent
statement; but a statement always belongs to a series or a
whole, always plays a role among other statements, deriving
support from them and distinguishing itself from them: it
is always part of a network of statements" (Archaeology 99).
8Arac's "To Regress·From the Rigor of Shelley," a

review of Harari's Textual Strategies and Deconstruction and
Criticism, champions the essays in the Harari collection
which have an overt historical or political agenda, but does
not question the institutional imperatives which might give
rise to such collections; he seems, on the contrary, to
toast these imperatives. He writes, building on an image
from Shelley: "The 1970's have experienced critical
fermentation, following the notable effervescence that began
the decade" (242).
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house of language.

Again, I think this is an inadequate

reading of both thinkers.

Derrida sums up the relation

between text and limit or context like this:
I set down here as an axiom and as that which is to be
proved that the reconstitution cannot be finished.
This is my starting point:

no meaning can be

determined out of context, but no context permits
saturation.

What I am referring to here is not

richness of substance, semantic fertility, but rather
structure:

the structure of the remnant or of

iteration ("Living On" 81);
while Foucault writes,
A statement always has borders [marges] peopled by
other statements.

These borders are not what is

usually meant by 'context'--real or verbal--that is,
all the situational or linguistic elements, taken
together, that motivate a formulation and determine its
meaning.

They are distinct from such a 'context'

precisely in so far as they make it possible
(Archaeology 97-8/128-29).
Here again it seems that we see Foucault and Derrida in
general agreement against traditional and critical notions
of context:

one cannot appeal to (historical or extra-

textual) context to rein in the significations of a
statement or a text; a space of interior privilege
maintained ''outside the text."

ca~not

In fact, both Derrida and

be
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Foucault seem to agree that context cannot rule text--a
place of interiority cannot be maintained in an exterior
field--precisely because context is not really "outside" the
text at all.

Quite the contrary:

both text and context are

engendered or made possible in the same field, under the
same conditions--for Foucault this field is the "flat"
network of statements, for Derrida it is the "structure of
the remnant or of iteration." 9 Both notions serve to make
it impossible for literary criticism to preserve a space of
interiority by which it could construct a critical system--a
saturated critical context above, below, or outside the
text--to reveal and protect meaning.
This, it seems to me, is precisely why many literary
critics simply have to read Derrida and Foucault as they do
--Derrida as the last in a transcendentalist philosophical
line and Foucault as the last in a materialist historicist
line, as the founders of a "textual" deconstructive
criticism and a "worldly" new historicism.

Such readings

are necessary if literary criticism is to continue as an
autonomous discipline, because if literary criticism accepts
a notion of exteriority, it not only has to face the problem
of doing something other than revealing a meaning in the
9cf. Carolyn Porter's "After the New Historicism," in
which she tries similarly to read Derrida and Foucault
together: "to say that there nothing outside the text
because there is no transcendental signified is precisely to
cancel depth in order to foreground a signifying process
which operates in and constitutes a horizonless plane"
( 266).

86

text, it has the much more pervasive problem of actually
isolating its object, of separating inside- from outsidetext, texte from hors-texte.

Again we see the institutional

imperative for literary critics to read Derrida's famous
phrase "il n'y a pas de hors-texte" as "there is nothing
outside of the text":

if everything can be found within

texts or textuality, and critics read texts for a living,
then obviously the place or role of criticism is secured.
However, if one translates this phrase as "there is no
extra-text [literally, out-text]," it brings out a much
different reading:

a network of exteriority (here named

''text") is given--has no determinable origin or telos--and
no one term or discourse can claim privilege over another
within this field; no space can be protected from the play
of the network.

Obviously, while the latter reading is

positively disastrous for literary criticism's project, the
former interpretation allows a continued central role for
criticism:

as I argue above, it allows critics to produce a

deconstructive methodology and apply it to the whole of
their field--revealing that, indeed, there is a nothing
outside the determinate text precisely by applying a
deconstructive methodology from this ultra-privileged site
of the outside.
This easy methodologizing is one of Foucault's central
critiques of Derrida's thought; Foucault argues that certain
notions of the intransitivity of literature, extracted from
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the work of Barthes and Blanchet, "are quickly taken up in
the interior of an institution ... :
university" (Foucault Live

~14).

the institution of the
But, as we have seen, it

is only given a certain (rather suspect) reading of
Derrida's thought that it can be taken up for such
institutional imperatives--and, as is becoming clear in the
movement or methodology called new historicism, Foucault's
is no less prone to hypostasization.

One might profitably

object here that Foucault's work has no essential relation
to new historicism--as we have seen Gasche argue concerning
Derrida's relation to deconstructive criticism--but there is
no denying the perceived influence of Foucault's work on new
historicism, both in the texts of new historicists and
critics of new historicism alike.

Foucault's perceived link

to new historicism is so strong, for example, that Frank
Lentricchia's essay in The New Historicism, "Foucault's
Legacy:

A New Historicism?," does not quote one word of

Foucault's text; granted, the original printing of
Lentricchia's essay places it after his long and involved
discussion of Foucault in Ariel and the Police, but when
Lentricchia turns specifically to discuss new historicism,
he mentions Stephen Greenblatt throughout in the same breath
as Foucault, reinforcing the widespread belief that new
historicism is simply a translation of Foucault--that
because "Foucault's key obsessions and terms shape
Greenblatt's argument" (242n), the relation between
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Foucault's texts and new historicism is an unproblematic
one. 10

This claim, in fact, could be said to comprise the

"dominant'' reading of new historicism--it supposedly takes
directly from Foucault its ground notion, its "key
obsession":

a discontinuous power that moves through

everything.

For example, Carolyn Porter reads Greenblatt's

assertion that "theatricality ... is not set over against
power but is one of its essential modes" as a translation of
Foucault's claim that power "induces pleasure, forms
knowledge, produces discourse" (262).

In a crowning irony,

one can now find Foucault being referred to as a
practitioner of Berkeley new historicism, 11 just as Derrida
was or is thought of as a Yale critic.
Insofar as Foucault (infamously) criticizes Derrida's
thinking as "a historically well-determined little pedagogy"
("My Body" 27), all of this institutional attention creates

10 rt should be noted that Greenblatt is scarcely
responsible for such a reading; in fact, Greenblatt
stubbornly refuses to offer a methodologization of Foucault
--he cites Foucault quite sparsely, only twice in
Shakespearean Negotiations--and refuses to offer a readymade method for his own project, defining cultural poetics
rather open-endedly as the "study of the collective making
of distinct cultural practices and inquiry into the
relations among these practices" (5). Likewise, Greenblatt
stresses the institutional focus of cultural poetics,
especially in essays like "Shakespeare and the Exorcists."
11 see Richard Lehan's "The Theoretical Limits of New
Historicism," where, citing Hayden White, he attacks "the
logic of new historicism, at least as practiced by Foucault"
(540).
Lehan goes on to name Foucault's thinking the~
dominant component of "a theory that has now fashionably
emerged as the representation school" (540).
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something of a problem for him, though it seems fairly easy
to locate the beginning of a Foucaultian response to his own
methodization:

power produces, an institutional discipline

produces, and it consistently needs new processes by which
to produce new objects of study or new thematizations; in
short, a discipline like literary criticism needs
determinate--and determinin.g--methodologies.

New

historicism, then, takes Foucault's exterior notions of
power and discontinuity in historical analysis and turns
them into usable, interior, ontological notions:

new

historicism often analyzes texts by studying the slippery
relations of power in texts and in history.

This

historicism is "new" in that it takes into account the
discontinuity of history, but it can quickly become ''old"
again when it takes up a notion of discontinuity as a
simple, declarable discontinuity:

studies are produced

which tell us that while we used to think history was
continuous, it was in fact discontinuous.

For example, in

Habits of Thought in the English Renaissance (Volume 13 of
Greenblatt's New Historicism series), Debora K. Shuger takes
up "[t]he new historicist critique of traditional
formulations of Renaissance thought" (1 ); she writes:
Investigation of these habits of thought in the
dominant culture of the English Renaissance yields
surprising results.

Despite their general agreement on

doctrinal matters, the figures studied present an
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unexpected and sometimes drastic ideological pluralism.
Instead of a monologic world view, one uncovers complex
and divergent assumptions .... The [Renaissance] impulse
to define and distinguish ... results from a prior sense
of confusion and lack of demarcation. (9-10, my
emphases)
For Shuger, new historicism uncovers the "complex and
divergent assumptions" which underlie a supposedly or
traditionally "monologic world view"; in fact, she seems to
argue that behind any historical or intellectual order(ing)
there is

a prior sense of confusion and lack of

demarcation."

She concludes her introduction with what

seems to be an apt formulation of the new historicist
critique:

"Renaissance works noticeably lack a systematic

coherence, their discontinuities instead exposing the
struggle for meaning that fissures the last premodern
generation" (16, my emphasis).
If this is the case, then the place or value of
Foucault in new historicism is his discovery or exposure of
the disorder which lies under or behind the supposed order
of history--that behind what seems to be a historical
continuity, one can always and everywhere find or uncover
discontinuity.

However, we have already seen Foucault

problematizing this language of depth and his skepticism
about "exposing'' hidden origins (whether they be origins of
order or disorder); likewise, such a reading of Foucault
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precisely allows the easy methodological
institutionalization which he criticizes Derrida for
promoting--allows discontinuity to lie behind every
continuity, and allows for the exposure of this
discontinuity as/in the end of a discipline or method.
Foucault responds to such a fetishizing of discontinuity:
My problem was not at all to say, 'Voila, long live
discontinuity, we are in the discontinuous and a good
thing too,' but to pose the question, 'How is it that
at certain moments and in certain orders of knowledge,
there are these sudden take-offs, these hastenings of
evolution, these transformations which fail to
correspond to the calm, continuist image that is
normally accredited?' (Power/Knowledge 112)
For Foucault, it is not a matter of offering a choppy,
discontinuist image of history to combat the "normally
accredited" image of calm continuity, but rather a matter of
attending to the disruptions themselves.

Discontinuity, as

a declarable historical or philosophical principle, can and
does lead back to a totalizing image or picture of the
historical "orders of knowledge"--is part and parcel of a
very continuous

institutional and methodological project.

As Foucault writes about historical discourse at the end of
the 18th century:

"the regular historians were revealing

continuities, while the historians of ideas were liberating
discontinuities.

But I believe that they are two
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symmetrical and inverse effects of the same methodological
renewal of history in general" (Live 47, my emphasis).
The methodological problematic Foucault outlines here,
no doubt, doubles my own:

I do not wish simply or primarily

to offer a "symmetrical and inverse picture" of Foucault and
Derrida--to say, 'Voila, literary criticism misreads
Foucault and Derrida, and here is the correct way to read
them'--but to try to ask how or why it is, in some sense,
inevitable that they will be misread by a discipline, and to
ask if there is a mechanism in either thinker's text for
explaining this appropriation--perhaps also complicating it
--and to locate difference(s) through this operation.

As I

state above, I am less interested in "exposing" poor
readings and misappropriations (though there is obviously a
necessarily critical or polemical tone to parts of my text)
than I am in tracing the institutional and systematic
imperatives of these appropriations.

The question at hand

becomes, then, can Foucault and/or Derrida provide a
rationale for their own appropriation by the discipline of
literary criticism--can their thinking of the reflexive
moment of exteriority explain its own, for lack of a better
word, re-interiorization within an institution or a method,
within "new hi stori ci sm" or "deconstruct i ve er it i ci sm" ? 12
12rt is interesting to note here Gayatri c. Spivak's
provocative comments on her position in the new historicism/
deconstruction debate: she writes, citing Derrida, that
"the conflict between New Historicism and deconstruction can
now be narrowed down to a turf battle between Berkeley and
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Perhaps tracing out possible answers to this question will
help bring out important differences which, so far at least,
I have been at great pains to collapse.
As I argue above, Foucault's explanation for his own
appropriation would revolve around the problematics of
power, and the way in which instances of power tend to move
the exterior toward the interior--that even institutional
studies which liberate in some way also create a new object
or topic for discourse or study, a new subject(ification).
Foucault puts it quite succinctly in "La folie, l'absence
d'oeuvre," an appendix to the second edition of Historie de
la folie:
[Someday,] everything that we experience today in the
form of a limit or as foreign or insupportable, will
have taken on the serene characteristics of what is
positive.

And what for us today designates this

Exterior risks one day designating us.

(trans. and

cited in Carroll 76)
Later in his career, Foucault criticizes Madness and
Civilization for its naive notions of power (Power/Knowledge
118-19) and of "experience" (Archeology 16/27, where the

translation incorrectly renders "experience" as

Irvine, Berkeley and Los Angeles .... At any rate, since I
see the new historicism as a sort of media hype mounted
against deconstruction, I find it hard to position myself in
its regard" (280).
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"experiment"), 13 but this "early" quotation seems to be
consistent with "late" Foucaultian interest in "a form of
power which makes individuals subjects ... a form of power
which subjugates and makes subject to" ("Subject and Power"
212).

Every liberation (of a cause, a discourse, a group,

especially of an "individual" like the madman liberated from
his madness) can and will transform into a type of
subjugation--into a subject for definition--and subsequently
into the conditions of emergence for later definitions,
later designations. 14

The exterior does not remain

exterior; it "risks one day designating us.

Through this

formulation, Foucault names the logic by which his thought
is brought into an institution.

He offers no "counter-

formulation" precisely because he does not want to play into
the hands of this logic by designating alternative
conditions of possibility; his texts do not attempt to
theorize or "ground" an outside precisely as a buffer
against a totalizing logic which could then subsume or
sublate it.

He refuses to play the game on the terms of

transcendental/dialectical philosophy, on Hegel's terms.
Indeed, Hegel is the thinker who poses the greatest

13 see

David Carroll's excellent discussion of this
problem in Paraesthetics (53-67); I must also credit him
with drawing my attention the mistranslation (57n).
14 cf.

Deleuze: "From Madness and Ci vi 1 i zation on,
Foucault analyzed the discourse of the 'philanthropist' who
freed madmen from their chains, without concealing the more
effective set of chains to which he destined them" (54).
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question to thinking in our "postmodern'' epoch (insofar as
he is the thinker of the completion or totalization of the
modern):

how does one think against a Hegelian system which

is fueled by negation, which diffuses contradiction or
opposition by consuming it as merely a higher form of the
system's own truth?

As Derrida summarizes Hegelian

sublation, "The Hegelian Aufhebung is produced entirely
within discourse, from within the system or the work of
signification.

A determination is negated and conserved in

another determination which reveals the truth of the former"
(Writing 275).

All critical discourse, then, risks playing

directly into Hegel's hand, "risks agreeing to the
reasonableness of reason, of philosophy, of Hegel, who is
always right, as soon as one opens one's mouth in order to
articulate meaning" (Writing 263).

For Foucault, this

question of Hegel is perhaps the most important question for
postmodern thought:
truly to escape Hegel involves an exact appreciation of
the price we have to pay to detach ourselves from him.
It assumes that we are aware of [suppose de savoir] the
extent to which Hegel, insidiously perhaps, is close to
us; it implies a knowledge, in that which permits us to
think against Hegel, of that which remains Hegelian.
We have to determine the extent to which our antiHegel ianism is possibly one of his tricks directed
against us, at the end of which he stands, motionless,
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waiting for us. (Discourse 235/74-5)
Here Foucault takes up the question that Hegel poses to
contemporary thought:

how to think against a structure that

anticipates or negates such thinking, that in fact thrives
on determinate negations?

And it is precisely because of

his suspicion of Hegelian sublation that it is difficult to
read Foucault as ideology critique--as, for example,
Habermas would like to read him. 15

Ideology critique

depends on a moment of liberation through reason, on the
demystification of ideology in order to unmask knowledge.
As Louis Althusser writes, ideology critique moves in the
service of "scientific knowledge, against all the
mystifications of ideological 'knowledge.'

Against the

merely moral denunciation of myths and lies, for their
rational and rigorous criticism" (Lenin 11).

But, for

Foucault, "criticism"--as an attempt to stake out a more
excellent reason or ground--guarantees that the winner has
already been declared:

Hegel in a unanimous decision; the

dialectic continues undisrupted; reason is reassured.

As

Foucault writes, "'Dialectic' is a way of evading the always
open and hazardous reality of conflict by reducing it to a
Hegelian skeleton" (Power/Knowledge 114-5).

15Habermas' first lecture on Foucault in Modernity is
entitled "An Unmasking of the Human Sciences: Foucault,"
and while he clearly sympathizes with the "critical" side of
Foucaultian analyses, he cannot agree with Foucault's
genealogical analyses in that they deny the moment of
"liberating'' knowledge that ideology critique seeks.
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The overarching criticism of Foucault's work in
literary critical circles revolves around his refusal to
acknowledge a moment of liberation through reason.

For

example, Edward Said, while sympathetic to components of
Foucault's work, refuses to accept the notion that there is
no space or end of liberation in criticism, or that a
discipline like literary criticism necessarily creates a
kind of subjugation as it studies phenomena; he writes,
criticism must think of itself as life-enhancing and
constitutively opposed to every form of tyranny,
domination, and abuse; its social goals are noncoercive
knowledge produced in the interests of human freedom.
(World 29, my emphasis) . 16
While these certainly are reassuring sentiments, for
Foucault reassurance is precisely the problem here:

a

"belief in non-coercive human community'' (246) is a claim
for the self-evidence of the critical project--is ultimately
a justification that cannot be examined or questioned, just
as the ideological justifications for the political powers
Said would wish to demystify ultimately protect themselves
from examination.

Likewise, it seems that the most

16 cf. Merod's The Social Responsibility of the Critic,
where he writes, on the Chomsky/Foucault debate that Said
(246) makes much of:
"Chomsky stresses 'the normal
creativity of everyday life' which prompts the emergence of
language, culture, and both individual and societal
practices that cannot be thought of as regulatory or .
repressive in any systematic way, but rather as life-giving
and constructive. genuinely experimental" (168, my
emphasis).
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traditional critic could see his or her project in Said's
f o rmu 1at ion:

"noncoe re i ve know 1edge" seems precise 1 y a

translation of ''disinterested knowledge," and as such serves
to protect the institutional interests of criticism all the
more strongly. 17

For Foucault, there is no simple

"liberation" through knowledge; as he writes, "knowledge is
not made for understanding; it is made for cutting"
(''Nietzsche" 88).

The "knowledge" produced by the human

sciences cannot move away from its origins as/in a kind of
violence--and literary criticism (in both its institutional
and systematic functions) is implicated in the movement of
"liberation" through the subjugation of knowing:

a

discipline makes a new object to be studied out of the
liberation itself, thereby reasserting reason's control.
Liberation is confronted at its end by the smiling figure of
Hegel, who has been there all along.
But this does not lead Foucault to a kind of stagnation
or silence.

The absence of a determinate methodology in his

work and his denial of liberation within a discourse--so
frustrating and ultimately paralyzing to some--have
certainly not curtailed his production of important studies:
17 see Paul Bove's insightful discussion of Said and
Foucault in chapter 5 of Intellectuals in Power, where he
writes: "My objection ... to Said's position is that it
leaves this regime [the regime of truth] unchanged insofar
as it validates the traditional role played by the leading
intellectual who, above all, will not call into question his
or her own interests in exploiting the ability to imagine
and promote 'alternatives' continually in order to maintain
or achieve authority and identity in society" (234).
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studies of the madhouse, the prison, the clinic, sexuality.
But, one might profitably ask, why does Foucault produce
studies if they do not lead to the Enlightenment goals of
heightened understanding or liberating knowledge?
on?

Why go

As he takes a chair at the College de France, he

discusses his "projects":
the analyses I intend to undertake fall into two
groups.

On the one hand, the 'critical' group which

sets the reversal-principle to work.

I shall attempt

to distinguish forms of exclusion, limitation and
appropriation .... I shall try to show how they are
formed, in answer to which needs, how they are modified
and displaced, which constraints they have effectively
exercised, to what extent they have been worked on.

On

the other hand, the 'genealogical' group, which brings
the other three principles [chance, discontinuity, and
materiality] into play:

how series of discourse are

formed, though, in spite of, or with the aid of these
systems of constraint:

what were the specific forms

for each, and what were their conditions of appearance,
growth, and variation. (Discourse 231-32/61-2)
Foucault's answer is necessarily double, thinking
necessarily both inside and outside a system that is to be
interrogated.

For Foucault, like Derrida, analysis begins

with an indispensable "critical" or polemical phase of
reversal, a phase which attempts "to distinguish forms of
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exclusion, limitation and appropriation."

But, and this is

the crucial point (as it is with Derrida), Foucault's
analysis does not stop here with an overturning; if it does,
it cannot truly escape Hegel--it is doomed to repeat the
exclusions it uncovers.

The overturning or uncovering

itself must be subjected to an examination, but one which
brings a sort of indeterminacy to bear on the overturning,
on its emergence among various possibilities, chances, and
discontinuities.

Contra many of his critics, Foucault

certainly does recognize a kind of "progress" in or through
disciplines and the human sciences, 18 but it is necessarily
a progress that leads to other--though, admittedly, often
more humane or palatable--forms of exclusion and
subjugation, not to a space of unproblematic, reassuring
freedom.

The progress of knowledge is itself a Hegelian

ruse, and for Foucault, it is only if one takes into account
a certain exteriority in the conditions of emergence for a
discourse--thereby refusing an alternative, determinate
ground or higher knowledge--that one has the chance of
denying Hegel his otherwise predetermined victory by
refusing to play the game of knowledge on his terms.
18 cf. Rorty's critique in "Foucault/Dewey/Nietzsche,"
where he writes: "We liberals in the USA wish that Foucault
could have managed, just once, what ... he always resisted:
'some positive evaluation of the liberal state.' ... You
would never guess, from Foucault's account of the changes in
European social institutions during the last three hundred
years, that during that period suffering had decreased
considerably, nor that people's chances of choosing their
own styles of life increased considerably" (3).
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This is perhaps where we see the major point of
conflict between Foucault and Derrida:

Derrida, rather than

refusing to play on Hegel's terms, attempts to beat Hegel at
his own game; he encounters transcendental/dialectical
philosophy and tries to disrupt it by theorizing its
conditions of possibility--which must, he argues, be
partially non-transcendental, impure.

This gives us a way

of offering what might be Derrida's answer to the question
of his appropriation by criticism:

a transcendental or

critical discourse will, to be sure, expel the otherness
within it--the dialectic will totalize, will bring becoming
into being--but for Derrida, an otherness still remains.
writes,
There is no choosing here:

each time a discourse

contra the transcendental is held, a matrix--the
(con)striction itself--constrains the discourse to
place the nontranscendental, the outside of the
transcendental field, the excluded, in a structuring
position.

The matrix in question constitutes the

excluded as transcendental of the transcendental, as
imitation transcendental, transcendental contra-band.
The contra-band is not yet dialectical contradiction.
To be sure, the contra-band necessarily becomes that,
but its not-yet is not-yet the teleological
anticipation, which results in it never becoming
dialectical contradiction.

The contra-band remains

He

102

something other than what, necessarily, it is to
become.
Such would be the (nondialectical) law of the
(dialectical) stricture, of the bond, of the ligature,
of the garrote, of the desmos in general when it comes
to clench

tigh~ly

dialectical.

in order to make be.

Lock of the

(Glas 244a)

Derrida offers a logic of his own appropriation which is at
once very similar to Foucault's and at the same time
radically different.

Derrida's text can explain its

interiorization in terms of the violence of dialectical
thinking:

the violence of the dialectical stricture "when

it comes to clench tightly in order to make be"; the need
within dialectical thinking (which is also critical
thinking) for definition, synthesis; critical thinking's
necessary interiorizing of an outside in order to cover up
the structuring (literally transcendental) position of an
outside within that thinking.

Derrida attempts to disrupt

this movement of making be by thinking the "transcendental
of the transcendental," the structuring principle of the
transcendental which the transcendental itself cannot think
--that is, if it is to do the work of a traditional
transcendental.
So perhaps we have come to the point where Derrida's
thinking and Foucault's most radically part company:

for

Foucault, the ''transcendentalist" emphasis of Derrida's work
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is simply unacceptable, too prone to become a new orthodoxy.
For all the similar effects and attributes of a Foucaultian
network of statements and Derridean general text, perhaps
the overriding difference is that "for statements it is not
a condition of possibility but a law of coexistence"
(Archaeology 116/153). 19

For Foucault, Derrida's

involvement with a transcendental vocabulary allows the
possibility that a transcendental space of interiority
can be purified in the problematic of trace, which,
prior to all speech, is the opening of inscription and
the difference of deferred time [ecart du temps
differe]; it is always the historico-transcendental
theme that is reinvested. (Archaeology 121/159,
translation modified)
Such a potential for reification, according to Foucault,
plays into the hands of institutional, status quo thinking.
But it seems, in the wake of Hegel, that these are the risks
of thinking itself--the risks of thinking or speaking at

°

all . 2

Foucault's disruptive materialist discourse is no

less difficult to take up for institutional uses than
Derrida's disruptive transcendental discourse.

And Derrida,

for his part, is acutely aware of the institutionalization
of undecidability or unreadability as a reading method in

19 see

Dreyfus and Rabi now, who make much of this ·
distinction (52-58).
20 cf. Derrida's "The Principle of Reason" (17ff.).
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American literary criticism; Derrida writes his essay in
Deconstruction and Criticism with this caveat concerning
Maurice Blanchot's L'Arrat de mort:
The readability of unreadability is as improbable as an
arrat de mort.

No law of (normal) reading can

guarantee its legitimacy.

By normal reading I mean

every reading that insures knowledge transmittable in
its own language, in a language, in a school or
academy, knowledge constructed and insured in
institutional constructions, in accordance with laws
made so as to resist (precisely because they are
weaker) the ambiguous threats with which the

arr~t

de

mort troubles so many conceptual oppositions,
boundaries, borders.
the
This

arr~t

arr~t,

of the law.

The

arr~t

de mort brings about

("Living On" 171)

this interruption, this gap, this falling out of

(the dialectical movement of) work, lives on and remains uninstitutionalizable, untranslatable, impossible to
legitimize, precisely because it disrupts the laws by which
it could be institutionalized, defined, or legitimated.
Even after its seeming sublation, for Derrida the

arr~t

remains.
And perhaps it is here that Derrida and Foucault can be
thought together again; they both attempt to bring about and
attend to a certain absence of work, an

arr~t,

a break, a

fissure, a discontinuity of /at/on/in the otherwise smooth,
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confident flow of dialectical thinking.

Whether this break

is located at a transcendental or emergent level seems, to
me anyway, not as important as the insistence on the break
or hesitation itself, the moment of exteriority that poses a
very difficult question for critical thinking--including
literary critical thinking:

can this hesitation, this

otherness, be attended to "critically," that is thematically
or in a revelatory discourse, one which attempts to uncover
a determinate truth?

Or does it require what Derrida calls

a "thinking altogether differently" ("Sending" 326)?
very well may.

It

Perhaps Foucault puts the question--the

question to critical thinking that both he and Derrida, in
different ways, pose--most succinctly:
There are times in life when the question of knowing if
one can think differently than one thinks, and perceive
differently than one sees, is absolutely necessary if
one is to go on looking and reflecting at all .... what
is philosophy today--philosophical activity, I mean--if
it is not the critical work that thought brings to bear
on itself?

In what does it consist, if not in the

endeavor to know how and to what extent it might be
possible to think differently, instead of legitimating
what is already known? (The Use of Pleasure 8-9)
But how, one might ask, does one think differently,
especially if one cannot simply escape a certain thinking of
the same?

What exactly does "postmodern" mean in the
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context of this questioning?

How can it be thematized?

What do the necessarily "double" analyses of the postmodern
look like, and what do they accomplish?

Likewise, after

three chapters, we must at long last broach the question of
the specificity of literature in or for this thinking
differently.
After discussing for three chapters philosophies of
borders and withdrawing grounds, perhaps we also need to ask
why such questions become pressing at a particular
historical space or time we call postmodern.

Why, in other

words, do these questions and problems arise "now''?

Why

would the questions posed to critical thinking by notions
like general text or the statement come on the scene at all,
much less at this postmodern "now"?

Perhaps, as much

postmodern discourse suggests, we are indeed at the end of
something--the end of the subject, the end of art, the end
of history--but what does or can "end'' mean in this
displaced postmodern context?

In the following chapters, I

will attempt to take up these topics--to perform, for lack
of another word, "positive" analyses of postmodern thought
and literature.

CHAPTER 4
THINKING\WRITING THE POSTMODERN
Criticism, if it is called upon to enter into explication
and exchange with literary writing, some day will not have
to wait for this resistance first to be organized into a
"philosophy" which would govern some methodology of
aesthetics whose principles criticism would receive .... But
this enterprise is hopeless if one muses on the fact that
literary criticism has already been determined, knowingly or
not, voluntarily or not, as the philosophy of literature.
--Derrida
Theorizing the Postmodern,
At the End of Metaphysics
Theorizing the postmodern has become a full-time
profession for a cross-disciplinary army of thinkers.
Generally speaking, defining the postmodern has become a
vexing problem which has led to widely varying critical
positions on the matter; however, the one thing that various
postmodernisms and postmodernists seem to have in common is
their assertion that a stable, knowable, transcendental
notion of "truth" has become impossible to ground.

From

there, agreement ends, though at the risk of being
reductive, I will venture to say that thematizations of the
postmodern among literary critics tend to fall into two
camps:

those who define postmodernism as a stylistic or

systematic phenomenon and those who define it as a
historical phenomenon.

Both kinds of definition have proven
107
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problematic.

For example, if postmodernism is a stylistic

phenomenon (defined by a system of features such as
playfulness, open-endedness, discontinuity, self-conscious
reflection on the production of literature, excess, reader
participation, etc.), 1 then why isn't, for example,
Tristram Shandy postmodern?

Tale of a Tub?

Why not Milton, for that matter? 2

Chaucer?

Ovid?

Defining the postmodern

as a stylistic phenomenon tends to rob it of any historical
significance or specificity--in fact, at its strongest this
notion tends to reduce the complex play of the history of
literature to the transhistorical battle of postmodernism
and its other by turning postmodernism into a kind of Geist
which animates the whole of literary history. 3
1see, for example,

Lodge, who discusses "the formal
principles underlying postmodernist writing" (228ff.), among
them contradiction, permutation, discontinuity, randomness,
excess. See also Hassan's "Toward a Concept of
Postmodernism," where he offers a conveniently dialectical
list of the features of modernism and postmodernism (91-92).
2For just such a treatment of Milton--and an impressive

one at that--see Herman Rapaport's Milton and the
Postmodern. While I find his reading of Milton compelling,
I wonder whether it doesn't fall into the de Manian
problematic I discuss in Chapter 2--where all literature
becomes fodder for a method or discipline. For example,
Rapaport writes that in composing the book he "was
interested in attempting to use Milton as a test case for
poststructuralist reading" (xiii).
3This is especially true in the work of Hassan; in
"POSTmodernISM" he writes, "there is enhancement of life in
certain anarchies of the spirit, in humor and play, in love
released and freedom of the imagination to overreach itself,
in a cosmic consciousness of variousness as unity. I_
recognize these as the values intended by Postmodern art,
and see the latter as closer, not only in time, but even
more in tenor, to the transformation of hope itself" (45).
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Historical characterizations of postmodernism seem to
offer an escape from the totalizing or generalizing problems
inherent in a more descriptive or systematic theory, but
even these characterizations often end up trapped in a kind
of historical determinism which is a version of the
transcendental truth postmodernism wants to question:

if

postmodernism is primarily a paralogistic reaction to a
monologic modernism, 4 or is inexorably brought about by
determining societal factors (such as the emergence of "late
capitalism"), 5 then how can it escape having its truth
given by a kind of lock-step, determining Hegelian
historicism--where the truth of postmodernism is secured and
guaranteed through the work of dialectical opposition and
sublation?

The vexing problem--made all the more difficult

both by the complexity of the issue and the sheer volume of
critical material on the subject--becomes, then, where to
situate oneself in this discussion about the postmodern, at
the impasse between system and history.

Rather than argue

for one side in this complex and far-ranging argument, I
would like to step back and investigate the terms of the
opposition itself.

In general, my question here will be:

what is the status or force of the opposition between
history and system in a postmodern "context"?

To anticipate

4see Lyotard's The Postmodern Condition.
5see Jameson's "Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of
Late Capitalism."
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a bit, it will be my contention that an engagement between
the postmodern and literary criticism must go ''through" the
discourse of philosophy--especially the ''problem" of
philosophy's closure or end--because, as Derrida notes in
the epigraph to this chapter, "literary criticism has
already been determined, knowingly or not, voluntarily or
not, as the philosophy of literature" (Writing 28).

Any

criticism presupposes a theory, and literary theory is first
and foremost a philosophy of literature.

Because literary

criticism and theory are bound to philosophy in this way, it
seems necessary to examine or reevaluate criticism and
theory in--to use an incredibly ironic term--the "light" of
philosophy's closure.

Such an examination is, it seems,

doubly pressing in relation to the postmodern, insofar as
the closure of philosophy and the concomitant withdrawal of
a stable ground for critical thinking is precisely what
gives rise to what I call the question of the postmodern.
But rather than trying to construct a historical or
systematic narrative leading up to postmodernism's
withdrawal of truth, I will attempt briefly to outline the
genealogy of this withdrawal--to trace a path back to this
"event."
To find this "event" named, one need look no further
than Nietzsche's texts--and perhaps most succinctly his
(in)famous phrase ''God is dead," by which a Madman
pronounces the withdrawal of transcendental ground with a
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kind of terrifying simplicity.

One is tempted to say that

this phrase, and the ethos that surrounds it, ushers in the
era of ''ends" that is so familiar to the postmodern:

the

end of metaphysics, the end of religion, the end of history.
But, while this phrase certainly does not instigate these
ends as a "cause"--the Madman's remark, remember, is already
directed at "those who did not believe in God" (181)--one
could argue that it certainly does name or mark the "logic''
of these ends:

metaphysics, religion, and history terminate

with the death of God precisely because each of them-whether they are conceived of as disciplines, belief
systems, or both--had lived on the promise of meaning in an
end or telos; each organized itself around the guarantee of
meaning beyond the physical realm which is inscribed in the
very word meta-physics.

So, if metaphysics is first

philosophy--the discipline or belief system which can secure
the ground for all others--it is clearly terminated if first
principles are deemed to be "dead'':

arbitrary, fictional,

"merely'' invented, impossible to ground as transcendental:
One can certainly recuperate these principles or mourn their
loss--what else characterized the literary period known as
"modernism," and continues to animate many critiques of the
postmodern?6--but after the death of God, it can no longer
6rhe dominant critique of postmodernism, in whatever
form, is that it does not attend to such a metaphysical or
historical "real." See, for example, Graff, who writes that
the upshot of a Derrida's work--and postmodernism in
general--is "the absence of any reality or meaning in life
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be a matter of simply asserting the self-evidence of ground.
The very fact that a stable ground must be recuperated or
argued for at all attests to the impact of what Nietzsche's
thought names:

thinking can no longer be self-grounded in

reason, subjectivity, method, history, God.

As Reiner

SchUrmann writes, with the "death of God,"
The schema of reference to an arche then reveals itself
to be the product of a certain type of thinking, of an
ensemble of philosophical rules that have their
genesis, their period of glory, and that today perhaps
are experiencing their decline. (4)
When reason has to defend itself or attempt to ground itself
as reason--when the category can no longer be taken for
granted or a ground for it secured--a certain kind of
thinking begins to draw to a close:

when speculation must

ask about the value of speculation (as when Warhol's Brillo
box poses the question, "Why is this not art?''), 7 a
category--indeed, an entire system of thinking through which
one constructs categories and defines the world--begins to
experience its closure.

But, as Scharmann reminds us, this

closure is not simply a matter for thought--a systematic or
idealist problem; it is both a systematic and historical
closure:

to which effort might be directed" (62).
7cf. Charles Bernstein's discussion of Arthur Dante's
reading of Warhol in ''Critical Excess (Process)" (846-49).
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This hypothesis functions doubly (even though the
opposition between system and history will eventually
fall victim to that same hypothesis):

it is a

systematic closure, inasmuch as the norms for action
'proceed from' the corresponding first philosophies;
and it is a historical closure, since deconstructionist
discourse can arise only from the boundary of the era
over which it is exercised. (4)
At the closure, then, thinking runs up against a systematic
and historical limit within itself:

when metaphysical

thinking shows itself to be "historical"--when thinking as
reference to stable ground can be thematized as a kind or
~

of thinking rather than as thinking itself--it also

runs up against certain debilitating "systematic"
consequences.

In other words, the historical closure of

metaphysics is itself systematic, and vice versa:

the cause

and effect categories by which one could name the prior or
proper origin are rendered problematic by the closure
itself--by the inability to secure a ground outside the
closure by which it could be judged in a summary fashion, or
upon which a narrative historical account of it could be
rendered.

The peculiar and pernicious problem in all this,

though, is that the notion of ground and the concepts of
philosophical thinking cannot simply be abandoned; as
Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe writes, "We are still living .on
philosophical ground and cannot just go and live somewhere
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else" (Heidegger 3).
Metaphysical thinking, then, finds itself at an impasse
at the closure, the death of God, the loss of a stable
ground--an impasse we began to examine above in terms of the
nihilist reversals to which it inevitably leads:

truth

shows itself to be a lie, critical thinking can neither be
affirmed nor denied, anti-professionalism shows itself to be
professionalism, and so on.

In the face of this impasse,

the recuperation of a kind of metaphysical ground is
certainly possible (at least discursively, rhetorically or
pragmatically), but this shows itself not necessarily to be
desirable because, from its "end," metaphysical thinking
also shows itself to have been grounded in a kind of violert
exclusion--a grounding exclusion which must efface its other
to preserve its purity, eliminate difference to preserve the
same.

So, in the nihilist reversals that signal the closure

of metaphysical thinking, we see a kind of cruel joke played
out:

nihilism, rather than helping to displace the

privilege of the same, protects it all the more greedily-bringing, with its reversals, literally more of the same.
From its "end," then, as Heidegger notes, the history of
this thinking shows itself--in the triumph of will to power
and the age of technology--precisely to be the history of
this nihilism:

nihilism as metaphysics' final and most

glorious moment in the control and elimination of its

~ther.

And, in the most chilling of reversals, the legacy of this
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thinking reveals itself (often brutally) in twentiethcentury history.

Lacoue-Labarthe summarizes the legacy left

to our age, the age of technology:
There is a kind of 'lethal' essence of technology,
which means that its 'everything is possible' does in
fact end up introducing, that is to say bringing about,
if not the impossible, then at least the unthinkable
(Extermination or genetic manipulation--and the latter
is still on the agenda today). (Heidegger 69)
The "unthinkable" former, extermination, has indeed been
brought about--in the holocaust; and Lacoue-Labarthe argues
that the holocaust is "a phenomenon which follows
essentially no logic (political, economic, social, military,
etc.) other than a spiritual [metaphysical] one .... In the
Auschwitz apocalypse, it was nothing less than the West, in
its essence, that revealed itself" (35) . 8

8ro many critics of the postmodern, this seems an
outrageous claim. For example, Huyssen writes, "Auschwitz,
after all, did not result from too much enlightened reason-even though it was organized as a perfectly rationalized
death factory--but from a violent anti-enlightenment and
anti-modernity effect, which exploited modernity ruthlessly
for its own purposes" (203, last 2 emphases mine). For
Huyssen (citing Habermas), the Enlightenment, as the
strictly benign or progressive movement of reason, is
"exploited" by the evil of Nazism in the holocaust; this, of
course, allows reason to emerge safe, having banished terror
once more by explaining it away. However, it seems
astonishing that reason can emerge unscathed from the
"perfectly rationalized death factory'' that was Auschwitz.
Huyssen is forced to refer to a pure, benign intentio~ to
salvage reason here, and in the process ironically offers
what he accuses the postmoderns of supplying: "too limited
an account of modernity" (203).
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For Lacoue-Labarthe the holocaust is both a
horrifyingly "logical" extension of metaphysical logic and
an absolutely unique event (an event that shatters any
possibility of "explanation," any attempt to account for it
within a larger, ultimately reassuring narrative). 9

In

fact, Lacoue-Labarthe argues that the holocaust cannot
sufficiently be explained in terms of scapegoating or any
other narrative which makes the Jews remotely "sacrificial"
--as having died to bring about some greater revelation;
even "holocaust" is the wrong word:
[it] was a pure and simple elimination.
or residue.

Without trace

And if it is true that the age is that of

the accomplishment of nihilism, then it is at Auschwitz
that that accomplishment took place in its purest
formless form.

God in fact died at Auschwitz. (37)

For Lacoue-Labarthe, the completion of metaphysics in the
death of God can be "read" in the holocaust:

a wholly

bankrupt way of thinking and acting burns itself up in
attempting to exterminate its other, but leaves no
possibility for a Phoenix-type rising from among the ashes.
The ''formless form" of the holocaust is nonetheless quite

9rnsofar as the holocaust can be spoken of as a "unique
event," this does not imply that it is somehow more horrific
than the Stalinist purges or the Cambodian genocide--that
the violence against the Jews was so much more violent that
it remains unique. Rather, the status of genocide as _an
"event'' precisely suggests that no comparision is possible,
no simple accounting can be rendered which would allow us to
say that one genocide was "worse" or ''better" than another.

11 7
concrete; it is an irreducible event in that it cannot be
reassuringly reduced to a logic which can be said to have
brought it about.

It remains simply too horrific to be

adequately explained or--in a philosophical phrase with a
chilling body-count resonance--"accounted for."

This, of

course, does not mean that there are no historical and
systematic reasons or precedents for the holocaust--a long
historical tradition of anti-Semitism and its theoretical
defenses certainly cannot be simply ignored.

However, the

holocaust remains an event that a rationalist history cannot
explain within its own logic--insofar as that logic is
itself implicated in the event; 10 as Lacoue-Labarthe
writes,
And this event, we must admit, is historical in the
strongest sense, i.e. in the sense that it does not
simply arise from history, but itself makes history,
10 Lacoue-Labarthe gives 2 reasons for the essential

irreducibility of the "event'' of the holocaust's genocide:
1. Jews posed no threat to the Nazis, had no
revolutionary social cohesion, "were not in 1933 agents of
social dissension (except of course in phastasy)" (36);
2. also, the means used in the slaughter of the Jews
were not of an essentially police or punitive nature; though
police tactics were indispensable in rounding the Jews up,
there were no confessions to be forced, etc: "None of the
'machines' invented to extract confessions or remorse or to
mount the edifying spectacle of terror, was of any use. The
Jews were treated in the same way as industrial waste of the
proliferation of parasites is 'treated' .... As Kafka had
long since understood, the 'final solution' consisted in
taking literally the centuries-old metaphors of insult and
contempt--vermin, filth--and providing oneself with the
technological means for such an effective literalizati6n"
(37).
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cuts into history and opens up another history, or else
unmakes all history. (5)
The holocaust, as an irreducible "event," precisely shatters
any possibility of accounting for it in what is
traditionally called historical terms--a notion of history,
as the destinal story of a people, certainly cannot remain
unimplicated in this event.

Rather, this event "opens up

another history, or else unmakes all history"; this event,
in unmaking history and the systematic thinking upon which
it depends, perhaps opens up the history of the other, the
history of that which or those who would disrupt the purity
of meaning upon which history depends.

As Derrida writes,

the very concept of history has lived only upon the
possibility of meaning, upon the past, present, or
promised presence of meaning and of truth.

Outside

this system, it is impossible to resort to the concept
of history without reinscribing it elsewhere, according
to some specific systematic strategy. (Dissemination
184).

Given the realization of the exclusionary violence of a
will-to-wholeness, the postmodern project cannot be a
properly "historical" nor "systematic" one.

It perhaps

becomes a matter, as Derrida suggests here, of constructing
logic that "works" without working in the Hegelian sense of
coming to an Aufhebung of wholeness--rather, a project of
reinscribing "the possibility of meaning" as other than "the
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past, present, or promised presence of meaning and of
truth."

This is, I have suggested, a necessary project at

the closure of metaphysics, insofar as ignoring this closure
leads inexorably to nihilistic impasses.

Traditional

thinking, then, must always fail to ''work" because it cannot
account for a "founding moment" otherness, and it is this
"moment," as we saw in Chapter 1, which must be taken into
account "according to some specific strategy."

As Foucault

phrases the problematic, "we must elaborate--outside
philosophies of time and subject--a theory of discontinuous
systematisation," (Discourse 231/60) outside transcategorial
and transhistorical systems.

Derrida and the Postmodern
Despite the problems we have raised with the concept of
history and the furor raised by many of Derrida's critics
over his lack of attention to history, 11 it seems to me
that he is careful to historicize his thought precisely to
avoid its being taken as such a transcategorial and
transhistorical system; he historicizes it as postmodern,
situates it at the historico/systematic closure of
metaphysics.

He does this--often quite subtly--in virtually

all of his texts; take, for example, this above-cited
quotation from Writing and Difference, this time with a
11 For

such a criticism of Derrida as ahistorical, see
Said's readings in The World, the Text. and the Critic,
especially Chapter 9.
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different emphasis:
If totalization no longer has any meaning, it is not
because the infiniteness of a field cannot be covered
by a finite glance or a finite discourse, but because
the nature of the field ... excludes totalization.
(Writing 289)
Note, here, the first part of the sentence, in which-without absurdly over-reading a simple adverbial clause-Derrida addresses some issues that he is often criticized
for neglecting:

first, totalization has had meaning, was

possible to think given certain societal and historical
circumstances which, at the closure of metaphysics, no
longer exist; also, totalization may still have meaning (he
writes "if totalization no longer has any meaning") but any
meaning it has is radically altered by a contemporary--dare
I say "postmodern"--notion of the conditions of possibility
(and impossibility) for any kind of totalization.
Derrida sets out to historicize--and we have,
hopefully, managed to complicate this word--his thought most
overtly in "No Apocalypse, Not Now," his essay on nuclear
society, on living after the holocaust, under the shadow of
the bomb.

He writes of the (im)possibility of nuclear

holocaust:
The hypothesis of this total destruction watches over
deconstruction, it guides its footsteps; it becomes
possible to recognize, in the light, so to speak, of
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that hypothesis, of that fantasy, or phantasm, the
characteristic structures and historicity of the
discourses, strategies, texts, or institutions to be
deconstructed.

That is why deconstruction, at least

what is being advanced today in its name, belongs to
the nuclear age.

And to the age of literature. (27, my

emphasis)
The possibility of apocalypse without revelation is what
makes it possible for deconstruction to take notice of "the
characteristic structures and historicity of the discourses,
strategies, texts, or institutions to be deconstructed."
How so?

Derrida writes, "As you know, Apocalypse means

Revelation, of Truth, Un-veiling" ("No Apocalypse" 24); but,
of course, at the closure or end of metaphysics, there is no
determinate ''revelation" of truth, but only its withdrawal-not truth but impasse.

Again, the "structure" of

metaphysics shows itself to have a (debilitating)
historicity.

Likewise, the historical situation of nuclear

society is infused by the structure of a nuclear logic of
apocalypse with no revelation--the impossible possibility of
a horrifying telos without an accompanying revelation of the
meaning of history.

Given these historical anp systematic

conditions, the stakes of a writing, the stakes of truth,
the stakes of living at the closure, in a nuclear logic, are
irreducibly different:

these stakes are not reducible to a

thinking of the same, to a thinking based on the assumption
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of wholeness in a beginning or an end, to a thought based on
revelation of truth or meaning, to a thinking which can
confidently answer the metaphysical question ''what is it?".
But what are we to make of Derrida's claim for this
apocalyptic age as the age of literature?

Surely there is

an entire history of apocalyptic literature, and it is by no
means a recent arrival.

But the apocalyptic tradition is

one that is firmly based on a coming revelation; the Books
of Daniel and Revelation, for example, are firm calls for
the end as a revelation and a remedy in times of crisis. 12
Literature, though, seems to be that body of texts which is
in some way enabled by the relation between thought and this
postmodern notion of apocalypse--as apocalypse without
revelation, end without summary--and deconstruction belongs
to this age, adopts its peculiar kind of postmodern
apocalyptic tone, the tone which recognizes today, in
Derrida's words,
the apocalyptic structure of language, of writing, of
the experience of presence, in other words of the text
or of the mark in general:

that is. of the divisible

dispatch for which there is no self-presentation nor
assured destination. ("Apocalyptic Tone" 28, Derrida's
12 cf. Derrida's summary of the onto-theological notion
of apocalypse: "Truth itself is the end, the destination,
and that truth unveils itself is the advent of the end.
Truth is the end and the instance of the last judgment. The
structure of the truth here would be apocalyptic. And that
is why there would not be any truth of the apocalypse that
is not the truth of the truth'' ("Apocalyptic Tone" 24).
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emphasis)
Thinking has, up until the nuclear age of its closure,
proceeded for the most part under the impression that it can
reveal truth, it can totalize, it can assure its
destination; even the skeptical tradition works under the
auspices of revealing a truth--the truth that there is no
truth or that truth is unknowable.

The postmodern epoch,

though, is conditioned by this apocalyptic--in this
postmodern sense of the word--structure "of the text or of
the mark in general," a structure which frustrates the
arrival of truth, the structure of what Derrida calls
elsewhere "general text."
This notion of the text or general text is the most
criticized and misunderstood component of Derrida's thought;
it is often read as Derrida's attempt to turn the world into
a text, and in the process effectively to diffuse the real,
historical problems of political and social existence by
treating them as mere textual conundrums. 13
13 This

This is,

is a very popular misconception, and one that
came to a head in the pages of Critical Inquiry 13 (1) 1986,
where Anne McClintlock and Rob Nixon took Derrida to task
for stepping out of his hermetically sealed textual world to
write about apartheid. He replies: "Text, as I use the
word, is not the book. No more than writing or trace, it is
not limited to the paper which you cover with your graphism.
It is precisely for strategic reasons ... that I found it
necessary to recast the context of text by generalizing it
without any limit .... that is why there is nothing 'beyond
the text.' That's why South Africa and apartheid are, like
you and me, part of this general text, which is not to say
that it can be read the way one reads a book. That is why
the text is always a field of forces: heterogeneous,
differential, open, and so on .... That's why I do not go
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however, simply not the case; as I argue in Chapters 2 and
3 1 for Derrida, general text is not the text, the book, but
rather a realm of mediation, something of a phenomenological
life-world, the "given" network or chain that possibilizes
discourse--in the broad sense of the word as a place where
things are mediated--but at the same time makes it
impossible for this discourse to arrive at any ontologically
determinable destination, any telos.

With his notion of

general text, Derrida works out the consequences of "the
apocalyptic structure of language," where nothing outside
the differential network--general text--can guarantee
meaning or arrest the chain of referrals; there is, in this
sense, no extra-text, no term which could rule, organize, or
regulate the system from without the system, precisely
because the supposed master term must constitute itself
within this network of referrals--by "referring endlessly to
something other than itself." 14

There is no simple outside

or beyond the closure.
It is crucial here to note, also, that general text is,
despite the flood of claims to the contrary, a historical
formulation.

"There is no extra-text," the infamous phrase

by which Derrida supposedly kills history, is itself an

'beyond the text,' in this new sense of the word text, by
fighting and calling for a fight against apartheid" (166-7).
14 For the latest instance of Derrida discussing--or
should I say defending?--general text, see the Afterword to
Limited Inc. (136-7, 148).
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irreducibly historical formulation, situated at the
historical site of the closure.

Derrida's, in other words,

is a postmodern thought, conditioned by a postmodern world
which lives after Auschwitz, after Hiroshima, always under
the shadow of an apocalypse without revelation; in fact, for
Derrida the postmodern world is conditioned not so much by
living, but by
LIVING ON, the very progression that belongs, without
belonging, to the progression of life and death.
Living on is not the opposite of living, just as it is
not identical with living.

The relationship is

different, different from being identical, from the
difference of distinctions--undecided (135).
Here we see most clearly the "worldly'' aspect of Derrida's
thought; it is concerned not simply with texts and their
internal workings, but it grows out of a postmodern
consciousness:

a consciousness of being a survivor, a

consciousness of living on rather than simply living or
dying, of living on in the undecided--of not closing off
possibility (difference) in favor of actuality (sameness),
that determining closure being a necessary prerequisite to
violence--beyond (which is to say between, as there is no
simple beyond) the oppositions or hierarchies which have
allowed and validated the horrors of the twentieth
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century . 15
Living on in the between, in the undecided, at the
limits, disrupting the will to sameness or truth (as I state
above, disrupting the metaphysical question "what is it?'')
is something which is "characteristic" of writing the
postmodern; as Julia Kristeva writes,
postmodernism is that literature which writes itself
with the more or less conscious intention of expanding
the signifiable and thus human realm.

With this in

mind, I should call this practice of writing an
I

"experience of limits," to use Georges Bataille's
formulation:

limits of language as a communicative

system, limits of the subjective and naturally the
sexual identity, limits of sociality .... Never before
in the history of humanity has this exploration of the
limits of meaning taken place in such an unprotected
manner, and by this I mean without religious, mystical,
or any other justification. ("Postmodernism" 137, 141)
This questioning of the will-to-truth through an examination
of the limits of truth is "characteristic" of postmodern
writing and reading--where this interruptive questioning is

15 As Andrew McKenna writes, "The question of the
postmodern in its most far-reaching implications, which are
nonetheless the most concrete, is the question of survival,
of living on after the dead. A postmodern consciousness is
indissociable, for demonstrable, concrete reasons bearing on
the recent past as they affect the possibility of a future,
from the consciousness of being a survivor, of living on"
( 229) .
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done, as Kristeva notes, in an unprecedented, "unprotected
manner," without a traditional ontological justification.
Here, though, we should be careful of a kind of privileging
historicism slipping in the back door.

There are, of

course, writers previous to the postmodern or nuclear age
who deal with the "problem" of end without revelation
(Cervantes, Mallarme, Joyce, Sterne, Kafka, Woolf, Chaucer)
as well as contemporary writers (even writers referred to as
"postmodern") 16 who do not.

But this postmodern

questioning of limits--including a notion like general text,
which Derrida explicitly ties to the question of limits--is,
in a certain way, impossible to think outside a "postmodern"
culture.

This is, though, not to say that certain remark

and supplementarity structures cannot be found at work in
texts written previous to the nuclear age, but rather that
it is precisely this nuclear logic which allows us to think
these structures, to read their "work"--and its suppression

16 Take, for example, the group of American poets known
as "the postmoderns"--a broad term used to refer to the
Beats, San Francisco Renaissance, Projectivists, New York
School, and Confessional poets--whose aesthetics are summed
up by Charles Altieri: "postmodern poets have been seeking
to uncover the ways man and nature are unified, so that
value can be seen as the result of immanent processes in
which man is as much object as he is agent of creativity"
(608).
The revelation of meaning is taken here "directly
from experience, in fact from the fundamental experiences of
human life like eating and making love, and does not require
a mediating mythology" (635).
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--in a tradition. 17
This reevaluation of the stakes of the assignment of
limits and quasi-ethical imperative to expand the realm of
the signifiable--which grows, in Kristeva's reading, out of
an experience of limits brought about by undecidability of
the

postmodern writing/reading of texts--is finally, I

think, where deconstruction can be put into a relation with
writing which we would call literary, that is if this
distinction between thinking and writing even holds at this
point in the discussion.

The undecidability or

unthematizability of texts--brought about by the structure
of the postmodern field (the societal and textual conditions
equally) in which they exist--represents, in a certain way,
the limits from which discourse becomes possible in a postmodern context:

and these limits have dire consequences for

the totalizing impulse of the discourse of literary
criticism, based as it is on the discourse of philosophy.
17 As Derrida writes concerning the seemingly ignored,
disruptive work of writing in a tradition, "it is a
peculiarity of our epoch that, at the moment when the
phoneticization of writing--the historical origin and
structural possibility of philosophy as of science, the
condition of the episteme--begins to lay hold on world
culture, science, in its advancements, can no longer be
satisfied with it. This inadequation had always already
begun to make its presence felt. But today something lets
it appear as such, allows it a kind of takeover without our
being able to translate this novelty into clear cut notions
of mutation, explication, accumulation, revolution, or
tradition. These values belong no doubt to the system whose
dislocation is presented today as such, they describe styles
of an historical movement which was meaningful--like the
concept of history itself--only within a logocentric epoch"
(Grammatology 4, my emphasis).
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As Gasche writes,
If, in the last resort, the unthematizable because
undecidable agencies of modern literary texts--agencies
that are not of the order of image or concept, content
or form, but that are textual structures--radically
subvert the possibility of literary hermeneutics, it is
because they represent the limits from which
understanding and knowing become possible. (Tain 267)
It is in the exploration of these limits from which
understanding and knowing become possible in a postmodern
context that I see a possible relation between
deconstruction and postmodern literary texts.

By

"postmodern literary texts" I mean a certain body of
contemporary "literary" writings which explores the limits
and possibilities of writing and thinking difference rather
than sameness, writing which can account for the possibility
of apocalypse without revelation--writing which frustrates
the metaphysical question of truth, the question "what is
it?".

However, I must stress again that it is highly

problematic to "define" this writing simply in ":.erms of its
features or historicity; the disruptions or transgressions
of postmodern literary texts are necessarily written or
performed--are part and parcel of the reading and writing
process--or else they fall back into a such a descriptive
category or theory.

Such a writing then reinscribes within

itself those marginalized differences, categories, excesses,

130

remains, groups, institutions and discourses which are
excluded and then forgotten by a history of thought that
raced toward totalized identity, revelation, wholeness,
sameness, and meaning at the expense of all else.

It is

here, at or from the place called the closure of
metaphysics, that relation between deconstruction and
literature--as, crudely, a postmodern thinking and a
postmodern writing--could begin to be thought, and it is
around this set of concerns that I will examine postmodern
thinking and literature in subsequent chapters.

To begin to

work toward some kind of specificity for these notions of
postmodern thinking and writing, I would like to turn now to
discuss the "problem" of representation in postmodern
literature.

This, it seems, is a crucial problem for

postmodern writing, insofar as any disruptions it would
perform or bring about must, in some way, go "through"
representation--must be represented--even while
representation experiences its closure.

1 31

Representation, End, Ground, Sending
He knew but must say. To say, he must start, but this could
never be the start, for he could never see or have seen the
start. He could go on, only, and in pieces, pieces that did
for him, or that is, pieces that would do. But as he did,
he felt divided and redoubled into several places of
himself, inside and out. How did he focus? There wasn't
one center.
Everything comes to pass in retraits.
--The Post Card
So I want to write about representation and postmodern
literature, but I have a difficulty from the very beginning
of this inquiry:

there is a certain way in which I can

write about nothing but representation, because a
metaphysical structure governed by a privilege of
representation is what makes it possible for me to say
anything at all.

Foucault thematizes this difficulty:

the human sciences, when dealing with what is
representation (in either conscious or unconscious
form), find themselves treating as their object
what is in fact their condition of possibility.
They are always animated, therefore, by a sort of
transcendental mobility .... They proceed from that
which is given to representation to that which
renders representation possible, but which is
still representation. (Order 364, my emphasis)
There is, then, no way I can place my two concerns in a
simple relation and discuss one vis-a-vis the other--something like "The Problem of Representation in Postmodern
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Literature"--because there is no "place" outside
representation from which to speak about it or about
whatever "postmodern literature" might be; to do so would be
to treat as the object of my discourse that which, in fact,
constitutes the very conditions of possibility for discourse
in general:

a representative metaphysical structure--

characteristic of the epoch of modern subjectivity--that
partially dictates what can be said and the ways in which it
can be said.

The only way to speak about this system, then,

is from within; the only way to deconstruct the system is by
thinking the system's ground--its conditions of possibility
--carefully and problematically.

This is not a prime

directive, but rather a recognition of what Derrida calls "a
necessary dependency of all destructive discourses:

they

must inhabit the structures they demolish" (Writing 194).
Discussions of representation, then, are rendered
highly problematic by their "necessary dependence" on the
structure of representation itself.

Much discussion of

postmodern thought and literature centers around what
theorists perceive to be postmodernism's critique and/or
outright rejection of representation; many such readings
presuppose, in fact, that postmodern texts are in a simple
oppositional relation with representation--postmodernism
against representation. 18
18see,

It seems to me that the question

for example, Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the
Mirror of Nature: "Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey are
in agreement that the notion of knowledge as accurate
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is much more complicated than that.
his essay "Sending:

As Derrida writes in

On Representation,"

Today there is a great deal of thought against
representation.

In a more or less articulated or

rigorous way, this judgment is easily arrived at:
representation is bad.

And this without being

able to assign, in the final analysis, the place
and necessity of that evaluation .... And yet,
whatever the strength and the obscurity of this
dominant current, the authority of representation
constrains us, imposing itself on our thought
through a whole dense, enigmatic, and heavily
stratified history.

It programs us and precedes

us and warns us too severely for us to make a mere
object of it, a representation, an object of
representation confronting us, before us like a
theme.

It is even difficult to pose a systematic

and historical question on the topic (a question

representation, made possible by special mental processes,
and intelligible through a general theory of
representation, needs to be abandoned" (6); cf. Huyssen's
After the Great Divide, where he characterizes postmodernism
as a brand of decadent modernism "confident in its rejection
of representation and reality" (209). For an excellent
discussion of representation and postmodernism, see Arac's
introduction to Postmodernism and Politics, in which he
addresses the reception of Derrida's work in the United
States, especially the mistaken notion that his work is
essentially epistemological and that it is characterized by
a "rejection of representation" (xxiv). I must also credit
Arac for drawing my attention to the opening quotation from
Foucault.
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of the type:

"What is the system and history of

representation?") now that our concepts of system
and history are essentially marked by the
structure and the closure of representation. (304)
In this section, I would like to discuss representation in a
postmodern context, to work out "the place and necessity" of
representation "now that our concepts of system and history
are essentially marked by the structure and the closure of
representation"--to paraphrase, I would like to discuss what
it might mean to come to the limits of the structure of
representation (the limits of modern subjectivity) and begin
to recognize aporias, gaps, fissures at its limits, but
still to inhabit a discourse possibilized by the traces of
this structure.

I will draw here on Heidegger's reading of

the rise of representational thinking in modern philosophy
and Derrida's reading of this concept's "fall" in postmodern
thought.

This fall brings about the closure of

representation and in some sense makes possible an
investigation of modern philosophy's ground, as it affects
both philosophy and literature after subjectivity.

In

broaching the question of the literary, I will pay
particular attention to Joseph McElroy's Plus and Ronald
Sukenick's The Endless Short Story.
Already, though, I encounter any number of problems,
not the least of which is keeping my own analysis from
simply replicating the dialectical movement of critique,
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which is the mainspring of representation.

Likewise, here

we need to confront the disciplinary slippage created by
employing the sense of the words "modern" and "postmodern"
across two different disciplines where they carry different
significations:

modern philosophy designates the

philosophies of the subject, or a period in the history of
Western philosophy running from Descartes to Hegel; whereas
modernism in literature studies designates a movement among
artists at the beginning of this century.

However, I want

to suggest here, as I argue above, that postmodernism in
literature and the arts must confront postmodernism in
philosophy, that the postmodern in any discipline or form
must confront the "problem" of thinking after
representation.

However, that having been said, more

problems are created than solved:

the disciplinary

periodizing (modern/postmodern) and genre distinctions
(literature/philosophy) that my argument seems to take for
granted are rendered problematic by the closure of
representation.

Hence, my argument has both to trace the

closure of representation and to recognize that the argument
itself is subject to this very closure and the slippage it
engenders.

Thinking\Writing the postmodern must account, in

some way, for its own status as an other discourse--a
discourse both inside and outside the problematics of
representation.

As Derrida writes,

This other discourse doubtless takes into account the
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conditions of ... classical and binary logic, but it no
longer depends entirely upon it.

If the proponents of

binary opposition think that the "ideal purity" to
which they are obliged to appeal reveals itself to be
"illusory," ... then they are obliged to account for this
fact.

They must transform concepts, construct a

different "logic," a different "general theory,"
perhaps even a discourse that, more powerful than its
logic, will be able to account for it and reinscribe
its possibility. (Limited Inc. 117).
It is this different logic, a logic of the postmodern that
can reinscribe the very function of logic, which
thinking\writing the postmodern calls for--a logic that can
think representation, end, and ground along a different way,
a way which Heidegger and Derrida call, among other names,
sending.
In his essay "The Age of the World Picture, " 19
Heidegger ties the rise of representational thinking to the
rise of modern philosophy and its notion of the subject or
Cartesian cogito.

For Heidegger, thinking in this

subjectivist mode literally becomes re-presenting in that
19 The

German, "Die Zeit des Weltbi ldes" from Holzwege,
has been translated as "The Age of the World View." The
title seems better translated as "The Age [or Epoch] of the
World Picture" for at least two reasons: 1) Bild is clearly
"picture," not "view"; and 2) "world view" confuses this
analysis of the rise of the subject with Heidegger's much
earlier analysis of Jaspers' Weltanschauung philosophy· in §2
of the Introduction to Basic Problems of Phenomenology.
Throughout, I wi 11 render "Bild" as "picture."
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everything which presents itself must be referred or represented to the normativity of the human subject; he
writes,
To re-present here [in the modern period] means to
bring what is present before one [Vorhandene] as
something confronting oneself, the person
representing it, and to force it back into this
relation to oneself as the normative area.
(350/84)

This notion of re-presenting is impossible without modern
philosophy's notion of the subject--the subject as that
which must filter all things confronting it through its
subjectivity, in turn forming the basis or ground for "this

°

relation to oneself as the normative area. " 2

For

Heidegger, this privilege of the subject leads to a
humanistic notion of the world as totalizing subjectivist
world picture with man as the absolute mean or measure for
all things; he writes that in the epoch of re-presentational
thinking, "man fights for the position in which he can be
that existent which sets the standard for all existence and
forms the directive for it" (353/87).
But what happens to this ground of subjectivist re20 cf. Derrida's reading of Heidegger's notion here:
"It is only the rendering available of the human subject
that makes representation happen, and this rendering
available is exactly that which constitutes the subject as
subject. The subject is what can or believes it can offer
itself representations, disposing them and disposing of
them" ("Sending" 309, my emphasis).
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presentation when man, as that which would serve as the mean
for all other things and the ground for all determinations,
shows itself to be a problematic category--to paraphrase
Foucault, an invention of modern times which is fast
approaching its end? 21

When man approaches its end, these

modern times--or, better, the time of philosophical
modernism--and their dominant modes of thinking also
approach their end.

And this means, in a certain way, the

end of the absolute privilege of re-presentation as well as
the end of metaphysics, because, as Heidegger notes in "The
End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking," "Metaphysics
thinks beings as being in the manner of representational
thinking" (374/62).

But here the analysis moves all too

quickly, without asking what it might mean to come to the
end of philosophy, the end of metaphysics, the end of
representation.

In Heidegger, this notion of end cannot be

read in the traditional, metaphysical manner--as a simple
limit.

He writes, "We understand the end of something all

too easily in the negative sense as a mere stopping, as the

21 of course, representation itself plays a large role
in this "death of man"; as Foucault notes, because "man"
cannot be both that which gives representations and that
which is represented, it must withdraw as a category. Cf.
Derrida's "Sending": "The subject is no longer defined only
in its essence as the place and the placing of its
representations; it is also, as a subject and in its
structure as subjectum, itself apprehended as a
representative. Man, determined first and above all as
subject, as being-subject, finds himself interpreted
throughout according to the structure of representation"
(314).
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lack of continuation, perhaps even as decline and impotence"
("End" 374/62).

For Heidegger, we cannot--without overtly

and simplistically playing metaphysics' game--understand the
end of re-presentative thinking (the end of philosophy) as a
simple limit which stifles progress; such a thinking of end
remains metaphysical, remains a representation.

But, and

perhaps more importantly, neither can we thematize this end
as the precondition to a simple breakthrough where the
ground of metaphysical thinking is no longer problematic.
The question(s) of ground(s) is and will be crucial for
postmodern thinking--thinking after modern subjectivity;
rather than seeing the end of philosophy as the place where
the question of grounds can be abandoned and the tradition
simply left behind or overcome--thinking end as a simple
limit or boundary--Heidegger sees the end of metaphysics as
that place where these questions become most crucial, most
problematic, and perhaps most enabling.

He writes, "The end

of philosophy is the place, that place in which the whole of
philosophy's history is gathered in its most extreme
possibility" ("End" 375/63).

This characterization of end

as radical possibility rather than simple limit calls for a
rethinking of the tradition and the question of grounds.
There is, then, the task of rethinking modern
philosophy's conception of representation as ground rather
than simply thematizing representation as "bad" and/or
thinking that we can simply move beyond it; we must try to
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think its possibility as a condition of possibility.

The

modernist philosophical schema of representation cannot
simply be criticized and replaced with another, equally
problematic interpretative metatheory--to do so is to fall
back into the metaphysical trap of representational,
subjectivist, dialectical thinking; but neither can the
problem of representation simply be left behind.

As Derrida

writes,
We might say in another langauge that a criticism
or a deconstruction of representation would remain
feeble, vain, and irrelevant if it were to lead to
some rehabilitation of immediacy, of original
simplicity, of presence without repetition or
delegation, if it were to induce a criticism of
calculable objectivity, of criticism, of science,
of technique, or of political representation.

The

worst regressions can put themselves in service of
this anti representat i ona 1 prejudice. ( "Sending"
31 1 )

For Derrida, it is fruitless to "criticize" representation
in any traditional way, because such a notion of "criticism"
presupposes a displacement of representation and its
replacement by another system on the way to a more objective
or scientific understanding of truth. 22

A criticism based

22 This is not, as many critics would have it, to say
that deconstruction is an inherently status-quo thinking
which merely stands impotent before oppositions or simply
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on an "antirepresentational prejudice" remains naive--and,
essentially, representational--if it attempts to recuperate
another simply non-representational ground for
interpretation, if it simply pushes representation to the
margins and moves another notion to the center.

Such a

criticism ends up simply recuperating a representational,
metaphysical world view or hermeneutic in the name of an
antirepresentational thinking.
How, then, are we able to think this ground of
representation, if we cannot overcome it or leave it behind
in any simple way, but neither can we think in opposition to
it in any simple way?

Perhaps what we must do in a post-

modern epoch is to think ground differently, to think the
conditions of possibility for thinking in a different way,
to ask questions other than "how do we criticize this
position or overcome this opposition"?

As Derrida writes,

all this "is difficult to conceive, as it is difficult to
conceive anything at all beyond representation, but [it]
commits us perhaps to thinking altogether differently"
("Sending" 326).
insistent:

Neverthe 1ess, the question remains,

how can we conceive of a relation to this

philosophical ground, these conditions of possibility, which
might possibilize a "thinking altogether differently"?

neutralizes them. As I argue throughout, criticism--as the
overturning or neutralizing of oppositions--is a crucial
part of deconstruction, but it does not constitute the "end"
of a deconstructive analysis.
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In "Sending:

On Representation," Derrida develops

Heidegger's notion of the "sending" of being as a possible
postmodern relation to philosophy's status as ground for
thinking, as conditions of possibility.

Heidegger refines

his notion of sending in the late lecture series "On Time
and Being"; he writes,
In the beginning of Western thinking, Being is
thought, but not as the "It gives'' [Es gibt] as
such.

The latter withdraws in favor of the gift

which It gives.

That gift is thought and

conceptualized from then on exclusively as Being
with regard to beings.

A giving which gives only

its gift, but in the giving holds itself back and
withdraws, such a giving we call a sending [das
Schicken].

According to the meaning of giving

which is to be thought in this way Being--that
which It gives--is what is sent.

Each of its

transformations remains destined [geschickt] in
this manner .... to giving as sending there belongs
keeping back--such that the denial of the present
_and the with ho 1ding of the p resent____g_l ay within the.
gjving of what has been and what will be. (8,22/
8,23 my emphasis)
For Heidegger, this peculiar sort of ground-as-sending both
gives or sends itself (offers conditions of possibility) and
holds itself back (withdraws); it is not a traditional,
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metaphysical notion of ground in that it does not offer the
gift of presence in its sending--its withdrawal of presence
as it simultaneously offers the conditions of possibility
for presence makes simple notions of presence impossible to
ground:

hence, "to giving as sending there belongs keeping

back--such that the denial of the present and the
withholding of the present play within the giving of what
has been and what will be."

This notion of simultaneous

withdrawing and offering from a shifting ground--which he
names Ereignis--allows Heidegger to thematize the epochs of
Being in an other-than-positivistic way; he writes,
To hold back is, in Greek, epoche.

Hence we speak of

epochs of the destiny of Being [Eoochen des
Seinsgeschickes].

Epoch does not here mean a span of

time in occurrence, but rather the fundamental
characteristic of sending, the actual holding back of
itself in favor of the discernability of the gift.
(9/9)

For Derrida, Heidegger's notion of sending is a place
to begin to think a postmodern (post-subjectivist) ground, a
quasi-transcendental ground which is no longer a
traditional, simply transcendental or immanent ground, but
which continues to function as that which gives a peculiar
kind of universality through offering conditions of
possibility.

Gasche explains this notion:

The quasitranscendentals upon which philosophy's
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universality is grounded are no longer simply
transcendentals, for they represent neither a
priori structures of the subjective cognition of
objects nor the structures of understanding of
Being by the Dasein.

The quasitranscendentals

are, on the contrary, conditions of possibility
and impossibility concerning the very conceptual
difference between subject and object and even
between Dasein and Being. (Tain 317) 23
For Derrida, there is a certain sort of
quasitranscendentality in Heidegger's notion of sending-especially in ground's giving and simultaneously taking away
conditions of possibility ("conditions of possibility and
impossibility"), but Derrida maintains that Heidegger's
notion remains haunted by the specter of teleological
thinking in that sending is "destined" [geschickt] from
ground to thinking in various epochs of Being. 24

Also, it

seems suspect to Derrida that there could be a pure gift of
time or Being, a giving prior to a system(aticity) that
always already makes pure giving--giving without some kind
of reciprocation, giving (from) without a system, "the

23cf.

24 cf.

Limited Inc. pp. 127ff.

"On Time and Being": "What is historical in the
history of Being is determined by what is sent forth in
destining, not by an indeterminately thought up occurrence
[Das Ge sch i cht 1 i che der Gesch i chte des Se ins best i mmt ·s i ch
aus Geschickhaften eines Schickens, nicht aus einem
unbestimmt gemeinten Geschehen]" (8-9/ 8-9, my emphasis).
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actual holding back of itself in favor of the discernability
of the gift" -- i mposs i b 1e. 25
Given Derrida's reading, Heidegger's epochs of Being-the epoch of representation, for example--are destined or
given from the ground of Being to arrive at certain points
in the history of Being.

To bolster this reading, Derrida

turns to "The Age of the World Picture'' and Heidegger's
discussion of the vast difference between the Greeks' notion
of truth as unconcealment or aletheia and the modern
conception of truth as re-presentation.

Heidegger concludes

that "in Greece the world cannot become a picture"; but he
hastens to add:
On the other hand, the fact that for Plato the
existent is determined as eidos (appearance, view)
is the presupposition, coming far in advance [weit
voraus geschickte] and for a long time acting
secretly and indirectly, for the eventual
transformation of the world to a picture. (351/84)
Derrida quickly picks up on this notion of Heidegger's,
arguing that such Heideggerian sendings and transformations
are "fated, predestined, geschickte, that is to say,
literally sent, dispensed, assigned by a fate as a summary
of history" ("Sending" 311).

For Derrida, such a notion of

sending presupposes that ground was, is, or could be present
to itself, able to give the gift of presence but unwilling
'~

'"Cf. Glas,

242-244a.
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to do so--instead, working "secretly and indirectly" to
shape the history of Being.

But, Derrida asks, what if this

ground is always already divided, never present to itself,
discontinuous, unable to gather itself and unable to send to
a specific destination, unable to secure the history of
Being:
Wherever this being-together or with itself of the
envoi of being divides itself, defies the legein,
frustrates the destination of the envoi, is not
the whole schema of Heidegger's reading challenged
in principle, deconstructed from a historical
point of view?

If there has been representation,

it is perhaps just because the envoi of being was
originally menaced in its being-together, in its
Geschick, by divisibility or dissension (what I
would call dissemination).

(323)

This quasitranscendental ground that Derrida posits--this
ground which itself is subject to dissemination and trace-cal ls for a different kind of thinking of ground:

a ground

"older" than any philosophical distinction, but one which in
no way offers a pure origin or beginning point to validate
the traditional work of these distinctions; a ground which
could not assure the arrival of a sending, which could not
determine "positive," inexorable circumstances and thereby
function metaphysically.
sending as envoi,

Rather, in Derrida's notion of
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The envoi is as it were pre-ontological, because
it does not gather itself together or because it
gathers itself only in dividing itself, in
differentiating itself, because it is not original
or originally a sending-from (the envoi of
something-that-is or of a present which would
precede it, still less of a subject, or of an
object by and for a subject), because it is not
single and does not begin with itself although
nothing precedes it; and it issues forth only in
already sending back; it issues forth only on the
basis of the other, the other in itself without
itself.

Everything begins by referring back, that

is to say, does not begin ... from the very start,
every renvois, there is not a single renvois but
from then on, always, a multiplicity of renvois,
so many different traces referring back to other
traces and to traces of others.

(324)

Such a notion of ground as discontinuous and never present
to itself--as ground which issues forth only by issuing back
to "itself" which is already plural--necessitates that the
envoi be at the same time "a multiplicity of renvois," an
unsheltered origin which cannot master that which it
engenders; this ground--which respects the unthematizability
of the Other and moves through the entre of difference
rather than the binary oppositions of sameness--may be a way
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to conceive of the thinking differently about representation
that the postmodern calls for.
But perhaps Derrida has all-too-hastily denied
Heidegger's Ereignis such a status as withdrawing,
postmodern ground.

Derrida often calls attention to

Heidegger's continued claim that the essence of important
terms in his thinking (technology, representation, Ereignis)
does not belong to those terms:

so the essence of

technology is nothing technological, 26 the essence of
representation is not a representation ("Sending" 314), and
Ereignis (which makes the history of Being as sending
possible) is itself unhistorical.

About this move in the

Heideggerian text, Derrida writes, "It is in any case by a
gesture of this type that Heidegger interrupts or
disqualifies, in different domains, specular reiteration or
infinite regress [renvoi

a

l'infini]" ("Sending" 314).

Derrida argues that when Heidegger removes the "essence'' of
his terms from the field(s) they engender, he shelters this
grounding function--precisely protecting ground from the
play of the network, protecting ground from the potential
slippage of dissemination and thereby guaranteeing the
arrival of Being's sending.

For Derrida, Heidegger's

withdrawal of ground serves primarily to protect ground's
purity more rigorously.
26on this point, see a brief question-and-answer
exchange between Derrida and Geoff Bennington in "On Reading
Heidegger" 175-76.
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Derrida's reading, though, can be complicated
considerably by closely examining Heidegger's notion of the
"grounding" function of Ereignis.

In "On Time and Being,"

for example, Heidegger insists that Ereignis, not Being, is
the matter for thinking--that "Being, which lies in sending,
is no longer what is to be thought explicitly"; he
continues:
Thinking then stands in and before that which has sent
the various forms of epochal Being.

This, however,

what sends as Ereignis, is itself unhistorical
[ungeschichtlich], or more precisely without destiny
[geschicklos] .... With the entry into Ereignis, its own
way of concealment proper to it also arrives.

Ereianis

[appropriation] is itself Enteignis [expropriation].
(42/44)

Here we see Heidegger performing the very move which Derrida
thematizes as a protective one:

Heidegger seemingly removes

Ereignis from the history of Being which it renders
possible, thereby mystifying Ereignis by attempting to seal
it hermetically, beyond the reach of contamination.

But

what are we to make of Heidegger's claim that the thinking
of Ereignis "stands in and before [in und vor] that which
has sent the various forms of epochal Being"?

It would seem

that Ereignis is already divided as a ground, standing not
simply before what it engenders (as an a priori ground
would), but both in and before--an already double(d) mark at
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the origin.

Also, here Heidegger refines the "unhistorical"

essence of Ereignis not as a transhistorical grounding
function that fatalistically determines the field it makes
possible, but as the ground of a history that is itself
without destiny--a Geschick that is, in and by its
"essence," geschicklos.

Top this off with Heidegger's

insistence that the "concealment proper'' to Ereignis is
itself Enteignis--expropriation, dispersion, one could name
it "dissemination"--and we would seem to be a long way from
the sheltered ground and the assured sending and arrival of
Being that Derrida reads in Heidegger's texts.

And, one

could further ask, even if Derrida's deconstruction of
Heidegger's grounding function is on the mark, what is to be
said about differance--which, it has been argued, is clearly
heterogeneous ("literally neither a word nor a concept"
("Differance" 3]) to the field which it makes possible, and
therefore precisely the sort of ground-beyond-question that
Derrida accuses Heidegger of producing. 27

Derrida responds

that differance is not an essence or origin--that
undecidability does not exist in general as a sort of
negative ground. 28

He argues that deconstruction is a

27 See, for examp 1e, John Bo 1y' s "Deconstruction as a
General System": "Differance is a mystified concept, an
absolute, all-inclusive origin that is strategically,
conveniently put beyond analytical reach" (201).
28see "Differance," esp. pp. 26-27.

r.
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situation, not an essence. 29

The same argument, however,

can be (and has been) 30 made in favor of Heidegger.
on ... in a sort of renvoi

a

And so

l'infini.

I let citations stand in place of arguments here not
because, as Habermas' infamous phrase would have it,
postmodernists "[do] not belong to those philosophers who
like to argue" ( 193) , 31 but because an extended discussion
of the "Who's-more-metaphysical?" type would ultimately
prove unsatisfying and would remain (rather overtly) within
the bounds of representation as critique.

Rather, I step

back and hesitate, pointing out that the criticointerpretative vertigo I outline above is part and parcel of
the problematic I am discussing under the rubric
thinking\writing the postmodern:

there is no guaranteeing

the arrival of a message--the economies of (mis)reading
between and among Heidegger, Derrida, and their readers can
be accounted for by the very "theory" under consideration
here.

This accounting for non-plenitude, non-arrival, and

29see Limited Inc., pp. 115ff.
30see Reiner SchUrmann's Heidegger on Being and Acting:
From Principles to Anarchy:
"In reading Heidegger from
beginning to end ... the practical implications of his
thinking leap into view: the play of a flux of practice,
without stabilization and presumably carried to the point of
an incessant fluctuation in institutions, is an end in
itself. The turn beyond metaphysics thus reveals the
essence of praxis: exchange deprived of a principle" (18).
31This

charge is specifically leveled against Derrida;
see his response to Habermas in a long footnote to Limited
Inc. , pp. 1 56-58.

152
errancy in an other-than-negative way is part of the
"project" of thinking\writing the postmodern:

these texts

are--if my "argument is correct"--in-scribed within the
network(s) they de-scribe, and are subject to its play.

Or,

as Derrida writes about Heidegger's attempt to tell the
story of Being,
As soon as there are renvois, and that is always
already, something like representation no longer
waits and we must arrange to tell this story
differently, from renvois of renvois to renvois of
renvois, in a destiny which is never certain of
gathering itself up, of identifying itself, or of
determining itself. (325)
Perhaps this postmodern call "to tell this story
differently"--to tell a story which does not move toward a
transcendental signified--allows us to bring the question of
literature onto the scene, as a challenge to the
philosophical, representational mode of story telling.
Joseph McElroy's Plus takes up this challenge by trying
to think these problematic postmodern relations--by trying
to think the status of the representing subject after the
"death" of the subject and of representation.

Plus is a

different kind of science fiction story about a disembodied
human brain called Imp (Interplanetary Monitoring Platform)
Plus which is put into orbit of Earth and monitored by
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Ground. 32

Imp Plus sends and receives messages from

Ground, but it always receives more than these messages.
The text begins:
He found it all around.

It opened and was close.

He felt it was himself, but felt it was more.

It

nipped open from outside in and from inside out.
Imp Plus found it all around.
this was not the start.

He was Imp Plus and

(1)

This "more"--the "plus" that simultaneously "was himself"
and "was more"--is a recurring concern of McElroy's text.
This initial "Plus" or "more" (at the beginning of the book
which is "not the start"), this excess--of message, of self,
of experience--cannot be thematized into a totalized
metaphysical picture.

The messages from Ground come on a

closed Concentration Loop, but even this direct sending does
not guarantee their intelligibility; the more, the
dissemination always already at work even at the "source,"
makes the meaning of the sendings from Ground difficult to
control:

"through the message impulses [from Ground] Imp

Plus knew a thing more than what they told" (5); "Ground
said the word" ( 7), but "Imp Pl us knew more" ( 8).

As the

text continues, this excess of message and of self, this
ground withdrawing from both Imp Plus and from Ground, makes
not only the meaning, but the very destination of the
32 The

"story" is very much more comp 1 i cated than I make
it out here. For an excellent distillation of the plot of
Plus, see David Porush's The Soft Machine (172-75).
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sendings from Ground to Imp Plus impossible to control:
"And Imp Plus did not know if the transmission was to Ground
or him.

He seemed to be transmitting within

himself .... There was more all around, and the more all
around was joining itself to Imp Plus" (36).

This Plus,

this more, this excess of signification, is one of the
things that Derrida points to as a possibilization for
deconstruction, for a postmodern exploration of the question
of ground; he writes,
If I had to risk a single definition of
deconstruction, one as brief, elliptical, and
economical as a password, I would say simply and
without overstatement:

plus d'une langue--both

more than a language and no more of

s language.

(Memoires 15)
The excess that Imp Plus experiences in the messages from
Ground, "more than a language," is what makes the sendings
from

G~ound

possible (allows them to be thematized in

language, to be offered as representations), but
simultaneously makes it impossible for them to come to the
specific destination and interpretative closure that the
representing, philosophical subject wishes to achieve--"no
more of

s langauge," no more of a single, univocal, self-

present message to be transmitted between stable
interpreting subjects, and no more of a guide from the
Ground of language as representation:

"Ground did not fee 1
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familiar now" (25).
But this problematizing of the question of ground does
not lead to a simple abandonment of the question of ground-for Imp, Ground cannot simply be turned off or abandoned
when it shows itself as problematic:
he found by having done it.
transmissions as silence.
(73).

"One thing he could do

This was to hear Ground's
Yet when and how weren't sure"

Imp Plus contemplates turning off the sendings from

Ground, but finds this impossible because the very activity
of thinking--in this case, the category of negation--is shot
through with and implicated by the
representation.

metaphysical ground of

How or when can the conditions of

possibility for discourse and thinking be abandoned or
turned off, especially if it is these conditions which are
being interrogated?

The only way Imp can conceive of a

different mode of thinking is through the system of a
present mode of thinking, so he must interrogate the ground
that modernist thinking stands on if he is to think
differently:
So all he knew was that what life he was possessed
of inclined him to give Ground answers.

In return

for answers that in turn might make him know the
more that he had come to be.

(170)

In order to theorize his postmodern existence--one
characterized by a recognition of the inevitable excess
which makes totalizing systems untenable--Imp engages the
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ground of the modernist systems which his postmodern
knowledge exceeds; this ground must be interrogated if he is
to "know the more that he had come to be" on the way to
postmodern thinking--a thinking that is inevitably, Imp
realizes, in two places at once, both inside and outside
representation as the language of the subject:

"Imp Plus

thought his being outside and inside had hit him with an
impedance of doub 1e vision" ( 50).

This doub 1e vision,

needless to say, impedes my own sight of Plus; I am, in
reading the text, inside a problematic of representation as
critique while simultaneously attempting to open up this
reading or critique to an outside, an excess, to the plus
which makes reading Plus (im)possible.
It is this "double vision" that a postmodern thinking
and writing attempts to attend to--a double vision caused by
"being inside and outside'' the structures of a thinking that
is to be displaced.

But if the postmodern must both

displace and account for the displacement of the modern,
then stubborn question of how such displacement is possible
needs to be asked:

how is it possible both to make use of

and also to displace--to be inside and outside--the thinking
of a tradition?

Derrida likens this situation--the

postmodern situation--to writing, receiving, thinking a post
card:
its lack or excess of address prepares it to fall
into all hands:

a post card, an open letter in
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which the secret appears, but indecipherably ....
What does a post card want to say to you?

On what

conditions is it possible? (Post Card 17 November
1979)
Derrida here poses the questions of end, sending, ground,
and representation using the metaphor of a post card:

a

representation (a "world picture," one might say) sent along
its way with the distinct possibility of never reaching a
specific destination, open to many readings along the way.
However, given its limited discursive space and the fact
that--unlike a letter--its representations are open and
inscribed directly on its surface, a post card is also prone
to many misreadings along the way, and this is what a
thinking\writing the postmodern attempts to account for:
not only the possibility of plenitude, understanding,
reading, but the simultaneous possibility--engendered by the
same ground, by the same conditions of possibility--of nonplenitude, misunderstanding, misreading.

And it is perhaps

this ability to understand the problematics of the
(non)arrival of the post card which is the condition of
possibility for postmodern writing and thinking; maybe it
requires, as Derrida writes,
Knowing how to play well with the poste restante.
Knowing how not to be there and how to be strong
for not being there right away.

Knowing how not

to deliver on command, how to wait and to make
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wait ... to the point

of dying without mastering

anything of the final destination.

The post is

always en reste, and always restante.

It always

awaits the addressee [destinataire] who might
always, by chance, not arrive.

(Post Card

191/206)

Perhaps postmodern knowledge is "itself'' this writing of the
approach, the never-not-yet of the (im)possible (non)arrival
of truth; a conception of end in this thinking differently
about metaphysics and about literature--end as other than
simple limit--allows us to thematize this approach without
arrival of meaning, this envoi, as other than a lamentable
situation.

As Derrida writes, "this divisibility of the

envoi has nothing negative about it, it is not a lack, it is
altogether different from subject, from signifier"
("Sending" 324).

We can thematize this envoi as a

lamentable situation only from the premises of untenable
metaphysical system, a system which is experiencing its
closure.

And Derrida's Post Card not only thematizes but

also enacts or performs this (im)possible (non)arrival of
truth after the closure of representation:

the text is

written in short, cryptic, sometimes discontinuous sections
which strain and finally crack traditional distinctions
between letters and post cards, between philosophy and
literature, between the discourse of truth and the discourse
of fables.
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But despite Derrida's insistence that a writing of the
post card shakes representation, it is important even-perhaps especially--here to hesitate, to point out that the
metaphor of thinking\writing the post card--if taken solely
stylistically, as the "form" of the postmodern--risks the
arrival of a new representation, a new world picture
centered around the cryptic ambiguity and catchy slogans of
a post card.

One need only think of the myriad discourses

(advertising and architecture, for example) which locate
their notion of the "postmodern" in the short, ambiguous
juxtaposition of unrelated images to see that this has
already happened--and, one is quick to add, to reiterate the
inadequacy of reading the postmodern as a sheerly stylistic
phenomenon (what Lacoue-Labarthe has called the "rag-bag"
school of postmodernism). 33

Such misreadings and

misappropriations are, of course, inevitable in any period,
but postmodernists, in attempting to account for these
misreadings, can also become aware of the cultural logic of
(mis)appropriation which .fuels them--to paraphrase an
unlikely source, to understand how bad things happen to good
ideas--and thereby remain aware of the risks of
thinking\writing the postmodern.

As Derrida writes,

... "thought" risks in its turn (but I believe this risk
is unavoidable--it is the risk of the future itself)

33 Lacoue-Labarthe's remark is cited in Gasche's
"Postmodernism and Rationality" (534).
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being reappropriated by socio-political forces that
could find it in their interest in certain situations.
Such a 'thought' indeed cannot be produced outside of
certain historical, techno-economic, politicoinstitutional and linguistic conditions.

A strategic

analysis that is to be as vigilant as possible must
thus with its eyes wide open attempt to ward off such
reappropriations. ("Principle" 17)
This problem of reappropriation--often criticized as
something postmodernists celebrate--brings us back to the
necessity of the double move:

the necessity of both

philosophical thematization (a thinking) as well as a kind
literary reflexivity (a writing) which can disrupt the
reappropriation of dialectical sublation; a double move
which can attempt to disrupt the reappropriation of the
postmodern as a commodity, as a programmatic institutional
scheme--in short, as a representation.3 4
34 This is not to say that deconstruction or Heidegger's
thinking are not commodifiable; aside from the more obvious
academic commodifications, one need only note Bob Mackie's
Spring 1990 advertising campaign with Bloomingdale's ("A new
cool of thought. A new philosophy of style. Deconstruct.
Lighten up. It's a 1itt1 e more free."] and the recent
"Applied Heidegger" movement [cf. Gottleib's "Heidegger for
Fun and Profit"] to see that there is indeed a rampant
appropriation mind-set at work in what is perhaps too
blithely called late capitalist society (a mind-set which,
it should be noted, depends upon representation--upon the
consumability of representations); however, it seems hasty
to indict Derrida and Heidegger as cheerleaders for these
misappropriations, or to accuse them of being romantically
unaware of the dangers of reappropriation. See, in addition
to numerous Derrida essays (esp. "Living On," Memoires, and
"Principle"), Heidegger's remarks about the university,
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And with this double move we return to the question of
literature--to the question of the specificity, the place of
literature--in a postmodern situation.

Perhaps literature,

what we call the literary, has always, from before the
beginning, been that which poses the greatest danger to
representation:

perhaps it can be called the "post" which

has always haunted the "modern", 35 the (im)possibility of
representation which has haunted representation.

Perhaps

now--from the place we call the closure of representation-we are able to read this threat that literature poses.
Literature has existed throughout the modern, subjectivist
period (one could argue throughout its entire history) only
in, by, and for philosophy--only within the problematics of
a revelation of its truth.

Literature exists in the

subjectivist period primarily insofar as it represents
experience--the edifying truth embedded in the fiction of
the fable.

But what happens after Nietzsche, when the

discourse of truth shows itself to be a fable?

Literature

comes to be that which can, in some sense, mark the break,
the interruption, the insufficiency of truth as
representation, and the necessity to tell the story
differently.

Hence a certain privilege of literature, of

writing, in coming to grips with a postmodern logic; but, as
capital ism, and the "gigantic" in "The Age of the World
Picture."
35 r steal this phrase from a conversation with John
Protevi.
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Lacoue-Labarthe warns,
If writing has this privilege ... it is not because we
are finally delivered from the world, from presence
(and from representation)--as one now hastens to add
rather quickly--by simply inverting (or even not
inverting at all) metaphysical oppositions.

Rather it

is because writing is, above all, this reflection of
experience where reflection (and hence experience)
constantly undoes itself. ("Fable" 55-6)
Postmodern writing (postmodern literature, postmodern text)
then becomes the place (the site, the space) where the logic
of the renvois (the logic of a writing which cannot control
its own destination, the logic of what we would call the
postmodern) moves and shows itself--as thinking\writing,
that "reflection of experience where reflection (and hence
experience) constantly undoes itself."

It is not, as

Lacoue-Labarthe maintains, a matter of inverting strategies
--of scrapping the subjectivist category of representation
and being free of it--but rather a matter of constantly
undoing, of rethinking representation, end, and ground in
writing--of thinking\writing the post card.
So the literary seems a privileged place to ask the
question of thinking\writing the postmodern--provided, that
is, literature can twist free 36 from before the law of
36 r

lift this phrase from John Sal 1 is, who al lows -it to
resonate as "the slightest twist, setting one from that
moment adrift from the logic of opposition, adrift in a
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philosophy, from before the law of representation which
would give literature its form, its signifying transparency,
its end.

Literature can, perhaps, attempt to twist free

from representation in being end-less, rejecting the
transcendental signified--remaining a story without ends.
text like Ronald Sukenick's

The Endless Short Story.

A

In

the penultimate section of ESS, "The End of the Endless
Short Story, Continued," Sukenick asks the question of
writing the postmodern, of writing the end-less, of writing
a tenuously addressed post card from the closure of
representation:

"the end of one ti me is a 1ways the

beginning of another kind of time," he writes, "And who
knows what the mailman may bring?" (130).

Sukenick plays on

notions of time and end in his text; his is a continuing
rather than a simple end--an ''End, continued," an end which,
like the postcard, may or may not arrive.

In fact, the

text's final endless story is titled "Post Card," and is
characterized as
a post card from THE ENDLESS SHORT STORY. THE ENDLESS SHORT
STORY has a secret ambition it wants to write the Great Amer
ican Postcard. The~e are some of the requirements for The
Great American Postcard it has to have a Great Character.
It has to have an All Encompassing Plot. It has to be Signific
ant and easy to read. It should Be Serious but not so seri
ous as to make us feel bad. (130)
The traditional criteria for the form of a representative

certain oblique opposition to logic" (160).
37This quotation,

as well as the ones which follow,
contain Sukenick's original line breaks and spelling.
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narrative are satirized here by Sukenick as the
"requirements for the Great American Postcard":

totalized,

logical plot; a serious, significant--but not too
depressing--theme; and simple, consumable readability.
Sukenick's text possesses precious few of these
"requirements":

it is discontinuous, playful, and

unreadable--that is, if reading means the consumption of "an
All Encompassing Plot."

The fractured "form'' of Sukenick's

text also doubles or performs the fracturing "content":

the

fracturing of the text makes the call for the Great American
Postcard "to be Signific/ ant and easy to read" a difficult.
one to fulfill.

In fact, because the Great American

Postcard is itself a sending from the already disseminated
ground of Sukenick's text--"a post card from THE ENDLESS
SHORT STORY," a postcard within a postcard--the distinctions
of form and content (origin and end, context and text,
philosophy and literature) are themselves subject to a
fracturing.

The "end"--the revelation of meaning, the

transcendental signified that representation has always
dreamed of--is literally de-formed here by Sukenick:

the

form of language as representation is literally broken or
cracked on the page in Sukenick's attempt to write/think in
an other way.
But Sukenick is not simply gushing abstract thoughts
onto the page in random order--a romantic, subjectivist
project to be sure; rather, his text both enacts and
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thematizes (in a simultaneous double movement) the
destructuring of the language and tradition of
representation--the conditions of possibility given to
postmodern literature.

Sukenick writes of the tradition as

alphabet soup dissolving in the thick warm broth of humanism
fish food again. For as Captain Postcard knows the target
is always poetry. And the bullet is poetry. And the gun is
poetry. Every poem destroys the language a little. Blows a hunk
off the stale i·ntractable block of it. Blows it to bit
s so the fish can eat again and multiply in their many surpr
ising species shapes and hues only to fall prey to bigger f
ish or to fish that are smaller but more numerous and one ho
pes more lively like dull unwieldy epistolary novels that break
down into constituent postcards while tragic Captain Postcar
d sails off his moment past to meet his fate in the bland de
pths of cliche. What you hear is the sound of fish nibbling
alphabets. It's three generations later and all of this has
happened a 1 ready.
( 131 )
For Sukenick, the literature of the past gives conditions of
possibility to a postmodern literature, which must work
within the framework of the past insofar as it must use the
same language and acknowledge its tradition as
representation, but Sukenick is here literally rethinking
the tradition of representation "three generations later."
In Sukenick's text, this tradition is to undergo not only a
critique but a destructur i ng:
poetry.

"the target/ is a 1ways

And the bullet is poetry.

And the gun is/ poetry";

and each postmodern text "destroys the language a little.
Blows a/ hunk off the stale intractable block of it.
it to bit/ s."

Blows

Postmodern text destroys the language of the

past to allow others to feed on its innovations and further
open up the system to the possibility of thinking
differently.

The language of representation is the only
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language we have, so the forms we take from the past--the
"dull unwieldy epistolary novels" of the Eighteenth century
--must "break down into constituent postcards'':

the

monolith of writing as representation must be broken down
"so the fish can eat again and multiply," so artists can
produce new forms.

Indeed, the question of form here is

crucial for Sukenick--his text both uses and disrupts forms
of language as representation, but it does so without
offering a ready-made form with which to replace
representation.

In this way, his text is both inside and

outside representation:

it gives way to an endless

rewriting\rethinking of form--an approach of form--and
broaches the possibility of thinking differently, thinking
end-lessly, thinking as writing, thinking\writing the
postmodern.
This different thinking--an other thinking rather than
another thinking--likewise calls for a different practice of
literary "criticism."

Sukenick concludes his text with two

literary critics fishing for the meaning of the Great
American Postcard--for the end of The Endless Short Story:
Two fishermen with elaborate gear stand o
ver a pool and talk about it. They haul out fish one after
another club them pull out their guts. When they're done the
y string them up on their car and take a snapshot. And ther
e it is. The Great American Postcard. They stutter off in the
clumsy model T of analysis bringing home food for though
t. Dear ESS. Went fishing today but all I caught was a pos
tcard and it wasn't Serious. Didn't have no plot. No charac
(132)

Here Sukenick suggests a certain practice of literary
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criticism:

haul out the fish--the new texts fed on the bits

of langauge blown off by the gun of postmodern writing--and
"club them pull out their guts" for a meaning, a
representation, a world picture, a snapshot.

Such a

practice allows the critics to "stutter off in the/ clumsy
model T of analysis bringing home food for though/ t," to
bring the food for thought to the classroom as a dead fish
brought home in a model T of paradigmatic analysis.

But

what they will have caught is the "Great American Postcard"
--a sending which, in the end, cannot be "hooked."
it?

A question remains:

what have 1 caught here?

Or can
Indeed,

am I myself caught in the wide-angle lens which takes the
fishermen/critics' snapshot, next to any number of dead
fish:

Sukenick, McElroy, Derrida, Heidegger?

Have they

become mounted and stuffed above these pages; has
representation been waiting here, quietly at the end of this
discussion, to reimpose its order?

Perhaps, as there is no

absolute escape from representation, no clean place or
language--no untouched fishin' hole.

But there remains also

at this end an other notion of end, a hesitation rather than
a resolution, a challenge to the fishing licence issued by
representation, a sending that remains unapprehended:

"Went

fishing today but all I caught was a pas/ tcard and it
wasn't Serious.

Didn't have no p 1ot.

No charac."

End of

story; end of a certain kind of stories--or, perhaps more
precisely, end of a certain kind of writing; end of a
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certain kind of thinking.
end ( s).

End of a certain notion of

CHAPTER 5
GRAVITY'S RAINBOW AND THINKING THE POSTMODERN OTHER
Alas, who is there
we can make use of? Not angels, not men;
and already the knowing brutes are aware
that we don't feel very secure at home
within our interpreted world.
--Rilke
Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are,
but to refuse what we are.
--Foucault
There's no real decision here, neither lines of power nor
cooperation. Decisions are never really made--at best they
manage to emerge, from a chaos of peeves, whims,
hallucinations and all-around assholery. This is less a
fighting team than nest full of snits, blues, crochets, and
grudges, not a rare or fabled bird in the lot. Its survival
seems, after all, only a mutter of blind fortune groping
through the heavy marbling skies one Titanic-Night at a
time. Which is why Slothrop now observes his coalition with
hopes for success and hopes for disaster about equally high
(and no, that doesn't cancel out to apathy--it makes a loud
dissonance that dovetails inside you sharp as knives).
--Gravity's Rainbow (676)
At this point in this work, an urgent question
reemerges:
of ends?

how does one proceed after the end of a notion
How does or can one read the postmodern?

How does

one read--let alone write about or "criticize"--a text that
is perhaps the postmodern text par excellence, Gravity's
Rainbow (hereafter GR), an encyclopedic, end-less text whose
difficulty and resistance to interpretation are legendary,
even within the criticism which.would want to interpret it?
169
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How does a critic or discipline respond to a text that
resists the paradigms of criticism, that always seems to
elude being mastered, that puts aside the possibility of a
determinate decision concerning its meaning?

As I have

suggested above, one way to deal with such an impasse is
"simply" to re-thematize the work of criticism, to
allegorize reading or critical work as the revelation of its
own impossibility--the route taken by a certain kind of
rhetorical deconstructive criticism.

Strangely enough, this

route is largely untravelled in Pynchon criticism, though
almost all readings of GR contain a caveat about the
difficulty, impossibility, or undesirability of totalizing
the text. 1

In fact, for the majority of Pynchon scholars,

the way into a reading of GR is precisely through this
difficulty, through the text's status somewhere between
meaning and non-meaning:

GR is consistently thematized in

terms of its richness (its vast size, complex use of
sources, and highly complex narrative constructions and
obfuscations), a richness which in turn offers criticism
multiple--perhaps infinite--interpretations. 2
1see, as a general caveat, Bernard Duyfhuizen's "Taking
Stock," a review essay of 26 years of Pynchon criticism; he
writes that "all future critics of Pynchon must remember the
lessons of the past: his complex texts resist reduction,
and patterns of meaning rarely extend beyond momentary, and
sometimes illusory, conditions of being" (88).
2There is, in fact, an entire genre of Pynchon
criticism which takes this "encyclopedic" route; see, -in
addition to Mendelson's seminal "Gravity's Encyclopedia,"
Toloyan's "War as Background in GR," Weisenburger's A_GR

1 71
Paradoxically, however, such a critical maneuver can
end up treating discontinuity or unthematizability as a
continuous theme--which, once uncovered, reveals that GR is
not really unthematizable at all.

GR's rich ambiguity

becomes, rather, its over-arching theme, and the novel
becomes an allegory for the ambiguity of the world and of
art--for their plurality.

In the secondary literature, GR

is consistently read as a text which affirms a sort of
Romantic, humanist freedom among myriad possibilities for
being--the richness of the text figures the freedom of the
reader within the plurality of the world.

This is, in fact,

virtually uniformly the case in GR criticism.
almost randomly:

I cite,

Seed writes that GR's myriad patterns

"raise multiple possibilities of arriving at knowledge.

At

the same time, since there is a continuity between
characters' efforts to know and the readers', Pynchon raises
different possible ways of interpreting his own novel"
(209). Earl writes that we as readers "are all
shocked ... into a higher consciousness that can finally lead
us to a transcendental freedom" (249). Schaub argues that
Pynchon's "writing succeeds in binding people
together ... [his] fiction reminds us of what a true society
would mean" (151-52). Hite writes that "GR is another
mammoth project of loving the people, loving even their

Companion and "The End of History?," Cowart's Pynchon: The
Art of Allusion, and Moore's .Lhe Style of Connectedness.
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preterition in its scatological profusion, avoiding a
univocal standard of judgment, avoiding hierarchy .... It is
instead a novel that affirms the nonsystematic,
nontotalizing connections of a community based on making
meanings" (156).

Moore argues that "the reader of GR must

learn to see the quasi-magical, part-hallucinatory web of
interconnections, variously familiar, obscure, farfetched
and hitherto unthought-of among all these images, signs and
omens'' (28). Wolfley writes that for Pynchon "[n]othing
really matters but individual freedom" (121).

Ames argues

that the Counterforce releases linguistic "possibilities
that give hope and life to those outside" (206).

Even

Hume's study of myth in GR has a pluralist/humanist bent:
"To our monomyth-shaped minds, openness, kindness,
acceptance of preterition, and responsiveness to the Other
Side seem terribly evanescent and fragile, but Pynchon
organizes them into a structured model, so we can consider
his proposition for its validity as a whole" (139-40).

And

so on. 3
My question concerning GR and the critical project
surrounding it, however, will be a different one:

what

happens when criticism encounters a text which, far from
offering the critic many possible interpretations, radically

3McHoul

and Wills' Writing Pynchon is, in fact, the
only major book that doesn't put forth such a humanist
reading, and in fact has much to say about this reading's
inadequacy to the complexities of GR (1-13).
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resists any thematized reading whatsoever?

If, as I have

argued in the preceding chapter, the postmodern signals the
end of a certain notion of ends, then an end-oriented
discipline (if that is not a redundant formulation) which
encounters an end-less writing must, in some way,
domesticate that writing, put it to work in the service of a
determinate end.

Phrased in another--perhaps more

combative--way, my question will be what happens if one
takes quite seriously criticism's ubiquitous claims about
the non-totalizing (or non-totalizable) nature of GR?

If

one is to take these claims seriously, it seems to follow
that GR is characterized not by a plurality of possible
interpretative meanings, but rather by a strange inability
to interpret its meaning(s) at all.
This, of course, will need to be worked out, but I must
stress that I do not mean to suggest GR is,
simply unreadable or without meaning.

a

la de Man,

To clarify what might

seem like an obvious and inescapable inconsistency (the
problem of my own reading of what I have called an
unreadable text), I hasten to clarify two necessary points
about my conception of reading or thematizing the
postmodern:

1) of course GR is able to be read and

thematized--what else characterizes the readings cited above
and makes possible my own reading of it?; and, 2) this
thematization is a necessary and unavoidable step within a
double gesture.

The pull toward determinate meaning comes
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with any use of language; however, I want to suggest here
that there is something other than thematization which is
not simply the opposite of thematization.

I want to suggest

that GR poses a ground-question to criticism's pull toward
determinate meaning through its disruptions of any simply
thematized reading, through its disruptions of any attempt
to assign it a comforting, consumable readability.

In

short, I will argue that GR produces neither the plurality
of interpretations that most Pynchon critics argue for, nor
the reassuring unreadability that de Man practices, but
rather a fracturing unreadability coupled with the
imperative to read differently; in other words, GR produces
an unreadability that is not simply the opposite of
readability, but one which calls into question the field of
opposition wherein the unreadable is simply opposed to the
readable.

GR's unreadability, as the epigraph to this

chapter reads, "doesn't cancel out to apathy--it makes a
loud dissonance that dovetails inside you sharp as knives."

Pynchon and Pluralism;
or, Pluralism is a Humanism
It is well-documented that Pynchon's texts overtly
discuss the status of thinking the "between"--the middle
ground between the exclusionary poles of binary thinking.
Many critical discussions of Pynchon use the texts' overt
thematizations of the question of the between--in the· final
pages of The Crying of Lot 49 and in the Pointsman/Mexico
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debate in GR--to ground a pluralist reading.~

Hite sums up

this pluralist reading in "Included Middles," the first
chapter of Ideas of Order in the Novels of Thomas Pynchon,
There is an infinite "middle" region between the
hyperbolic extremes of an absolute, externally imposed
... order and total chaos .... Pynchon's novels
themselves are "middles," and they demonstrate how much
significance can be included within a plurality of
limited, contingent, overlapping systems that coexist
and form relations with one another without achieving
abstract intellectual closure. (16, 21)
For Hite (as for the litany of critics cited above), Pynchon
deals thematically with excluded middles in order to include
them; he thematizes the ''bad shit" (Crying 137) of excluded
middles in the service of a pluralistic community of
interpretations.

If this is the case, though, Pynchon's

text finds itself placed in a rather sticky situation,
valorizing or offering a vision of what is presumably the
"good shit'' of inclusive pluralism in dialectical
contradiction to the "bad shit" of excluded middles.
Including the middle by hypostatizing it as an inhabitable
place populated by competing relational systems precisely
allows this "middle" to be located and sublated by a
dialectic, allows dialectical thinking to achieve "abstract
closure."

And GR seems to take this into account:

~See pages 136-37 in Lot 49 and 48-55 in GR.
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pluralist criticism's notion of the between as a place to
write your own solutions, as a place to be ''included," is
precisely the reading of the between given by Pointsman, one
of the arch-villains of GR, as he lusts after the minds of
Kevin Spectre's tabula rasa shellshock victims, who are
"egoless for one pulse of the Between . . . tablet erased,
new writing about to begin" (50). 5 The logic of pluralism
remains a logic of metaphysics, of humanism.

This pluralist

"humanism," though, is something of a misnomer, insofar as
pluralism is characterized not so much by a concern for the
otherness of others, but by an obsession with manipulation
and ends--with determinate meaning and rhetoric, persuasion,
use.

And Pointsman realizes the potential political economy

of those in the between; he longs "to use their innocence,
to write on them new words of himself, his own brown
Realpolitik dreams" (50).
Up to this point, I have (at least surreptitiously)
been advancing the argument that literary criticism is a
kind of "human science":

I have argued that literary

criticism is, in many ways, a quasi-scientific discourse
interested in producing ever-more methodologies in the hopes
of better controlling and understanding its object,
literature--just as Pointsman dreams of producing ever-more
methodologies in the hopes of better controlling his human

5Throughout, ellipses are Pynchon's, except where

enclosed in brackets.
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subjects.

This argument can most specifically be developed

here, I think, by looking at the question of "pluralism" in
and around the text of GR, a text that rather overtly
concerns itself with sciences and their workings, 6 and
likewise a text given a thoroughly pluralist reading by
literary criticism.

But we need to hesitate here and ask if

it is really fair to say that a pluralist brand of literary
criticism is just another sort of human science, a
determining discourse that constrains its object in the
midst of studying it.

Isn't pluralism, as its proponents

would argue, precisely an incredulous response to the ironfisted, totalizing metanarratives of the sciences--a call to
recognize and foreground the constructed nature of any
interpretative claim, and hence a call to acknowledge the
potential plurality of such claims? 7 Pluralism in this
sense would seem precisely to invalidate the monologizing
claims of the sciences--human or otherwise--and hence could
be seen to be the "postmodern" discourse par excellence; as
Brian McHale argues in his "Telling Postmodernist Stories'':
To escape the general postmodernist incredulity toward
metanarratives it is only necessary that we regard our
own metanarrative incredulously, in a certain sense,
preferring it tentatively or provisionally, as no more

6see Alan Friedman's "Science and Technology."
7see, for example, Fish's "What Makes an Interpretation
Acceptable?"
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(but no less) than a strategically useful and
satisfying fiction .... I am recommending, in other
words, that we need not abandon metanarratives--which
may, after all, do useful work for us--so long as we
'turn them down' from metanarratives to 'little
narratives. ' ( 551 )
This is, I think, a concise formulation of the pluralist
logic which underlies much GR criticism:

the myriad

sections and various world views represented in GR are
consistently read as what McHale calls ''little narratives,"
multiple world views that can be and need to be adapted to
fit various circumstances.

As I argue above, this logic of

pluralism could be said to inform the dominant reading of GR
as a text that offers multiple readings, and in so doing,
figures the freedom of the reader to engender his or her own
provisional, un-transcendental narratives which can avoid
the totalizing violence and hegemony of binary, scientist
metanarratives.
But, again, it seems that the text of GR would
problematize such a humanist/pluralist reading, precisely by
implicating it in the movement of a kind of violent,
hegemonic scientism.

For example, Pointsman sums up the

world view of the master, Pavlov, in the following way:
'Pavlov believed that the ideal, the end we all
struggle toward in science, is the true mechanistic
explanation.

He was realistic enough not to expect it
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in this lifetime.

Or in several lifetimes more. But

his hope was for a long chain of better and better
approximations.' (89) 8
Pavlov's scientific method, it seems, follows precisely the
logic of a humanist pluralism, where the totalizing ends of
inquiry--the "true mechanistic explanation" that Pavlov
pragmatically knows cannot be reached--are protected by what
McHale calls "a strategically useful and satisfying
fiction."

In other words, precisely what remains

unquestioned by this pluralism are the ends of inquiry, the
unquestioned "useful work" that a discipline or method
allows one to perform.
However, the ends of methodological or scientific
inquiry often show themselves to be problematic rather than
merely ''useful and satisfying," and the technological world
in which these ends remain unquestioned is one of the
principle concerns of GR, where a kind of pragmaticopluralist humanism shows itself as the technological world
view par excellence--a world where everything becomes
available for use, to be taken up by a method and converted
unproblematically to an end.

As Ihab Hassan writes, quoting

8compare this quotation with the MLA's Introduction to

Scholarship on the present and future of literary criticism:
"Perhaps someday criticism will have become a science,
equipped with scrupulous (if not infallible) rules of
procedure. Perhaps someday critics will agree on most (if
not all) of their principles. Everyone impatient with the
current illogic and anarchy of much of the field would
welcome that day" (92).
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William James, the world of end-oriented thinking is the
world of pluralist/pragmatist thinking, which "looks away
from 'first things, principles, categories, supposed
necessities,' and looks toward 'last things, fruits,
consequences, facts,' and like a corridor in the great
mansion of philosophy, it opens on many rooms" ("Making
Sense" 453).

In Hassan's words, pluralist thinking helps

one breathe the fresh air of "many rooms" within "the great
mansion of philosophy"--it opens thinking to the fresh air
of many potential usages and many points of view, and allows
this fresh air to invigorate the closed, stale air of the
house of being; pragmatist thinking escapes totalization
through its emphasis on multiple, provisional ends rather
than on the inevitably metaphysical and unitary notion of
grounds.

However, this naming of ends as simply provisional

or pragmatic in pluralist discourse hardly seems to shake or
open up metaphysical thinking, as Hassan--and many other
pluralists--seems to think it inexorably does. 9 The shift
of emphasis from grounds to ends is precisely the movement
of a technological, representational metaphysics--a
metaphysics we see at work throughout GR, in the myriad
forces that dog Slothrop, in the techno-representational
world "where only destinations are important, [where]

9see, for example, Hassan's reading of Rorty:
"Pragmatism brackets Truth (capitalized), circumvents
Metaphysics and Epistemology; it finds no universal 'ground'
for discourse" ("Making Sense" 453).
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attention is to long-term statistics, not to individuals:
and where the House always does, of course, keep turning a
profit" (209).
It is this profit, this end product, this work, that a
technological world view protects most greedily--and it is
also this end product that a pluralist humanism cannot live
without.

The economy of such a world view dictates that

ends must be determinable, that there be no reserve or
excess, that inquiry proceed, as Laslo Jamf's work does,
"logically, dialectically" (250).

In fact, it is the

dialectical thinking which pluralism protects--through a
common obsession with ends and complete expenditure--that

°

carries most clearly this technological world view. 1

For

example, note the way in which dialectics and the
expenditure (and/or profit) of ends are related in the
following passage, where Richard Rorty muses on what happens
when the "the pragmatist pulls out his bag of tried-and-true
dialectical gambits":

10 rhe rise of technology is, perhaps, the concern of

contemporary thought, for thinkers as disparate as
Heidegger, Adorno, Foucault and Bataille; Rebecca Comay
nicely sums up the notion of technologization: "the
progress of enlightenment brings new and seemingly
irreversible forms of domination: the reification of
experience and the introduction of the abstract measure of
utility; the reduction of qualitative difference to the
quantifiable identities of the market; the increasing
centrality of productive labor as the determinant of thought
and action; the expulsion of the mundane sacred and its
replacement by an otherworldly deity; and, last but not
least, the (Newtonian) determination of time as an inert
continuum of exchangeable now-points" (69).
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He proceeds to argue that there is no pragmatic
difference ... between 'it works because it's true' and
'it's true because it works' .... [The pragmatist] does
not want to discuss the necessary and sufficient
conditions for a sentence being true, but precisely
whether the practice which hopes to find a
philosophical way of isolating the essunce of truth
has, in fact, paid off. (Consequences xxix).
For Rorty, it is precisely the pragmatist's "dialectical
gambit" which has "paid off":

in the metaphysican's game,

Rorty offers the pawn of grounds in order to gain the
favored strategic position of ends.

For Rorty, ''truth" is a

game for patsies insofar as it ignores the real business of
thought:

the pay-off of work, of use, of return--the

dialectical pay-off that is the cornerstone of a wellfunctioning pragmatico-technological world view.
Strangely enough, this pragmatico-technological world
view in GR is most often analyzed by critics not in terms of
its offering multiple pragmatic freedoms for individual
decision, but in terms of the marriage of multi-national
corporations and government bureaucracies, wherein IG
Farben's death-dealing arrangements with the Nazis come to
prefigure the post-war order of multi-national
capitalism. 11

(We should note here that this seems rather

11 see, for example, Mazurek, who argues that GR
"describes the emergence of the permanent war economies of
the United States and the USSR from the ashes of World War
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baffling, precisely because of the dependence of these
readings on the premises of a humanist, pragmatic pluralism
--a pluralism which would want to read individual freedom
rather than institutional repression in its world view.)

A

Farben executive explains their corporate version of folk
history and the future of multi-national capitalism to Nazi
financiers:
'The persistence, then, of structures favoring death.
Death converted into more death.

Perfecting its reign,

just and the buried coal grows denser, and overlaid
with more strata--epoch on top of epoch, city on top of
ruined city.

This is the sign of Death the

impersonator.
'These signs are real.

They are also symptoms of

a process.

The process follows the same form, the same

structure.

To apprehend it you will follow the signs.

All talk of cause and effect is secular history, and
secular history is a diversionary tactic.

Useful to

you, gentlemen, but no longer to us here.

If you want

to know the truth--I know I presume--you must look into
the technology of these matters.' (167)
Throughout GR, this emphasis on technologies of death-especially the V-2 Rocket, and the nuclear rocket which it
(pre)figures--is perhaps the ultimate marriage of
II, a world in which Lt. Slothrop, the middle-class
everyman, is literally manipulated from cradle to grave by
the multinational I.G. Farben" (156).
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dialectical thinking and killing, of end-oriented research
and capitalism, of technology and "structures favoring
death."

Note the importance of research to Farben's

corporate world view, and their interest in dialectical
thinking--in the "process" or "the technology" by which they
hope to gain and maintain control.

And it is this emphasis

in GR that poses a very difficult question to claims for
humanist freedom made by the pluralists:

how can this

emphasis on ends and use not be a concomitant emphasis
manipulation and violence?

Again, I cite Rorty:

from a full-fledged pragmatist point of view, there is
no interesting difference between tables and texts,
between protons and poems.

To a pragmatist, these are

all just permanent possibilities for use, and thus for
redescription, reinterpretation, manipulation. (153)
Because it effaces differences among objects--or, better,
because it treats everything as a potential object--this
"full-fledged pragmatist point of view'' shows itself to be
in league with a manipulative, technological world view;
such a pluralist pragmatism, it seems, promotes the
dialectical, end-oriented thinking which, in large part,
allows and promotes the discovery of World War II's
"structures favoring death."
However, this relationship between dialectical thinking
and death moves not only at the empirical level of
invention, but indeed at the structural level that our
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Farben executive points us to.

Death can be seen as that

which fuels dialectical thinking, that which allows the very
movement of progress and history--as the Farben executive
puts it, "epoch on top of epoch, city on top of ruined
city."

In fact, as Hegel argues, dialectical thinking

cannot perform any useful work until it confronts and
masters death--the dialectic moves forward only when it
appropriates the negative moment of death, what Hegel calls
"the tremendous power of the negative; it is the energy of
thought, of the pure 'I.'" (19).

Hegel continues:

Death, if this is what we want to call this nonactuality, is of all things the most dreadful, and to
hold fast what is dead requires the greatest
strength .... But the life of Spirit is not the life
that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by
devastation, but rather the life that endures and
maintains itself in it.

It wins its truth only when,

in utter dismemberment, it finds itself .... Spirit is
this power only by looking the negative in the face,
and tarrying with it.

This tarrying with the negative

is the magical power that converts it into being. (19)
·Hegel here makes it clear that dialectical thinking needs
the negativity of death--the negativity of ''non-actuality,"
of the unrealized or unrealizable; 12 in fact, the negative
12 The

following discussion of death and negativity owes
a tremendous debt to Paul Davies' reading of Blanchet and
Hegel.
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moment of the dialectic is the only "productive" moment of
thought--the necessary ''dismemberment" of totality or surety
wherein truth "finds itself. " 13

.

If thought were to "shrink

from death," it would never experience this dismemberment,
and hence never experience the higher unity that the
dialectic allows--the ''magical power which converts it
[death, the negative] into being."

In short, dialectical

thought--which uncovers the technologies necessary to build
death-favoring apparatuses--is itself a "structure favoring
death," death in the form of the productive negativity
necessary to dialectical sublation.

The dialectic confronts

death--the absolutely other, that which dismembers life--and
masters it, thereby allowing thought to master anything else
in its path.

And it is this structure (or, as Derrida

writes, this stricture) of dialectical thinking that needs
to be accounted for in pragmatic-pluralist criticism, which
rather naively argues that a unitary metaphysics cannot deal
with any kind of uncertainty, dismemberment or plurality-that uncertainty or freedom can simply be opposed to or

13 In fact, death is fundamental to Hegelian "Man," as
Bataille points out: "If the animal which constitutes man's
natural being did not die, and--what is more--if death did
not dwell within him as the source of his anguish ... there
would be no man or liberty, no history of individual. In
other words, if he revels in what nonetheless frightens him,
if he is the being, identical with himself, who risks·
(identical) being itself, then man is truly a Man: he
separates himself from the animal" ("Hegel" 12).
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"defeat" a totalitarian certainty. 14

For Hegel, giving up

such certainty is precisely the productive moment of
thought:

"Thoughts become fluid ... when the pure certainty

of the self abstracts from itself--not by leaving itself
out, or setting itself aside, but by giving up the fixity of
its self-positing" (20, my emphasis).

In GR, then, it seems

one is compelled to analyze not only the death-dealing
products of a certain technological world-view, but the
structure of the world view itself--the structure of the
structures favoring death, their insidious movement(s)--and
to ask if these movements and structures can be disrupted in
any way.
While the intervention of a thematizing or interpretive
moment is necessary and inescapable in this inquiry, there
must be an other moment in the postmodern economy of meaning
if a pluralist economy of ends is to be disrupted.

As

Derrida writes,
The other relationship to competitive plurality would
not be strictly and rightly through and through
interpretive, even if it includes an interpretive
moment.

Without excluding the first interpretation,

above all without opposing it, [this other
relationship] would deal with the multiplicity which

14 see, for example, Slade's "Escaping Rationalization"
and Leverenz's "On Trying to Read GR," both of which center
on the reason/unreason opposition--with unreason as the
eventual winner--as the key to reading GR.
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cannot be reduced to the order [of competitive
plurality], be it a war order or not.

It would deal

with this multiplicity as a law of the field, a clause
of nonclosure which would not only never allow itself
to be ordered and inscribed, situated in the general
Kampfplatz, but would also make possible and inevitable
synecdochic and metonymic competitions:

not as their

normal condition of possibility, their ratio essendi or
ratio cognoscendi, but as a means of disseminal
alterity or alteration, which would make impossible the
pure identity, the pure identification of what it
simultaneously makes possible. ("Some Statements" 72)
A "reading" of GR must be accompanied by an other reading, a
second or double reading which "would deal with ...
multiplicity as a law of the field," as a structural
necessity rather than a pragmatic consequence, as a ground
which must be attended to rather than an end which must be
fought for.

For all its discussion of multiplicity, a

pluralist economy remains an economy of opposition because
it does not consider the structure of the field or network
in which truth arises--its conception of multiplicity
consists rather of (re)evaluating competing claims among
opposing truths.

A double reading necessarily begins in

such an economy of interpretation, opposition,
thematization, but it moves from there to examine the ground
of that economy itself, but not as a foundation which could
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assure the ends of inquiry--"not as their normal condition
of possibility, ... but as a means of disseminal alterity or
alteration, which would make impossible the pure identity,
the pure identification of what it simultaneously makes
possible."

The structure of the field--what I have been

calling the "postmodern" field--both makes thematization
possible and makes it impossible for that thematization to
cover or master the entire field, both makes relation
possible and interrupts determinate relation through a
disseminal otherness or alteration within the constituting
space of that relation.

The discipline of literary

criticism, as I have likewise argued, on the whole concerns
itself solely with this first reading or economy.

However,

it is toward this other field or economy in GR which we now
turn--though, of course, we never merely escape an economy
of reading or interpretation; it is, rather, a matter of
doubling this economy and disrupting it:

altering the space

of this economy, opening it to its other.

The Structure of the "structures favoring death":
Death and Dialectics
One of the most compelling "plot lines" in GR revolves
around the Herero, the African tribe subjugated by the
colonial Germans and subsequently turned into deathworshippers, into a people favoring death.

It should ·be

noted, however, that when the Germans went to Africa to
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build colonies and subjugate the Herera, the logic behind
this movement was precisely a dialectical one--where the
other is appropriated as a version of the same, to be
studied, ana 1yzed, used. 15

As GR puts it, "Eu rope came and

established its order of Analysis and Death" (722).

This

link between "Analysis and Death" explains Tchitcherine's
(and, one imagines, his Schwartzkammando brother Enzian's)
interest in dialectics:
Not till recently did he come to look for comfort in
the dialectical ballet of force, counterforce,
collision, new order--not till the War came and Death
appeared across the ring[ .... ] only then did he turn
to a Theory of History--of all pathetic cold comforts-to try to make sense of it. (704)
When death appears and comes to thought--as the absolutely
other, as that which cannot be experienced, thematized,
understood--thought must in turn find a way to master that
death, to find some way to make it productive, or at least
to obviate its potentially interruptive or dissembling
effects.

Thought will "try to make sense of'' death through

the "comfort" afforded by "the dialectical ballet of force,

15 cf. Hege 1, where otherness is thought as "a

difference which is no difference, or only a difference of
what is self-same, and its essence is unity" (99). See also
Pynchon's 1969 letter to Thomas Hirsh, printed as an
appendix to Seed: "I don't 1 i ke to use the word but I think
what went on back in SUdwest is archtypical of every clash
between west and non-west, clashes that are still going on
right now in South East Asia" (242).
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counterforce, collision, new order."

But, insofar as death

cannot be negated, used, understood, or even really chosen,
it has the potential to cripple dialectical thought.

For

example, in a famous scene in GR, Tchitcherine and Wimpe
discuss mystification and Marxist dialectics; Wimpe argues,
in an eminent 1y quotab 1e passage:

"'Marxist di a 1ect i cs?

That's not an opiate, eh?[ .... ] Die to help History grow to
its predestined shape'" (701).

Dialectics, here the Marxian

variety (which, of course, carries a well-known debt to the
Hegelian), 16 makes of death a productive moment within the
narrative of history--substitutes the narrative of History
for the narrative of God, and does so with the fuel supplied
by the negative moment of the dialectic.
But here a question remains:

is death really so easily

sublated, so easily mastered by a dialectic?
simple, sublatable negativity?

Is death a

As Tchitcherine stumbles

through the drug-induced argument with Wimpe, he becomes
increasingly less sure; he goes on concerning death: "'You
don't know.

Not till you're there, Wimpe.

You can't say.'

'That doesn't sound very dialectical,' [Wimpe replies]. 'I
don't know what it is'" (701).

16 see

Indeed, death is not very

Marx's Introduction to the second edition of
Capital: "The mystification which dialectic suffers in
Hegel's hands, by no means prevents him from being the first
to present its general form of working in a comprehensive
and conscious manner. With him it [dialectic] is standing
on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you
would discover the rational kernel within the mystical
shell" (25).
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dialectical:

as Tchitcherine points out, one never "knows"

about death until one "is there"; however, when one "is
there," one is no longer in a position to "know" anything at
all--one is dead, drawn out of the network of possible
relations which constitutes the world of knowledge.

In

fact, death--insofar as it does not respond to a rational
analysis, will not answer the question "what is it?"--stands
in a cripplingly neutral non-relation to thought:

the

inability to thematize death comes not from its potential
richness or the plurality of relations that a being can have
toward or with it, but rather from the fact that death shows
itself in no determinate relation whatsoever to a being.
As Hegel points out, there must be a double meaning to
the negative if there is to be sublation and mastery:

the

negative [death] must first dissemble or rend totality, and
then enter into a determinate relation with this
fragmentation, in the process saving it from the status of a
mere fragment.

In other words, for the negative to be

productive (indeed, for there to be production at all), the
dialectic must grasp terms within a relation; it is the
relation which assures the subject that it can appropriate
anything.

As Hegel writes of this dual meaning,

"Consciousness distinguishes something from itself to which,
precisely, it relates" (in Hyppolite 23-4).

But, again, as

Wimpe and Tchitcherine's conversation points out, the
subject cannot have a determinate relation with death--
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insofar as death "is" the disruption or stoppage of life,
the absence of all relationality.

This is precisely why

death has to be mastered by dialectical thought; it must be
brought into a (productive) relation with life if there is
to be any "progress," and this is precisely the brilliance
of the dialectic:

it acknowledges the potentially

dissembling effect of something other than thought (other
than life and reason) but goes on to master that other (that
fracturing irrationality) in an ever-stronger and more
rational unity.

This other-than-thought is trapped in a

productive relation with thought--becomes other-to-thought,
thought's opposite, dialectically contained within thought
as thought's other--and can thereby be taken up in a
philosophical relation and used towards the ends of thought.
Institutions like the White Visitation, then, strive to
produce "rationalized forms of death--death in the service
of the one species cursed with the knowledge that it will
die" (230); in short, they produce technologies which
reassure comfort in the face of death--if in no other way
than through the knowledge that humans can (re)produce
death, control its randomness, make death's negativity
productive, put it at the service of a cause or a useful
end, in a determinate relation with life.
But perhaps there remains an other death, a death
radically other to death as productive negativity--a death
which stands in no determinate (and therefore no enabling)

194

relation to technological thought.

As Rilke, certainly an

important presence in GR, 17 writes, perhaps the problem
becomes finding that which "permit[s] the reading of the
word death without negation; like the moon, life surely has
a side turned away from us which is not its opposite"
(Letters 316, second emphasis mine).

Heidegger glosses

Rilke's strange formulation:
Within the widest orbit of the sphere of beings there
are regions and places which, being averted from us,
seem to be something negative, but are nothing of the
kind if we think of all things as being within the
widest orbit of beings .... The self-assertion of
technological objectification is the constant negation
of death.

By this negation, death becomes something

negative. ("What?" 125)
Perhaps Heidegger's gloss here is stranger than Rilke's
formulation, but both ask a similar question:

is there

something which stands outside of the seemingly totalizing
relation(s) of use, something which cannot simply be taken
up by technological, dialectical thinking--something which
is not simply "opposite"?

Technological thinking

~ranslates

all things into a determinate, negative relation and thereby
17 For a concise discussion of the secondary material on
GR and Rilke, see Hohmann's "Pynchon and Rilke: A Survey of
Criticism" in his Thomas Pynchon's GR (271-82). Stark, for
example, writes that "[i]nformation about Rilke is
indispensable for a full understanding" of GR (in Hohmann
271 ) .
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masters them dialectically--brings them into a relation
where their truth can be known.

In GR, for example, the

Herera myth of death and the hidden side of the moon is
tainted by precisely this technological relation:
It began in mythical times, when the sly hare who nests
in the Moon brought death among men, instead of the
moon's true message.

The true message has never come.

Perhaps the rocket is made to take us there someday,
and then the Moon will tell us its truth at last. (322)
Because the Herera have been "Europeanized in language and
thought" (318), they are no longer able to think that
perhaps the "moon's true message," as Rilke suggests, is
that not everything exists to be appropriated by a
technological world view, that (like death and the other
side of the moon) not everything exists in some determinate
relation to technological thought.

Likewise, the Herera

stood in no determinate relation to Europe until its
technological order of analysis and death was reined upon
them--an order that tricked them into believing there was a
determinate ''truth" to the moon and to death, and enslaved
them to the project of the rocket in the service of this
deadly truth.
All of this is not, of course, to argue that death is a
wonderful thing--a positive rather than a negative; rather,
it is to argue that death resists characterization, resists
being opposed in any positive/negative way, resists being
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placed in any determinate relation at all.

The fact that

one hears (and Blicero and the Schwartzkammando read) a
death-worshipping affirmation of dying in Rilke precisely
makes this point:

we have not learned to hear death (nor

anything else, for that matter) as other than simply
negative or positive--we have not learned to think things,
in short, as other, as standing in no determinate relation
at all to humanity's technological world view.

As Rilke

writes, we have yet to think the "open":
You must understand the concept of the "open" ... in such
a way that the animal's degree of consciousness sets it
into the world without the animal's placing the world
'

over against itself at every moment (as we do); the
animal is in the world; we stand before it by virtue of
that peculiar turn and intensification which our
consciousness has taken .... By the open, therefore, I
do not mean sky, air, and space; they too are
"object", ... (in Heidegger, "What?" 108).
This "open" that Rilke speaks of stands in no relation to
the circumspective consciousness of appropriating,
technological subjectivity--it cannot be object for a
subject, and hence cannot be thematized in terms of the
relationality that pluralism posits as an alternative to a
binary world view.

Rather, Rilke's "open" is the very

opening of relationality itself--with which there can be no
determinate relation.

Everything in the technological world
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has become "object" to or for totalizing "subject," and must
be drawn out from that relation, allowed to resonate in what
Rilke calls the "open."

This would seem to require, then,

some notion of de-subjectification, impersonality:

the

determinate self--which experiences the world in relational
terms, in terms of use, of short term goals--must be
scattered, must be drawn out of the determinate relations of
dialectical thinking.
And this is precisely Slothrop's fate in GR.
Slothrop's self--a self tracked, charted, and probed
endlessly throughout GR--is consistently compared to an
albatross in section 4, until it finally becomes
"scattered":

"he has become one plucked albatross.

Plucked, hell--stripped.

Scattered all over the Zone.

It's

doubtful if he can ever be 'found' again, in the
conventional sense of 'positively identified and detained'"
(712).

Slothrop's scattering is often treated in Pynchon

criticism as a negative or lamentable situation.

Edward

Mendelson, for example, argues that Mexico ends up as the
novel's hero, 18 while Slothrop, in his scattering, suffers
a terrible fate; while Mexico survives to form the
Counterforce, "Slothrop will lose all real and potential
relation to any world, whether of language or of act" (191).
Perhaps, though, there is an other way to read Slothrop's
18 For Mendelson, Mexico represents the "affirmative and
true aspects" of GR, the "book's moments of hope and love"
(186).
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scattering in GR--a way to read his scattering as other than
involving a lack of wholeness or possibility.

Perhaps, GR

suggests, the self is an albatross, one of "their" agents:
"The man has a branch office in each of our brains, his
corporate emblem is a white albatross, each local rep has a
cover known as the Ego" (712-13); and Slothrop, even
(perhaps especially) in drawing out of "their" world of
determinate relations, remains involved in a power struggle,
a power struggle not thematizable as a simple opposition--a
"Counterforce"--but rather a struggle against a more
insidious kind of power.

Perhaps Slothrop carries on the

kind of struggle Foucault talks about in his late work, a
struggle which sets out
to attack not so much "such or such" an institution of
power, or group, or elite, or class, but rather a
technique, a form of power.

This form of power applies

itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the
individual, marks him by his own individuality,
attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of
truth on him which he must recognize and which others
have to recognize in him.

It is a form of power which

makes individuals subjects.
the word subject:

There are two meanings of

subject to someone else by control

and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a
conscience or self-knowledge.

Both meanings suggest a

form of power which subjugates and makes subject to.
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("Subject" 212)
Slothrop's determinate relation to forces throughout this
book--his individuality, his proper name--is precisely what
allows him to be "'positively identified and detained,'"
allows him to be marked by "a form of power which makes
individuals subjects."

His proper name, however, shifts

throughout the book only to disburse in his scattering, in
what could perhaps be called his final heroic action--if it
were properly either "heroic," an "action," or even his
final action in the logic of GR.19
Language here becomes difficult, because it too depends
on the categories (cause and effect, subjective intention
and objective act) that Slothrop's scattering disrupts.

It

is not that Slothrop exactly causes this disruption through
19 rt seems to be taken for granted in much GR criticism
that Slothrop's "scattering" is tantamount to a
disappearance into another realm--into a kind of
transfiguration or rewriting of the Orpheus myth. The
usually supremely authoritative Weisenburger, for example,
writes that those in the counterforce "organize around
[Slothrop's] memory" (Companion 263), which suggests
Slothrop "dies" in some sort of traditional way at this
point in the novel. T~is, however, doesn't pan out in the
(admittedly odd and unreliable) logic of GR itself, though.
On page 381, which Weisenburger dates mid-July, 1945 (at the
Berlin White House), Slothrop overhears a conversation among
some reporters concerning the 1946 Miss Rhinegold beauty
pageant, though we' re told it "wi 11 be mont·hs before he runs
into a beer advertisement featuring the six beauties" (381 ).
When he does run into the advertisement (and finds himself
rooting for a Dutch woman who reminds him of Katje), it will
be after his early September "scattering"; likewise, we are
told that Slothrop may have played harmonica on an album by
"the Fool," put out sometime after the Stones were famous
( 7 42). S l othrop does not, it seems then, "s imp 1 y" disappear
as a mythic hero or Jesus figure; he hasn't transcended, but
rather refuses to be tracked, identified.
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an intentional subjective action; as Slothrop himself says,
questioned about his ontological status by the deceased
Tantivy in a dream, "'I didn't do anything.
change'" (552). 20

There was a

Rather, perhaps we should say Slothrop

brings about or calls for(th) a certain disruption:
Slothrop's scattering disrupts a kind of subjectivity which
is part and parcel of the contemporary war state, of the
modern world of the subject and the state which depends on
identity, property, statistics, the individual.

Slothrop's

scattered state disrupts the world view of the Nazis, who he
notices are consistently "purifying and perfecting their
Fascist ideal of Action, Action, Action, once his own
shining reason for being.

No more.

No more" (266).

Perhaps in posing a question to the "Fascist ideal of
Action, Action, Action," Slothrop wages his own war, but a
war not waged in the name of "liberation" or action.
Perhaps Slothrop's agenda is not "liberation" or his "self"
at all; perhaps, as Foucault writes,
the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem
of our days is not to try to liberate the individual
from the state, and from the state's institutions, but
to liberate us both from the state and the type of
individualization which is linked to the state.

We

20 Also, as the text informs us, this way toward

scattering has been a long time coming and has not exactly
been Slothrop's choice: "Slothrop, as noted, at least as
early as the Anubis era, has begun to thin, to scatter"
( 509).
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have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the
refusal of this kind of individuality which has been
imposed on us for several centuries. ("Subject" 216)
So Slothrop, when he scatters/is scattered, may indeed "lose
all real and potential relation to any world," but he also
opens up a gap--a resistance--in a world which thinks only
in terms of "real" and "potential."

Slothrop opens a space

within the terms of dialectics, where an actual world is
consistently opposed to a coming world, where the only
relation among things is one of opposition, negation,
sublation--in short, where the only relation is a relation
of control.
As I argue in Chapter 3, to grant a dialectical world
view is to lose to the status quo in a fixed game, the game
of the negative.

To disrupt this world, it must not only be

negated, opposed, but also contested, its grounds shaken.
An "absolute" gap of otherness must be opened up within the
totality of the same.

As Emmanuel Levinas writes,

What is absolutely other does not only resist
possession, but contests it .... If the same would
establish its identity by simple opposition to the
other, it would already be part of a totality
encompassing the same and the other. (Totality 38)
So Slothrop's scattering, while it can be thematized as
either active or passive (positive or negative), is properly
neither, precisely because his scattering brings the rupture
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of the proper, the dependability of the sameness of the
same.

In short, Slothrop's scattering--in drawing him out

of the determinate relations of the technological world-opens upon an otherness that is not simply the opposite of
sameness, an otherness that breaches totality rather than
allowing itself to be contained within totality:

in short,

an otherness that is--to strain language--other to the
relations of opposition.

Slothrop's death as scattering

approaches, in this way, Rilke's "open" or his "other"
death--an end that is not properly an end at all, a
continuing end that carries no relation to a totality, but
rather disrupts it.21
And this disruption--this drawing language itself out
of work, out of a determinate relation with traditional
system(atic)s of meaning--is perhaps the postmodern "work"
of GR, though it is a work which performs more than the
thematizable work of the negative, and hence creates a
disruption of work.

The systematics of work and ends have

obtained throughout the history of Western thinking, a
history that Levinas thematizes in terms of war:

"The

visage of being that shows itself in war is fixed in the
concept of totality, which dominates Western philosophy"
(Totality 21).

This, of course, raises the question--a

question I have emphasized throughout this dissertation--of

21 see Blanchot's reading of Rilke and death in The
Space of Literature.
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the end of totality, the question of post-war, the question
of postmodern.

What is the post-war relation to a war

economy--to the language and concepts of the war, of
totality?

In GR, this question first comes up as Slothrop

escapes the V-2, in liberated France on his furlough at the
Casino Hermann Goering:
The manager of the Casino Hermann Goering, one Cesar
Fleb6tomo, brought in a whole chorus-line soon as the
liberators arrived, though he hasn't found time to
change the place's occupation name.

Nobody seems to

mind it up there, a pleasant mosaic of tiny and perfect
seashells, thousands of them set in plaster, purple,
pink, and brown, replacing a huge section of roof (the
old tiles still lie in a heap beside the Casino), put
up two years ago as recreational therapy by a
Messerschmitt squadron on furlough, in German typeface
expansive enough to be seen from the air, which is what
they had in mind.

The sun now is still too low to

touch the words into any more than some bare separation
from their ground, so that they hang suppressed, no
relation any more to the men, the pain in their hands,
the blisters that grew black under the sun with
infection and blood. (184-85)
Here we see worked out quite intricately the post-war
relation to the noccupation namen:

the words ncasino

Hermann Goering," once so pregnant with meaning for "a
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Messerschmitt squadron on furlough," now exist in no more
"than some bare separation from their ground, so that they
hang suppressed, no relation any more to the men," no·
determinate relation anymore to the war economy of totality
in which they formerly functioned.

Of course, this is not

to say that the pre-war name bears no connection at all to
the war name--not to say that a post-ontological language
has no connection to ontology--rather it is to say that the
post-war names do not exist in a properly philosophical
relation, a relation which grasps into a totality.22
Rather, these words are now "separat[ed] from their ground,"
uprooted from their fixed place within totality--after the
war, after ontology--bearing no relation anymore to the
painful work of the war:

unable to explain the terror and

horror of that economy, but not simply outside of it either
--therefore able to open up a dissembling space within it.

Post-war, Postmodern
The incommensurability of pre-war and post-war
vocabularies (following Levinas, ontological and postontological language) is a recurring concern of GR, and is
not simply, I would argue, a "thematic" or "critical"
concern, insofar as such a problem concerns the very
22 Again, Hegel: "Each extreme is a middle term for the
other extreme, a middle term by means of which it enters
into a relation with itself and gathers itself up .... {each
term] is for-itself only through this mediation [relation]"
(in Hyppolite 165n).
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(im)possibility of something like a theme or critique in a
postmodern context.

In fact, this incommensurability is

first treated in the novel's famous opening lines, the
always already underway (non)place where Gravity's Rainbow
begins:

"A screaming comes across the sky.

It has happened

before, but there is nothing to compare it to now.
too late" (3).

It is

Note the way the non-relationality of the

rocket--"there is nothing to compare it to now"--is phrased
in temporal terms; the rocket's non-relational "now" is, in
Marc Redfield's words, "disturbingly sandwiched between
competing temporal markers ('It has happened before' and 'It
is too late')" (160).

The rocket certainly refers to past

occurrences, but these do not seem to be up to the task of
describing it "now," of capturing this event in a properly
philosophical relation:

something like it may have happened

before, but there is nothing to compare it to now, no
context which can give it(s) meaning.

Hence, this "nothing

to compare it to now" is both a reversal--a negation, an
opposition--and a displacement:

the present itself--the

"now'' in which there could be a philosophical relation--is
exploded, and along with it goes the continuity between (and
the ground for) the past and future.

Under the postmodern

logic of the rocket, the present, like Slothrop, becomes a
perpetual crossroads that stands in no determinate relation
to the known past or foreseeable future--it stands in
relation only to the non-relation of an indeterminate future
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characterized by the unthematizable approach of death.

Each

segment of the novel is, in turn, akin to this "beginning"
undecidable screaming; past events or future promises cannot
explain the events at hand:

"now," post-war, post-modern,

there is nothing to compare events with in order to reveal
their hidden truth in the same way that one section of the
novel cannot be appealed to in order to explain or ground
all the others.

GR is an exterior, flat network of

statements, with all its sections on the same level, so to
speak--with no secret message hidden below their surface.
It has the structure of apocalypse without revelation-things happen but episodes are not thematizable in any
determinate way.
This non-relationality in or of the text can be
discussed in other ways, and is "at work" in any number of
GR's other "controlling metaphors."

In fact, the very title

of the book poses a question to the sublation of dialectical
relations.

When two nouns are placed together, one would

expect an attempt at sublation; with Gravity's Rainbow,
then, one would expect an attempt to think Newton's
explanation of the rainbow together with the imaginative
resonances of the rainbow for the poet, to bring the two to
some synthesis. 23

However, as the possessive of the title

suggests, the rainbow--even in its long symbolic history in

23 For

just such a discussion, see Abrams, "Newton's
Rainbow and the Poet's" (303-12).
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poetic or imaginative writing--always already belongs to a
kind of scientific discourse, insofar as even poetics is a
sub-genre of the discourse of truth, of philosophy.

So the

question posed even in the title of GR is not how to think
the technological (gravity) in relation to the poetic
(rainbow), but how to think the poetic in such a way as it
is not simply a subset of a determining technologized
philosophical discourse:

however, this project becomes not

the romantic project (an attempt to recuperate the primacy
of the imaginative rainbow over the technological
determinacy of gravity), but rather the postmodern project
of drawing the rainbow out of relation to the determining,
technological world of gravity--of attending to its opacity
rather than attempting to render it transparent.
And this project likewise has resonances for the
institutional apparatuses of literary criticism--a discourse
which attempts to gain a kind of scientistic or
technological mastery over its object, even if this mastery
is presented as a pluralism.

Underscoring the link between

pluralism and technological thinking, Weisenburger makes
much of GR's two mentions of Godel's theorem in his
Companion; he reads Godel as yet another marker of pluralist
hope:
In GR, Godel's incompleteness theorem is a hopeful
sign .... [T]he incompleteness theorem establishes that
formal closure, completeness, and internal consistency
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may all be pipe dreams.

As such, it makes a telling

background to Pynchon's representations of closed
versus open fields, of being "shut in by words'' as
opposed to breaking free by means of them. (145)
This is, by now, familiar ground:

Godel's theorem is

marshalled here by Weisenburger to bolster the humanist
freedom that GR mirrors and calls for--Godel shows us how
indeterminacy shatters determinacy and leads to freedom.
There is, however, an other reading of Godel.

As Derrida

writes,
An undecidable proposition, as Godel demonstrated in
1931, is a proposition which, given a system of axioms
governing a multiplicity, is neither an analytical nor
deductive consequence of those axioms, nor in
contradiction with them, neither true nor false with
respect to these axioms. (Dissemination 219)
Again, the difference here is that for Weisenburger, Godel's
undecidability unleashes many possible relations by
debunking the priority of the unitary; for Derrida, however,
Godel's undecidability points to a radically plural nonrelation--an undecidability that stands in no dialectical
opposition to decidability.

Even though it makes that

decidability possible, this undecidability stands in no
properly philosophical relation whatsoever--is "neither true
nor false" with respect to the axiomatics of scientistic
decision.
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And GR "performs" this absence of philosophical
relation--what in Chapter 2 I call an apocalypse without
revelation--as well as being overtly "about" it:
Screaming holds across the sky.

When it comes, will it

come in darkness, or will it bring its own light?

Will

the light come before or after?
But it is already light. (4, Pynchon's emphasis)
With the Rocket should come some kind of revelation, a new
determining order in its wake, as there should be a new
determining order in the wake of the war, under the shadow
of the nuclear Rocket.
for us:

The text asks the common questions

is there something "new," a new light or an

intensified darkness, that comes with the Rocket, and will
this new order, this new light, come before the Rocket or in
its wake?

But these questions become complicated by the

fact that "it is already light," that this process of change
is always already underway, and it has been from what would
metaphysically be called a beginning--a place prior to or
outside the textual network which, if it could be found or
posited, could give the text, the chain of referrals, a
determinate meaning.

But in GR, there is no beginning and

there are no determinate ends--this is the logic that the
Rocket allows us to see:

that a positive origin or

reference is always already withdrawing; the effects of a
network are always already in play; the other is always
already at work within the same.

In this sense, GR is like
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the diaspora of the novel's opening page:

"No, this is not

a disentanglement from, but a progressive knotting into" (3,
Pynchon's emphasis).

It is not an attempt to isolate and

study a kind of consciousness or reveal what is "behind" the
postmodern world--this, we should remember, is Pointsman's
and Laslo Jamf's work.

Instead, it is a postmodern

thinking, which Foucault characterizes as a thought that
bursts open the other, and the outside.

In this sense,

the diagnosis does not establish the fact of our
identity by the play of distinctions.

It establishes

that we are difference, that our reason is the
difference of discourses, our history the difference of
times, our selves the difference of masks.

That

difference, far from being the forgotten and recovered
origin, is the dispersion that we are and make.
(Archaeology 131/172-73)
So the Rocket, perhaps, does bring a new light with it--a
kind of revelation:

it is the light of that which has been

neglected throughout the history of light, but at the same
time has made that history possible:

non-dialectical

difference, otherness, "the dispersion that we are and
make."

CHAPTER 6
POLITICS, POETICS, AND INSTITUTIONS:
"LANGUAGE" POETRY AND LITERARY CRITICISM
A society which was really like a good poem, embodying the
aesthetic virtues of beauty, order, economy and
subordination of detail to the whole, would be a nightmare
of horror for ... such a society could only come into being
through selective breeding, extermination of the physically
and mentally unfit, absolute obedience to its Director, and
a large slave class kept out of sight in cellars.
Vice versa, a poem which was really like a political
democracy--examples, unfortunately, exist--would be
formless, windy, banal and utterly boring.
--W.H. Auden
Academic colonization is contemporary poetry's fundamental
social problem because it incorporates the politics of
culture into a process that can only be determined
institutionally .... Although historically self-defined
within an 'anti-academic' tradition, its long-term
engagement with social, aesthetic, and linguistic theory
provides language poetry with both a vocabulary and
potential mechanisms for posing the institutional question
that, for example, the anti-theoretical college workshop
tradition lacks.
--Ron Silliman
Up to this (late) point, I have for the most part
deferred overtly posing the question of the political
implications of the postmodern--though, of course, the topic
has come up in several different guises throughout this
study.

In the literary critical field at large, the

political questions raised by postmodern thought and
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literature are certainly well commented upon.1
Unfortunately, however, the arguments concerning the
politics of postmodernism are often all-too-easily reduced
to a kind of crude parody which betrays much of the
complexity of the questions.

Note, for example, the way

Jerome McGann formulates the question concerning the "heated
controversy which has developed around the idea of the
postmodern--is it or is it not a reactionary social
phenomenon?" ("Contemporary Poetry" 627).

McGann's phrasing

of the question concerning the politics of the postmodern is
quite problematic, and for reasons other than its reductive
either/or binary form:

McGann's question presupposes, as so

much of the secondary literature on the politics of
postmodernism does, that the "idea of the postmodern" is
somehow a unitary thing, and that this idea has some sort of
monolithic consequences--reactionary or progressive--for a
"society."

The apotheosis of this kind of reasoning can be

found in Jameson's "The Politics of Theory:

Ideological

Positions in the Postmodernism Debate," where he presents a
table of six theorists of postmodernism with a "+" or a " "

1The amount of work done on this question is, in fact,
staggering. Jameson's work is, perhaps, "seminal." See, in
a similarly Marxist/Frankfurt School vein, the critiques of
Huyssen and Habermas--both of which react to the type of
"poststructuralist" treatment found in Lyotard's The
Postmodern Condition. For feminist discussions of the
politics of postmodernism, see the essays collected in
Nicholson. See also the essay collections edited by Ross
and Arac. This, of course, only scratches the surface of a
topic that is buried under scholarship.

213
(or both, as in the case of Lyotard) next to their names,
"the plus and minus signs designating the politically
progressive or reactionary functions of the positions in
questions [sic]" (111).

I think we must remain wary of this

"either-or" approach to the complex question of
postmodernism's political implications for several reasons:
first, because it reduces a highly complex and contested
field to a simple binary skeleton.

Also, such a phrasing of

the question is troubling because it takes for granted an
unproblematic movement between aesthetic phenomena and
political actions--or, conversely, perhaps the problem lies
in the fact that this formulation so cleanly separates text
and context, postmodern art and postmodern culture.
In this literary critical parlance, "postmodern
culture'' most often means "fragmented culture"--as I argue
in Chapter 4, the one thing that various postmodernisms and
postmodernists have in common is their assertion that a
stable transcendental has withdrawn; and the controversies
surrounding the politics of postmodernism tend to focus on
whether this fragmentation or loss of center can be seen as
a positive or negative thing--whether it is socially
progressive or reactionary.

Again, as

~cGann

writes,

In postmodern work we become aware of the many crises
of stability and centeredness which an imperial culture
like our own--attempting to hold control over so many,
and so widely dispersed, human materials--inevitably
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has to deal with.

The response to such a situation may

be either a contestatory or an accommodational one--it
may move to oppose and change such circumstances, or it
may take them as given, and reflect (reflect upon)
their operations. (628, my emphasis)
Again, we see a familiar but problematic either/or spelled
out here.

For McGann, who engages contemporary American

poetics here, any (poetic) response to the conditions of a
seemingly monolithic postmodern existence can be categorized
as "either a contestatory or an accommodational one''; a poet
produces either a work which opposes the ''capitalist empire"
(624), or one which merely takes it "as given" and reflects
upon bourgeois experience, thereby reifying and validating
it.
The problem that remains here is one which we have
touched upon continually throughout this study:

how does

one secure a position outside the "given" structures of a
language or society in a postmodern situation--a situation
which is in large part defined by the absence of an outside,
the absence of an uncontaminated theory which could ground a
truly revolutionary practice?

Likewise, couldn't it be

argued that reflecting on the operations of culture--on, for
example, the operations of advertising or the State
Department or the university--is far from a merely
"accommodating" societal response, but rather a reflection
that can carry with it a necessary questioning?

Lastly, it
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seems that McGann conflates rhetorical or formal
experimentation--the devices by which contemporary poetry
makes us aware of postmodern "crises of stability and
centeredness"--with politics, making a mistake that Auden
warns us against in one of the epigraphs to this chapter.
While Auden's (elitist) poetics and politics are not exactly
to be lauded, he does warn us of the dangers of simply
equating poetic structure and political structure--of
assuming a simple relation (or of assuming any relation at
all, for that matter) between the structure of "society" and
the structure of a "good poem."2
It is against the backdrop of questions like these-questions about the politics of postmodern poetic form and
content, about the possibility of political and syntactic
disruption from irreducibly within a dominant discourse--

2I have no wish to endorse Auden's conception of poetry
or of politics here--his idea that all poetry involves the
"aesthetic virtues of beauty, order, economy and
subordination of detail to the whole" is certainly among the
first casualties of both "New American" and "Language"
poetics; also, his contempt for a radically democratic
rhetorical poetics seems quite obviously tied to his elitist
politics. However, I think it is important to keep in mind
(as Auden reminds us) that anything written is necessarily
structured; and, indeed, much of the literature that poses
essential questions to Auden's conception of poetry is
itself intricately structured--even if it is structured in
such a way as to de-structure "beauty, order, and economy."
The question is, in other words, always one of structure(s)
--in poetry as in politics; it is not simply a matter of
structure-order-totalitarianism vs. anarchy-freedom-peace.
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that the current debate over "1 anguage" poetry 3 is being
played out.

Enough general accounts of the language poetry

"movement" exist to justify making my introduction to it
here brief . 4

Language poets take their name from the

poetics journal L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E, edited by Bruce Andrews and
Charles Bernstein from 1978-81.

The term language poetry

has come to name a loosely affiliated group of North
American poets who are engaged in a radically heterogenous
questioning of contemporary poetic syntax, theory, and
politics--though the radicality of their critique makes
their grouping under such a homogenous label quite difficult
from the outset.

In fact, the name "language" poetry seems

to suggest an emphasis on language, hardly something new in
the history of poetics, and an emphasis which does not--on

3I insist on the quotation marks around "language" here
at the beginning, and will hereafter drop them. But
dropping them does not involve lifting the designation
"'language' poetry" to the level of the proper--a certain
non-propriety of usage being the primary reason for putting
words in quotation marks. Instead I wish to uphold a
different economy of quotation marks here vis-a-vis my usage
of the term "language" to describe language poetry. Derrida
describes this kind of economy quite nicely: "It is this
proper sense of propriety which, this time, is put in
quotation marks and not the opposite, which has always been
the case" ("Some Statements and Truisms" 77).
4For a general introduction to and evaluation of
language poetry, see especially Silliman's Introduction to
In the American Tree; see also Bartlett, McGann, Hartley's
Introduction, and Perloff 's review essay "The Word as Such:
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Poetry in the 80's."
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the face of it--seem conducive to a "political" poetry. 5
However, as Lee Bartlett points out, the common thread among
these heterogeneous poets is their interest in
poststructuralist theoretical discourse about language
(750); they share an interest in language as that which, in
some senses, shapes experience and constructs the world, and
an interest in the materiality and play of the signifier
rather than in the meaning of the signified--in paratactic
orders of poetic surface rather than in strictly hypotactic
orders of subordination and depth.

In this view, they draw

connections between themselves and the radical modernist
poetics of Stein, Williams, Zukofsky, Mallarme, and even the
Eliot of The Waste Land. 6
Language poetry began as an "outsider" movement in

5rndeed, as Michael Greer points out, an emphasis on
"language" is perhaps not what these disparate poets have in
common at all: "The name 'language poetry' is a misnomer
insofar as it suggests an organic or essentialist view of
language .... [I]t seems that one should argue instead that
'writing' rather than 'language' is the central term in this
field of work--not poetry, politics, or theory as distinct
fields of discourse, but writing as a space in which all of
what were once distinct genres, forms, modes of address, may
now intersect, undermine, reinforce, echo, contradict,
restate, or transform one another" (351 ).
6cf.

Silliman's "Negative Solidarity": "Like other
avant garde movements, 'language poetry' began by
identifying its own distinctness, criticizing the naive
assumptions of a speech-centered poetics. But, unlike many
of its modernist ancestors, 'language poetry' also drew
positive connections between itself and the work of
preceding generations, most explicitly to the New American
Poets of the 1950s and '60s: the projectivist or Black
Mountain writers, the New York School, the San Francisco
Renaissance, and even the Beats" (171).
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American poetics, and it remains consistently a discourse
marginal to the dominant "academic" or ''workshop" poetics
which informs the teaching of poetry in most MFA programs
and the publishing of the prestigious poetry magazines;
language poetry remains at the margins of what Charles
Bernstein has called "official verse culture" (Content's
Dream 246). 7 However, language poetry--as with almost any
avant garde--is now moving from the margins toward the
center, as it gains more attention from academic critics and
as more of its ''practitioners" take jobs within the
university. 8 And this attention has, not surprisingly,
only gained them more scorn in the eyes of fellow poets and
in the pages of The American Poetry Review; language poet
Ron Silliman summarizes the ''conflict" over language poetry
within the poetry community:
The specific charges are the following:

"language

poetry" is alleged to be driven by theory; it is antispeech and thereby anti-individual (sometimes this is

7see, for example, the letter exchange between
Bernstein and Marvin Bell in the September/October 1990
American Poetry Review, or David Shapiro's review in the
January/February 1991 APR, in which he argues that one could
plausibly map the current poetic spectrum as a political
one, with "'Language' poetries as an infantile left'' (37).
8Bernstein, for example, has recently taken a funded
Chair in the Humanities--formerly held by Robert Creeley--at
SUNY-Buffalo, and Barrett Watten is now on the editorial
board of Representations. Other poets associated with
language writing have had more long-standing associations
with the academy: Bruce Andrews, for example, has long
taught political science at Fordham.
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extended to anti-democratic and elitist); it
participates in self-conscious collective behavior; it
valorizes the ugly and the unintelligible; its leftist
politics are strident and didactic.

Taken together,

the implicit claim is that "language poetry" is closet
academic verse, seeking explicators rather than
readers. ("Negative" 172)
One is immediately struck by the fact that the "charges"
levelled against language poetry are strikingly similar to
those levelled against theoretical discourse in general:
language poetry is accused--as is, say, deconstruction--of
being at the same time impenetrable or elitist in its
difficulty and ultimately frivolous or meaningless; language
poetry is accused of slashing and burning a speech-based
poetic tradition in favor of an "unintelligible," "strident
and didactic" writing process; and it is accused, like the
theoretical discourse it often incorporates, of being a
"collective behavior" produced solely for other insiders.
As critic Eliot Weinberger writes, for many language writing
is far too "jargon-entangled" (181), characterized by
"specialized language, self-referentiality, and disdain for
the uninitiated" (182); however, for Weinberger, all of this
sound and fury signifies nothing in the end:

"the

'language' poets have exploded the myth of the whole, and
what seems to be left is what television calls 'bites' .... A
'language' poem in perhaps its most typical form begins,
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ends, and goes nowhere" (184).
It will, of course, be difficult to assess these
charges without examining an "actual language poem"--though,
of course I run the converse risk here of having any poems I
cite stand in as generalizing and narrow ''examples" of an
extremely diverse and contested field of writing.

This,

however, is a necessary risk; if I were to leave any
analysis of specific language poems aside, this text would
run the more dangerous risk of allowing the heterogeneity
and specificity that language writing stresses to be
obscured in generalizations.

So, we must keep this in mind,

even as I generalize about language poetry from the scanty
and in some ways arbitrary evidence of Barrett Watten's long
poem Progress, which begins:
Relax,
stand at attention, and.
Purple snake stands out on
Porcelain tiles. The idea
Is the thing. Skewed by design
One way contradictory use is to
Specify empty.
Basis, its
Cover operates under insist on,
Delineate. Stalin as a linguist
I trust replication.
Gives,
Surface. Lights string
The court reporter, distances.
That only depth is perfect . . . .
Comes to the history of words.
The thought to eradicate
In him. The poetry,
by
Making him think certain ways . . . . (1, ellipses Watten's)
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The first thing we note about Progress is that it begins
with a logical contradiction:

the contradictory imperatives

"Relax, I Stand at attention, and." 9 We note also that this
opening sentence ends with "and."--another seeming paradox,
insofar as the connector "and" should signal and/or promise
syntactic continuation and continuity.

However, an answer

to the syntactically logical question "'and' what?" is
immediately disrupted by the period.

The sameness or

continuity of meaning which should be guaranteed by the
syntactic bridge of the "and" is interrupted from the very
beginning of the poem:

the bridge which should guarantee

the very intelligibility of the line

"It is one and the

same." (21) is destroyed from the outset.

The opening

sentence ends in mid-thought, without coming to a proper
sublation or synthesis of meaning, without fulfilling the
dialectical promise of the connector.

The continuous

movement of meaning is interrupted prior to the initial
sublation necessary for progress (or for the poem Progress)
properly to begin.
Progress continues (or does it begin again?):
snake stands out on I Porcelain tiles.
thing.

Skewed by design . . . . "

"Purple

The idea I Is the

These lines seemingly

9For reasons which I hope will become obvious, I cite
Watten's text complete with intra-line periods, ellipses,
and other punctuation. This may require some patience on
the part of the reader: some of his periods will end·some
of my sentences, though any punctuation I add to a quotation
will be cited within brackets.
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engage the poetics of William Carlos Williams:

"Purple

snake stands out on I Porcelain tiles." seems a gentle
parody of Williams' "The Red Wheel Barrow," though the
question posed to Williams' poetics becomes more pressing in
the sentence "The idea/ Is the thing.": the emphasis here
is shifted from Williams' "no ideas but in things" to an
even more radical emphasis on the materiality of the poetic
idea:

"The idea I Is the thing." emphasizes the absence of

an interior space within or behind things which could carry
or protect their essence, and which poetry could make it its
job to reveal.

Rather, Watten's revision of Williams'

dictum--and the following stanzas quoted here--emphasizes
repetition and surface as a kind of radically non-revelatory
"essence":

"I trust replication. / Gives, I Surface."

Williams' "no ideas but in things" presupposes a depth-presupposes, as does "the court reporter," "That only depth
is perfect .

Watten suggests here that thinking in

terms of depth may actually "eradicate" poetry, eradicate a
type of poetic thinking that moves along the surface play of
writing. 10 "[T]he history of words" thought as depth,
"distances[,]" or meaning eradicates poetry "by/ Making him
think certain ways . . . . "and not others; but perhaps the
10 see also Watten's Total Syntax, where he compares
Williams' and Silliman's "insistence on the unheroic
particulars[ ... ] where the 'nonaesthetic' observed detail
is the key to social insight": "in Williams[ ... ] the
inconsequential is dramatized in a single moment of truth
that is also ironic, while in Silliman its use is in a much
more radical, ongoing process of evaluation" (109).
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idea here is written as surface (and the fragmentation
thereof):

"I write, as in a mirror, I This present." (4).

It should be noted, though, that in Progress this "I"
which "writes" and "trust[s] replication" also places its
"trust" in a lot more than replication:

we find "I trust

wheat . . . . " (2); "I trust the materials." (2); "I trust
the thing itself . . . ," (3).

It seems here that trusting

replication is trusting not "in" the idea in things, but
rather trusting the necessary movement of or between things,
the necessity of error, of change--in short, the
impossibility of static meaning:
(10).

"Stasis is a pinball."

The "I" that "trusts" and "writes," then, is likewise

drawn into this drama of non-teleological movement:

"I am

otherwise." (69) because "I" am always part of this
"replication[,]" of this linguistic network which ''Gives, I
Surface."

The poem, then, becomes a matter of thinking and

writing this surface--"Thinking on the planes / Of a
building, I but in verse." (6)--rather than thinking toward
a dialectic sublation which could reveal the stable essence
of the thing.
For Progress, it is not simply a matter of employing
words whose "contradictory use is to I Specify empty'' the
category meaning.

Nor does Progress give in to the urge

simply to "delineate[.]"

Rather, poetry like Progress

attempts to think an other notion of progress--an economy
which is not simply found or represented, but haltingly,
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disruptively written from the ground up.
disruption as an

~Aggressive

Progress names its

neutrality." (6), a kind of

writing which Bernstein characterizes as
noninstrumental (a writing that does not carry a
meaning along with it as information to take away,
which would make the writing there primarily to serve
up this information, a shell in itself) where language
is not in gear, is idling .... Writing as stupor,
writing as out-to-lunch.
degree zero.

Writing as vacation.

Writing

Idleness as antistatic (functionless, it

becomes estranged).

Writing as idled thinking (not

just the means to a displaced end ... ). (Content's 83-4)
The intransitivity of writing named here seems to describe
well Watten's Progress--and is, perhaps, characteristic of
language poetry on the whole, much of which could be called
"idl~d

thinking (not just the means to a displaced end)."

While there certainly is a displacement that language
writing creates, the writing and thinking of language poetry
is "not just the means to a displaced end," but rather
brings forth this displacement coupled with a necessary
displacement of end-oriented thinking itself--of disrupting
a larger end-oriented economy of meaning.
But, even within this double economy of disruption, it
is not a matter of being once and for all free of
teleological meaning's economy; as Bernstein writes in the
poem/talk/essay Artifice of Absorption,
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... the designation of the visual, acoustic,
& syntactic elements of a poem as "meaningless",
especially insofar as this is conceptualized as
positive or liberating--& this is a common habit
of much current critical discussion of syntactically
nonstandard poetry--is symptomatic of a desire to
evade responsibility for meaning's total, &
totalizing, reach; as if meaning was a husk
that could be shucked off or a burden that could be
bucked.

Meaning is not a use value as opposed to

some other kind of value, but more like valuation
itself; & even to refuse value is a value & a sort
of exchange.

Meaning is no where bound

to the orbit of purpose, intention, or utility. (8)
For Bernstein, there certainly is a "positive or liberating"
moment in language writing's "syntactically I nonstandard
poetry," but this liberation of alternative syntactical
meanings is not "just" the "displaced end" that language
writing moves toward.

Rather, there is a second and

simultaneous consideration for this writing, a consideration
which makes it impossible to "evade responsibility for
meaning's total, & I totalizing, reach"; poetry, in other
words, cannot be simply liberated from an economy of
meaning, "as if meaning was a husk I that could be shucked
off or a burden that could be I bucked."

Meaning is not

just one poetic value among others, but "more like valuation
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I itself"; hence, language writing, if it wishes to pose a
question to this economy, cannot simply throw off meaning,
but rather must disseminate meaning--doubly disrupting it to
the point where meaning becomes "no where bound I to the
orbit of purpose, intention, or utility."

As Bernstein

writes, his notion of language poetry is "a poetry that does
not assume a measure but finds it" (75), a writing that does
not move toward the wholeness of a meaning, but strives to
find a measure for itself, a way to account for the surface
play of the poem itself, rather than solely to refer to or
clarify some end or meaning "outside" of this play.
The politics of such a poetic project, however, seem
unclear at best.

In fact, for many commentators language

poetry comes dangerously close to reproducing an "art-forart's-sake" aesthetic, and, despite the overt political
claims of the poets themselves, 11 a question is often posed
to language poetry concerning the potential for a political
praxis drawn from a poetics of "idleness," discontinuity or
dis-functionality.

For example, Marjorie Perloff, following

Jackson MacLow, writes that "If language were really
stripped of its referential properties ... 'language poetry'
would be no more than a mandarin game, designed to entertain

11 silliman, for example, writes quite clearly and
unambiguously: "Let us undermine the bourgeoisie" ("If by
'Writing'" 168). His essay is included in the second
section of The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book, in which more than 25
writers associated with language writing take up the
question of Writing and Politics (119-192).
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an elitist coterie" ("Word as Such" 233). 12

This equation

of language poetry with an art-for-art's-sake aesthetic,
however, seems to miss the essential questions posed by
language writing.

It seems odd, for example, that Perloff

would align language poetry with something like MacLeish's
famous art-for-art's-sake dictum "A poem should not mean I
But be."

A conception of poetry like MacLeish's--where the

poem is mystifyingly wrenched out of the material networks
of language and into the purity of the realm of being--is
precisely the prime target of language poetics.

In fact, an

art-for-art's-sake aesthetic always has as its end some
notion of aesthetic distance, where the artistic object is
elevated above any networks of signification, placed at an
unreachable distance, and then contemplated in its being.
But this aesthetic distance is precisely what is collapsed
in postmodern work like language poetry--the language poem
exists in a network where language and syntax cannot be
separated from meaning and being.

The language poem cannot

be purified and held at a distance precisely because no
notion of disinterested aesthetic distance can continue to
hold in language poetics; as I argue throughout this work,

12Perloff, however, goes on to argue that this impotent
elitism is not necessarily the case in language poetry
because much of its syntactically non-standard work can
empower or free the reader to see myriad connections between
things. In the end, though, Perloff remai~s a bit
skeptical: "the question remains whether the calling .into
question of 'normal' language rules ... is a meaningful
critique of capitalism" (233).
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in a postmodern context no pure space outside the drama of
signification can be secured.
This is, however, not simply to call for or validate
what is called an "engaged art."

As Levinas writes in a

1948 essay on Sartre's engaged art, an art-for-art's-sake
aesthetic certainly "is false inasmuch as it situates art
above reality and recognizes no master for it" (''Reality"
131).

However, Levinas asks,
Is to disengage oneself from the world always to go
beyond, toward the region of Platonic ideas and toward
the eternal which towers above the world?

Cannot one

speak of a disengagement on the hither side--of an
interruption of time by a movement going on on the
hither side of time, in its 'interstices.' ("Reality"
131)
Perhaps, as Levinas suggests here in the context of a
similar argument, the interruptions of language poetry
cannot be collapsed quite so easily into Perloff's hermetic
"mandarin game.

As Levinas suggests, there can be a

disruption of meaning--a disengagement--which does not
simply or necessarily elevate the work of art to the
untouchable realm of being; rather, there is a disr,uptive
0

engagement brought about by attending to the discontinuous
space between things--by attending to the "interstices" of
presence or experience rather than to the seemingly smooth
continuities.

Perhaps language poetry is attempting to
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bring about this disengagement on what Levinas calls the
"hither side of time," an interruption on this side of
transcendence--a disengagement that does not try to take the
work of art beyond the world into a realm of purity, but
rather a disengagement which attempts to create a disruption
in the smooth functioning of this world's systems of meaning
and being.

This disruptive disengagement, then, would be

one which denies itself what Levinas calls the "pretentious
and facile nobility" ("Reality"

131)

that characterizes the

aesthetic distance engendered by an art-for-art's-sake
theory.
However, the politics of language poetry's poetics of
disengagement, disruption, or discontinuity remains a
sharply contested question.

Perhaps the most famous

academic critique of language poetry along these lines is
contained in Jameson's "Postmodernism, Or the Cultural Logic
of Late Capitalism."

For Jameson, language poetry is

architectonic of the surface-obsessed, fragmentary,
"schizophrenic" aesthetic of postmodernism--is
representative of an aesthetic/cultural logic that, in its
destruction of the autonomy of the subject and the
continuity of history, cannot help but ruin any possibility
for personal conviction or political change. 13

Jameson, in

t3As Jameson writes, a postmodern critique may liberate
one from the bounds of subjectivity, but it also entails a
"liberation from every other kind of feeling as well, ·since
there is no longer a present self to do the feeling" (64).
Likewise, this type of critique animates many feminist and
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fact, critiques a notion of postmodernism very much like the
one I have been developing here; my recurring concern with
the ''flattening of discourse"--the absence of an outside or
hors-texte, the (dis)locating of the subject within in a
network of exteriority--is precisely what Jameson attacks as
"a new kind of flatness or depthlessness, a new kind of
superficiality in the most literal sense--perhaps the
supreme formal feature of all the postmodernisms" (60).

For

Jameson, Warhol's work and language poetry are prime
examples of this schizophrenic depthlessness and its
emphasis on the surface or signifier.

While discussing

Warhol's "Diamond Dust Shoes," however, Jameson
inadvertently makes a case for a kind of "depth" to Warhol's
work--and to postmodern "fragmentation" on the whole.

He

writes
[in "Diamond Dust Shoes"] it is as though the external
and coloured surface of things--debased and
contaminated in advance by their assimilation to glossy
advertising images--has been stripped away to reveal
the deathly black-and-white substratum of the
photographic negative which subtends them. (60)
It seems that Jameson here (dis)misses the fact that
Warhol's emphasis on something like a "photographic
post-colonial critiques of postmodernism, which are less
interested in ''feeling" than in the oppositional power which
seems to require a subject position. See Christine Dt
Stephano's essay in Nicholson and Trinh T. Minh-ha's Woman,
Native, Other.
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negative"--that which allows pictorial representation to
take place but is not itself representative--is precisely a
kind of "depth" exploration, insofar as it is an exploration
of the conditions of possibility for representation.

But,

as Jameson notes, for Warhol this negative subtends the
image--that is, "underlie[s] as to enclose or surround" it
(American Heritage Dictionary).

So the subtending negative

has no essential or philosophical depth-relation to the
photograph; it is not simply before or below the
photographic image, but rather is both before the image and
contained within it, is a kind of always-already-divided
ground. 14
This emphasis on a peculiar kind of ground in Warhol's
work helps bring us back to Derrida's thinking, which Gasche
has written about in similar terms--in terms of the
subtending, non-reflective back or "tain" of a mirror which
makes reflection possible without itself being reflective.
Gasche writes,
Derrida's philosophy, rather than being a philosophy of
reflection, is engaged in the systematic exploration of
that dull surface without which no reflection would be
possible and no specular or speculative activity would
be possible, but which at the.same time has no place
and no part in reflection's scintillating play. (6)
Gasche here sums up in a nutshell many of the arguments I
14 see my discussion in Chapter 4 above.
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have been making concerning postmodernism and (the end of)
philosophy:

the emphasis on the play of surfaces or

networks in the work of Derrida, Foucault, Pynchon, or the
language poets is not simply a hedonistic, irresponsible
reaction to an ethos of impossibility; rather, this
confrontation with surface or depthlessness is, as I have
maintained throughout, necessary insofar as it is part and
parcel of the systematic and historical specificity of the
postmodern situation.

There simply is no outside to appeal

to, no space which can be protected from the play of an
exterior network; hence, thinking must proceed differently,
in and through the thought of difference without reduction
to sameness.
Of course, the recognition of the conditions of
postmodernity does not stifle but rather amplifies the
question of the politics of this kind of postmodern work-and specifically the politics of language poetry.

In

"Postmodernism," Jameson critiques language poet Bob
Perelman's poem "China," which begins:
China
We live on the third world from the sun.

Number three.

Nobody tells us what to do.
The people who taught us to count were being very kind.
It's always time to leave.
If it rains, you either have your umbrella or you
don't.
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The wind blows your hat off.
The sun rises also . . . . (in Jameson 73)
"China," we should note in passing, only gets increasingly
discontinuous from here, and Jameson hails this emphasis on
discontinuous, paratactic series as the "fundamental
aesthetic" of "so-called Language Poetry" (73).

For

Jameson, this paratactic emphasis on the play of signifiers
in the poem means that it "turns out to have little enough
to do with that referent called China" (75); he goes on to
argue that the poem's refusal to engage the real historical
situation of third-world China--"the third world from the
sun"--robs it of any proper political significance that it
might have had, leaving it instead merely as an example of
late capital's "schizophrenic fragmentation'' (73). 15

In

Jameson's reading of "China," then, "the signifying chain ...
is reduced to an experience of pure material signifiers"
15 cf. Bernstein, who poses a question to Jameson

concerning his totalization of the conditions of
postmodernism and the artistic responses to it: "the 'same'
artistic technique has a radically different meaning
depending on when and where it is used .... For example,
juxtaposition of logically unconnected sentences or sentence
fragments can be used to theatricalize the limitations of
conventional narrative development, to suggest the
impossibility of communication, to represent speech, or as
part of a prosodic mosaic constituting a newly emerging (or
then again, traditional but neglected) meaning formation.
These uses need have nothing in common .... Nor is the littleknown painter who uses a Nee-Hellenic motif in his or her
work necessarily doing something comparable to the architect
who incorporates Greek columns into a multimillion dollar
downtown office tower. But it is just this type of
mishmashing that is the negative horizon of those
discussions of postmodernism that attempt to describe it in
unitary socioeconomic terms" ("Centering'' 47).

234

(72); the signified is ''reduced" to the level of the
signifier, and we are left with the materiality of language
without any hierarchical order(ing)--we are left with a
world bereft, therefore, of history or praxis.

In short,

for Jameson language poetry's paratactic aesthetic of
fragmentation cannot help but be politically reactionary
insofar as it simply mimics and thereby upholds the
fragmentation and apathetic end-lessness promoted by the
bourgeois ideology of late capitalism. 16
However George Hartley, in Textual Politics and the
Language Poets, takes issue with Jameson's characterization
of the politics of language poetry.

Hartley argues that

when Jameson reads Perelman's poem merely as a schizophrenic
"breakdown of the signifying chain" (Jameson 72) and a
reification of the logic of late capital, he misses the fact
that "China" produces precisely the kind of powerful
critique of bourgeois ideology that Jameson sees lacking in
much postmodern art; for Hartley, Perelman's ''China" is an
example of language poetry's "deconstruction of the
'referential fetish'--and with it the bourgeois claims to
'natural' language" (99); language poetry performs this
16 cf. Adorne's Aesthetic Theory, where he offers an
interesting retort to this line of reasoning: "Those who
allege that art has no longer any right to exist because it
upholds the status quo do no more than promote one of the
stale cliches of bourgeois ideology. The latter has always
been prone to frown and demand to know 'where all this is
going to end'. Art, in effect, must escape from this-sort
of teleology .... The idea of destination or final end is a
covert form of social control" (357).
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"deconstruction" through a "laying bare of the framing
process" (99), through the exposure of the arbitrariness and
multiplicity of any poetic order(ing).

This being the case,

Hartley writes,
Ironically, Perelman and other so-called language poets
can be seen to meet Jameson's call for a new political
art whose 'aesthetic of cognitive mapping' in this
confusing postmodern space of late capitalism may
achieve 'a breakthrough to some as yet unimaginable new
mode of representing [the world space of multi-national
capital], in which we may again begin to grasp our
positioning as individual and collective subjects and
regain a capacity to act and struggle which is at
present neutralized by our spacial as well as social
confusion.' (52, quoting Jameson 92)
In Hartley's reading, Jameson misses the point of language
poetry's "fragmentation"; Hartley argues that language
poetry does precisely the needed work of ideology critique
so that, in Jameson's own words, "we may again begin to
grasp our positioning as ... subjects," begin once again to
act and struggle against the forces of late capital. 17

In

fact, Hartley argues that language poetry performs this

17 cf. Hartley: "It is to the ruling class's benefit
that we do not recognize the socially-constructed nature of
language, for if we did we might recognize that the
hegemonic views of reality--such as that commodities are
'natural'--are to a certain extent arbitrary, and,
therefore, open to questioning" (35).
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progressive ideology critique in and through the very
concepts that Jameson points to as the reactionary element
in language poetry:

its fragmentation of poetic form and

its emphasis on the materiality of the signifier.

Hartley

writes,
In their questioning of the function of reference, the
self-sufficiency of the subject, and the adherence to
standard syntax of the closed text, some so-called
language poets have developed a poetry which functions
not as ornamentation or as self expression, but as a
baring of the frames of bourgeois ideology itself. (41,
my emphasis)
So, in the end, for Hartley language poetry functions as a
discourse which, far from simply reifying bourgeois (poetic)
ideology, actually bares the ideological frame of bourgeois
workshop poetics and its conception of poetry as a product
or message simply to be consumed--"as ornamentation or as
self expression."

And in laying bare this framing process,

language poetry allows the reader to see and participate in
the myriad possibilities for meaning which are covered over
by a unitary poetic and sociological ideology of
consumption.
So, in the end, Jameson and Hartley have less a
disagreement on the proper ends of a politically engaged
postmodern art than they do a disagreement over whether
language poetry fits the bill.

For both Jameson and
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Hartley, it is imperative that there be produced a
postmodern art of critique, an art, in Jameson's words,
"which explicitly foreground[s] the commodity fetishism of a
transition to late capitalism" (60).

The thematization of

language poetry's project as this kind of ideology critique
has, in fact, become the dominant reading of language poetry
in academic literary criticism today:

for McGann, language

poetry's project is to reverse or oppose that "deformed and
repressive form of reference called referentiality wherein
language is alienated from its use-functions" (640);
likewise for Marjorie Perloff, who argues that languageoriented writing helps us to see that "our words can no
longer be our own but that it is in our power to represent
them in new, imaginative ways" ("Can(n)ons" 654).
But, as compelling as it may be, this critical apology
for language poetry remains itself problematic, insofar as
these literary critical readings of language poetry seem
rather unproblematically to recuperate a proper "job" or
brand of commodified "work" for language poetics:
the work of ideology critique.

namely,

This work of ideology

critique, it should be noted, is in large part a job given
to language poetry by criticism. 18

However, several

18 rt should be further noted, however, that many
language poets in the late 70's and early SO's were quite
comfortable with a poetry of ideology critique which
attempted to restore to the reader and society a linguistic
use-value rather than a deformed exchange-value. This,
however, has since come under scrutiny. Steve Mccaffery
writes, for example, "In hindsight, I can admit to certain
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pressing questions remain for the standard literary critical
reading of language poetry:

how, for example, is the

politically engaged critic or poet to account for the end
product or work performed by ideology critique itself--how,
in other words, can a poetics of ideology critique pose a
radical question to the drama of commodification if it too
produces a circumscribed use- or exchange-meaning, if it
reveals a consumable end?

In yet other words, one could ask

whether reading language poetry as ideology critique doesn't
precisely allow or force language poetry to become simply
another "bourgeois" poetry of reference in which the reader
comes to a consumable poetic realization or epiphany--an
epiphany concerning the poetic "framing process itself, and
by extension the process of ideological framing which is no
longer taken for granted" (Hartley xiii).

If language

poetry moves in the service of the pre-determined end of
ideology critique, as so many critics assert, doesn't it
then participate in a rationalist project which leaves it
squarely within an enlightenment bourgeois ideology of truth
as unconcealment?

How can the project of "laying bare" the

truth behind the ideology escape the very ideological fetish
which it seems that language poetry would displace:

a

naiveties in that approach. This writing was all produced
before any of us had discovered Baudrillard's seminal work
The Mirror of Production .... In light of the Baudrillardian
'proof' that use value is but a concealed species of
exchange value, I would say now that the gestural 'offer' to
a reader of an invitation to 'semantically produce' hints at
an ideological contamination" (in Bartlett, 747n).
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referential fetish which ignores the surface in favor of the
revelation, which ignores the parataxis of material
signifiers in favor of the hypotactic truth of the signified
which
lies behind them.
,

Indeed, language poetry's

"political" import seems to lie precisely in its refusal of
a such a commodifiable "project"; as language poet P. Inman
writes "Writing is inescapably political.

It doesn't

illustrate the bleakness of late capitalism.
outside itself.

It can't get

It is, rather, amidst itself, made out of

the social world around it" (224).
This gap between the surface of language writing and
its reception or thematization by certain literary critics
seems yet another indication of the drive toward
determination in the discipline of literary criticism, which
must cut this estranging discourse down to fit a
recognizable literary category; when language poetry becomes
thematized as an engaged avant garde, its politics and its
styles become recognizable.

Critics who laud or disparage

language poetry's politics for the most part eschew the fact
that, in Michael Greer's words, language poetry's
"'political' claims rest not so much on the expression of a
'position' or an agenda as they do on an effort to change
the way we attend to texts, 'poetic' and otherwise" (335).
Language poetry, in other words, has no traditionally
recognizable political ''agenda" over and above its
engagement with thinking, with texts.

(This, however, is no
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small field--as language poets on the whole recognize no
essential barrier between the text and the world; as Inman
writes, the poem is "made out of the societal world around
it.")

In fact, as Greer argues, literary criticism's

disciplinary drive to circumscribe language poetry and to
assign it a task ultimately diffuses the disruptiveness of
the writing, diffuses the potential radicality of its
rethinking the terms of the poetic and the political; he
writes, "the rethinking of subjectivity and authorship [in
language poetry] is ultimately overshadowed by a competing
impulse [in literary criticism] to situate 'language
poetry,' to name and define its 'place' in contemporary
poetry" (336).

He goes on concerning McGann, Bartlett, and

Perloff:
all these critics share an impulse to characterize
language poetry as the repressed 'other' of a dominant
'workshop' poetic, theoretically sophisticated where it
is naive, philosophically skeptical where it is
idealistic, and politically oppositional where it is
accommodating .... Language poetry is, in effect,
marginalized as part of an avant-garde 'alternative'
which functions merely as an 'ongoing corrective' to an
equally reified 'dominant' poetic.

It loses any

political or aesthetic significance it may have had in
its own right as this binary historical map is drawn,
and it becomes merely a way of provoking or irritating
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some fictional 'mainstream.' (337, 340).
Greer argues that McGann, Bartlett, and Perloff deradical ize the disruptions created by language poetry when
they name it as simply the opposite of the mainstream
workshop poetics--as "an avant-garde 'alternative' which
functions merely as an 'ongoing corrective' to an equally
reified 'dominant' poetic."

By locating language poetry as

the center's opposite and opponent, a determining "binary
map" is drawn and the fragmented text of language poetry
suddenly becomes easily readable--the location of the work
and the intention behind it having been ascertained.
Literary critics likewise domesticate language poetry,
I would argue, when they make claims for language poetry's
status as ideology critique; when language poetry is
thematized as performing ideology critique, this
determination ends up collapsing it into a familiar role--an
engaged avant-garde literature--which allows its potential
disruptions to become revelatory in a traditional or
recognizable way.

It seems that this is especially true for

Jameson's and Hartley's reading of an engaged postmodernism:
when Hartley argues that language poetry can actually assist
in Jameson's project of cognitive mapping, he goes a long
way toward domesticating language poetry as precisely the
kind of anti-postmodern postmodernism that Jameson calls for
throughout his essay--an art which involves "reconquest of
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sense of place" (89). 19

In short, readings which prescribe

such literary critical work for language poetry seem not to
account for the disciplinary politics of positing
recognizable labels such as "engaged avant-garde" or
"ideology critique" for language poetry.

Literary criticism

reduces the complexity of reading language poetry into an
accessible and commodifiable code or intention just as
workshop poetry reduces the complexity of poetic experience
to the consumability of an epiphany.

As Bernstein writes

about the recognizable codes and epiphanies of workshop
poetics,
Experience dutifully translated into these 'most
accessible' codes loses its aura and is reduced to the
digestible contents which these rules alone can
generate.

There is nothing difficult in the products

of such activity because there is no distance to be
travelled, no gap to be aware of and to bridge from
reader to text:

What purports to be an experience is

transformed into the blank stare of the commodity--

19 Again,

see Adorne's Aesthetic Theory, where, contra
Jameson, he calls for an authentic artistic "mode of
experience that is able to overcome the tendency to resort
to false immediacy. Immediacy is gone forever" (31~). More
recently, however, Jameson's work has been becoming a bit
more sympathetic to ''fragmentary" postmodernism; in the
recent "Postmodern Architecture," for example, he speaks
approvingly of the necessity for "a new kind of sentence, a
new kind of syntax, radically new words, beyond our own
grammar" and likewise seems more sympathetic to a radical
materiality, lauding architect Frank Gehry's "attempt to
think a material thought" (147).
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there only to mirror our projections with an unseemly
rapidity possible only because no experience of other
is in it.

(Content's Dream 59)

In its identification of language poetry as ideology
critique, the question of literary criticism's determining
disciplinary role again goes unasked.

When language

poetry's intention is thematized as the dialectical other of
academic workshop poetry's bourgeois poetics, the
unthematizable experience of "other" in reading it is
hypostatized, is negated and sublated:

the dissembling

experience of "other" in language writing is smoothed out of
the work as it is given a determining intention and a job to
do, as its heterogeneous surface "is transformed into the
blank stare of the commodity.·
However, it is important to note that when language
poetry is thematized as the dialectical other of academic
workshop poetry, something of a semantic confusion is
involved:

"academic poetry" is itself vehemently opposed to

the academy; it sees itself as the protector of the values
of the individual against the increasing
institutionalization of modern life.

It values the

"naturalist" qualities that are summed up in a speech-based,
subjectivist poetics:

the priority of the human voice, the

priority of non-linguistic experience over abstract thought,
the priority of individual freedom over institutional
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constraints. 20

This being the case, however, this

tradition is left in something of a compromising position-trapped within a university structure it would want to
question, while quite literally compromised by its position
within that structure.

The obverse of "insider" dilemma, of

course, is to remain ''outside" the academic poetic
establishment, but this likewise seems compromising, insofar
as it effectively cedes authority to the status quo.

The

canons of poetry and the manner in which poetry is taught,
read, and disseminated to the general public would remain
untouched in following this "outsider" strategy; political
purity would be purchased at the cost of impotence.
Weinberger, for example, defends his poetics against
language poets and literary critics--both of whom, remember,
he chastises for being too theoretical; 21 he writes,
"Unlike critics and 'language' poets, I have no agenda and
am opposed to all canon-formation" (184).

Unlike critics

and language poets, Weinberger here seems quite naive in his
belief in a disinterested place of objectivity, an outside
where he can be unproblematically opposed to and untouched
by the politics of an "agenda" or a "canon."

Indeed, it is

2°For a good--if polemical--summary and critique of

workshop poetics from outside the language movement, see
Dooley's "The Contemporary Workshop Aesthetic."
21This is,

I hasten to add, not to suggest that _
Weinberger is a friend of an apolitical, workshop aesthetic;
however, he does see poetry as a defender of the ideals of
individualism.
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precisely through their common engagement with theoretical
discourse that "critics and 'language poets''' would both
become suspicious of the agenda embedded in Weinberger's
claim, "I have no agenda."

Likewise, as Silliman notes in

one of the epigraphs to this chapter, it is precisely "its
long-term engagement with social, aesthetic, and linguistic
theory [that] provides language poetry with both a
vocabulary and potential mechanisms for posing the
institutional question that, for example, the antitheoretical college workshop tradition lacks."
That "institutional question," as I have emphasized
throughout this study, is necessarily a double one:

if a

pure "outside" space must be found in order to pose a
relevant question, it will not soon be formulated because
this kind of outsider distance has disappeared in a
postmodern epoch; the "purity" of the outside shows itself
as an illusion.

It seems, then, that the great

institutional lesson learned by marginal groups over the
past 25 years has been the necessity of mediating
institutions--that, despite the potential problem of cooptation, the presence of traditionally oppressed or
excluded groups within society's institutions is absolutely
necessary, as is a simultaneous and ongoing engagement with
problem of institutionality.

There must be, as I argue

concerning Derrida's and Foucault's thinking, a double move:
first, there is the necessary and indispensable critical
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move which intervenes and overturns a historical repression
or

exclusion--whi~h

promotes access by the excluded to

traditionally insular societal and political institutions;
but there must likewise be a second move--an ongoing
reevaluation of the field itself--if this critical move is
to avoid re-visiting the very exclusion it seeks to redress.
As Silliman argues in "Canons and Institutions," each
important social movement of the twentieth century
gravitates towards institutions to sustain its victories, or
it dies--the pro-choice movement, for example, would likely
die if there were no women serving as legislators and
lobbyists; feminism would exist in name only if there were
not concomitant institutional gains by women in politics and
public life.

As Silliman writes, "The history of movements

like these is virtually unanimous on the point that all tend
to gravitate over time toward mediating institutions,
regardless of what their original stance toward them may
have been, or else they suffer defeats and dissolve
outright" (162).

Generally speaking, institutions are at

the forefront of visiting repression on marginal groups,
which, of course, makes these groups wary of becoming
institutionally involved.

However, the reification of this

inside/outside distinction depends on a kind of atheoretical
one-way logic, wherein institutions are simply and
repressively "bad" and outsider status is liberating and
"good."

As Silliman writes, this one-way logic of
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institutional avoidance can no longer hold:
I have suggested throughout this talk that a feature of
mediating institutions is in the fact that they are
inescapable.

All forms of organization that attempt to

bypass, deny or avoid them are, I believe, social forms
of psychological denial built out of an inner need to
reject internal conflict and complexity. (162)
For Silliman, the question of marginal groups and
institutions cannot be sufficiently posed within an "attempt
to bypass, deny, or avoid" institutions, but rather must be
posed within a network of "internal conflict and
complexity," within a theoretical framework that refuses to
think institutions such as the academy in simple good/bad
terms.

As he writes, "Rather than being reducible to any

reified identity, for example that of 'the enemy,' the
academy is a ground, a field for contestation" (165).
This, it seems to me, summarizes the institutional
resonances of many of the theoretical arguments I have been
tracing throughout this work:

the theoretical position that

there is no pure uncontaminated space, liberation, or
outside--in short, that there is no extra-text--has gone a
long way toward theorizing the institutionalization of
interpretation, theory, poetry, and intellectual inquiry in
this postmodern era.

If they have anything in common, the

theoretical and literary works I discuss here engage and
engender a withdrawing, postmodern conception of ground.
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The unavoidable impurity of intention and meaning allows one
to account for misreading or multiple readings as something
other than error or plurality, as something engendered by
the linguistic ground of thinking itself.

As heterogeneous

as this work is, all of it in some way or another posits or
attempts to think an other-than-negative way to account for
error, to account for our necessary status inside a
domineering discourse as other than simple contamination or
co-optation--in short, to account for life in a postmodern
epoch.
Insofar as it confronts head on the impossibility of
traditional or metaphysical notions of the theory/praxis
distinction, this absence of an outside, rather than
paralyzing praxis, makes praxis possible in a different way
--as Bernstein writes, it allows one to "resume [activity]
in a different way, from a different direction" ("Optimism''
833).

How does, for example, a revolutionary explain that

in seizing power, his or her movement often replicates the
atrocities that made the old order untenable?

For that

matter, how does an intellectual movement--say,
deconstruction--account for the reinscription of orthodoxy
performed in its name?

Generally speaking, this accounting

is done in one of two ways:

some conciliation to

''pragmatic" concerns, a chilling subgenre of the Nuremberg
defense--and a line of reasoning that one sees quite a bit
in literary criticism these days; or, conversely, a
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protestation that the truth of the movement had been
hijacked, slandered, misread, manipulated--when, in fact,
there is nothing we could any longer recognize as purity in
the first place.
All of this is not to say that Democrats and
Republicans, Derrida and de Man, the Klan and the NAACP are
collapsed into a mishmash of the same; rather, as Bernstein
suggests above, seeing that nothing is pure, there is no
outside allows you to start again, in a different direction,
with your eyes wide open to differences, able to account for
difference in its own right, as other than a negative--other
than as a falling away from the possibility of sameness.
The only way postmodern ''essence" can actually be hijacked
or slandered is through attempts to reconstitute a
philosophically proper essence, an essence which engenders
positive, inexorable circumstances and leaves the question
of truth and the field where truth comes about undisrupted.
The "essence" of the postmodern is in its impropriety--in
its withdrawal of the proper, and its acknowledgement of the
ground of thinking and acting in the other of the proper.
As Derrida writes, "the proper of a culture is to not be
identical to itself--to have to say "me" or "us" in the
difference with itself" (''L'autre cap" 11). 22

In the end,

as language poet Peter Seaton writes,
22r must thank Michael Naas for his translation of this
passage. Also, the final quotation from Peter Seaton is
found in Bernstein, Artifice (44).
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("we keep coming
back and coming back
to the vision of displacement at the site of
enactment, procurement,
debasement, transsubstantiation, fulmination,
culmination . . . )

CONCLUSION:
ENDS
[T]wo propositions seem to me to have continued validity:
that the strictly technical work of art has failed, and that
the opposing route of arresting technique arbitrarily leads
to indifferent results. While technique is the epitome of
the language of art, it also liquidates that language. This
is art's inescapable dilemma.
--Adorno
These few general remarks to begin with. What am I to do,
what shall I do, what should I do, in my situation, how
proceed? By aporia pure and simple? Or by affirmations and
negations invalidated as uttered, or sooner or later?
Generally speaking. There must be other shifts.
--Samuel Beckett
Even while remembering all we have said about ends,
here at the end of this work perhaps a question remains:
are we, despite everything, left here at the end with a
version of what we began to study?

Are we, after the end of

an end-oriented economy, left simply with another--more
pernicious--impasse?

In the epigraph above, Adorno outlines

this sort of impasse, the impasse of a language whose endoriented economy of meaning as "technique" "has failed," but
a language which likewise needs this economy in order that
it not lead merely to "indifferent results."

For Adorno,

these "indifferent results" are brought about whenever one
tries to pose a question to an end-oriented economy of
techinque by which a work of art tries to communicate a
determinate message; "indifferent results" are, then; the
251
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inexorable upshot of taking "the opposing route of arresting
technique arbitrarily," of attempting to question the
functioning of meaning.

According to Adorno, because of the

postmodern disruption or alteration of an end-oriented
economy of meaning, the language of art--indeed, discourse
in general--cannot hope to lead to anything other than these
indifferent results.

Because art is left with nothing other

than this failed language, it too must fail; as he writes,
"while technique is the epitome of the language of art, it
also liquidates that language."

For Adorno, this double

bind is "art's inescapable dilemma."
This dilemma could, of course, also be posed within the
question of the theoretical or societal ends of discourse in
general--that is, if Adorno does not pose it in these terms
already.

Insofar as determinable ends in a postmodern

economy seem both necessary and impossible, the dilemma of
ends is the dilemma of the language of art; in fact, these
dilemmas are tied together by the question of language, by
the inescapability of language, the necessary mediating role
that language plays in society's discourses--a role which,
in a frustrating turn, makes determinate ends both possible
and impossible.

Language holds out the promise of an end,

while simultaneously sweeping the ends of determinate
meaning away, and this would seem to leave us squarely
within another impasse, as deep if not deeper than the
institutional impasse with which we started.
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However, throughout this work I have tried to
articulate an other economy of meaning, one which does not
depend on traditional notions of opposition, possibility,
ends or language--and hence an economy of meaning which is
not simply stifled by the closure or radical alteration of
these philosophical problematics.

Note that I do not write,

as Adorno does, about the "failure" of philosophy, language,
or thinking; as I argue concerning de Man, to talk in terms
of failure is to grant the validity of a philosophical
economy of ends.

To talk of failure (or, for that matter,

to talk of pluralism) is to remain always within reach of
the end, always having to account for the non-existence of
an end as the lack of an end (or the multiplicity of many
ends)--in short, always having to account for difference in
terms of the ultimate possibility of sameness.

It has been

my contention here that there is a thinking which, while not
wholly or simply outside or beyond the problematics of this
discourse, remains other to the discourse of opposition,
lack, or plurality--other to Adorno's choice between a
feeble discontinuity and an iron-fisted control.
Adorno's impasse is located at the impossible choice
between two untenable opposites:

the uncertain "route of

arresting technique arbitrarily" and the stifling or
oppressive "strictly technical work of art."

Perhaps

Beckett's epigraph, though, offers us an other way to think
this opposition.

It begins by likewise taking up Adorno's

254

problematic--speaking of two impossible ways to proceed:
merely discontinuously ("by aporia pure and simple") or
simply within the language of dialectical philosophy (by
"affirmations and negations invalidated as uttered, or
sooner or later").

However, perhaps I have, throughout my

text, been trying to approach a reading of the final words
of Beckett's epigraph here, specifically the sentence that
comes after the impossible (non)choice or opposition we seem
to be left with--after the recognition of an impossible
postmodern decision between a seemingly non-sensical
progression and a wholly untenable and manipulative fall
back into tradition.

In the end, I have perhaps argued

nothing other than this:

at the time or space we call the

postmodern, "There must be other shifts."
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